



Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-189
Friday
28 September 1990

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28 September 1990

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U.S. Commentators Cited on Arms Talks

'Key Problems' Hinder Accord

PM2709153590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Hopes and Difficulties. Soviet and U.S. Representatives Continue Discussing Disputed Problems of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty"]

[Text] New York—An article by commentators R. Evans and R. Novak appeared Wednesday in dozens of U.S. newspapers, including the capital's WASHINGTON POST. It made a highly pessimistic assessment of the prospects for a rapid conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive arms. The commentators maintain that the timetable set for signing the treaty will not be observed, because there is little chance of settling several key problems which are hindering the document's final elaboration.

The strategic offensive arms treaty was precisely one of the topics which Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker discussed at their Wednesday meeting in New York. According to reports from sources, both the Soviet and the U.S. delegations paint roughly the same picture of the state of affairs at the strategic arms talks.

Many fundamental problems have been resolved. But quite a lot of difficulties remain, as can be judged from the fact that something in the order of 10-15 percent of the text of the treaty and the closely related documents, to use the term employed by the talks participants, is still "enclosed within parentheses," i.e. it has not been specified or agreed on. The text itself runs to over 500 pages.

According to some assessments, something in the order of 60 different questions, chiefly of a technical nature, are still to be resolved. Such as, for example: How are missiles to be marked to facilitate their subsequent monitoring? Soviet missiles are housed in containers, which is a feature of their design. U.S. missiles are not. The U.S. delegation proposes marking the "body" of the missiles, while we propose marking the containers.

But a total of 12 different kinds of inspection, including so-called inspections on suspicion, will be covered in the treaty. Other technical problems—also as yet unresolved—include problems of telemetry and problems of locating the signals "emitted" by a missile during tests.

There are complexities of a different level. They are political or military-political. They relate, in particular, to how many of the aircraft which the West calls "Backfire" the Soviet Union will be permitted to have. Until recently we insisted on 600, the Americans on 450. As far as I understand it, the Soviet minister gave a new figure at his Wednesday meeting with J. Baker of 550. The Americans are now thinking about it.

There is still the problem of preventing the treaty from being violated by roundabout means—for example, by

supplying prohibited arms to Third World countries. In THE WASHINGTON POST, article commentators Evans and Novak write that, by referring to "noncircumvention," the Soviet Union would like to prevent the United States from fulfilling the long-promised delivery of Trident-2 missiles to Britain. This is not so. According to information which I have received, the problem is not the Trident-2's but the prevention of any future deliveries over and above the Tridents. The sides are now engaged in seeking acceptable wordings for a future ban.

Contacts are being maintained not only and not so much at the level of ministers but, above all, at the level of experts. For example, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov has just met with Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew in Washington—and will meet him again in New York. It is quite feasible that by the end of this series of meetings Moscow and Washington will be able to announce progress in preparing the strategic offensive arms treaty. It is also quite possible that the treaty will be ready precisely by the time which the Soviet and U.S. leaders were talking about earlier—by the new year.

Tremendous work has already been done. And it will be distressing and unforgivable if, for any reason at all, it is canceled out.

Difficulties at Geneva Reviewed

LD2709203990 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Reports appeared in the U.S. press that new difficulties arose at the Geneva talks on strategic offensive arms. Observers of THE WASHINGTON POST Rowland Evans and Robert Novak assert that the chances to settle differences before the end of this year are now lower than ever.

Three problems that remain unresolved are mentioned.

The U.S. side insists on its right to transfer strategic arms to allies, specifically, "Trident-2" sea-launched missiles. The U.S. side reasons that the United States has already signed an agreement with Britain about equipping the British Navy with contemporary missile systems. The Soviet Union insists that such transfers be banned.

The U.S. stance on the right of transfer of strategic arms to allies is, perhaps, the West's most sincere stake at unilateral military advantages, made at the talks. This would mean that instead of destroying weapons systems under the treaty, the United States would hand them over to its allies, disrupting East-West balance of forces. Besides that, the adoption of the U.S. proposal would lessen the overall scopes of arms elimination.

There are differences as to whether the Soviet bomber Tu-22M, described in the west as "Backfire," should be classed with strategic or with non-strategic arms. There are differences in assessing the plane's range.

Americans insist that this is a strategic plane, that it is capable to take off from the Soviet territory, reach the continental part of the United States and return to the airfield from which it took off.

The Soviet side denies that Tu-22M has such potentialities. It is said that striving to settle the dispute, the Soviet negotiator once suggested that chief U.S. negotiator General Rowny make a flight on board the plane from any airfield in the USSR to Washington and back. The American general politely declined the proposal.

The third problem, regarding SS-18 missiles, cropped up at the talks unexpected for many observers. Just a few months back, high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Department of State publicly declared that limitations on the number and the mode of basing of these missiles coordinated back in 1987 suit the purposes of the U.S. arms control policy. Indeed, all concerns of the U.S. side regarding SS-18 missiles have been removed.

Many U.S. specialists even said that the question of SS-18 missiles was removed.

Now the U.S. side insists on new restrictions on these Soviet missiles. Specialists believe that these restrictions will lead to "natural death" of the remaining part of these systems within a relatively short period of time.

The problem of SS-18 missiles has become the stumbling block at the negotiations. Who is to blame? Some American diplomats say that the impasse was created by Soviet generals who have no wish to part from these missiles.

This is a deliberate distortion of facts. Washington is apparently striving to disrupt the arrangements on SS-18 missiles agreed upon in 1987 and to achieve unilateral military advantages. This explains the deadlock at the Geneva negotiations.

To propose the revision of the almost completed agreement means to drag out the negotiations and to jeopardize the signing of the agreement on strategic arms within a certain timeframe agreed upon by the sides—by the end of 1990.

Soviets Seek Higher Share Under CSCE Ceilings

*PM2709141390 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 21 Sep 90 p 10*

[Report by Bjarne Stenquist: "Soviet Demands Upset Talks"]

[Text] Vienna—The Soviet Union is demanding that it be allowed to have 80 percent of the most important weapons within the Warsaw Pact. The demand is slowing down agreement on a European disarmament treaty. Now the smaller countries within the collapsing defense alliance are protesting at the Soviet Union's behavior.

As far as tanks are concerned the Soviet demands mean in principle that the country would have 16,000 of the total of 20,000 tanks which NATO and the Warsaw Pact would each have under the terms of a disarmament treaty. The other five members of the Warsaw Pact would have to share the remaining 4,000. The Soviet Union is demanding a similar share of troop transporters, artillery pieces, aircraft, and helicopters.

The distribution among the Warsaw Pact was discussed at a meeting in Bratislava last weekend but without any solution to the problem being found. A new attempt will be made in Prague 22-23 September.

"This shows that the Soviet Union has still not made up its mind about whether it should follow a new line of cooperation in Europe or the old one of military dominance," said Istvan Gyarmati, Hungary's unprecedentedly young new ambassador to the negotiations.

"For us it also proves that the Warsaw Pact is completely unusable for political cooperation and the coordination of disarmament negotiations. The pact is under a death sentence, and we will not remain members for much longer," Gyarmati stressed.

The disarmament negotiations in Vienna are now under pressure to reach a conclusion before the CSCE summit in Paris 19 November.

The disagreements among the former Warsaw Pact allies are a result of the fact that the revolutions in Eastern Europe have rapidly overtaken the negotiators in Vienna. When they began their work in the spring of 1989 Europe was still divided into two blocs.

The negotiations are built on the notion that the two blocs will be allowed to retain similar quantities of the most important categories of arms: 20,000 tanks, 30,000 troop transporters, 18,000 artillery pieces (NATO's proposal), 1,900 helicopters, and approximately 7,000 combat aircraft. Everything over these levels will be scrapped.

Then it is up to each alliance to distribute this materiel between its various member nations. However, to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming too powerful no single country may take more than 60 percent of an alliance's quota. Previously the Soviet Union agreed to this in principle.

"The situation has now changed. Our former allies have called for an end to the military cooperation in the Warsaw Pact while NATO remains the same in all essentials. The Soviet Union must now see to its security interests alone," a Soviet diplomat told DAGENS NYHETER.

"Those who think that 80 percent is too much forget that the Soviet Union is a big country. We have a surface area to defend that is twice as big as the all the other countries involved in the negotiations put together," he added.

But the situation is not completely deadlocked. The Soviet approach also contains a political demarche that the Soviet Union wants greater concrete changes in NATO.

"The London declaration from NATO on cooperation with the Soviet Union and on studies for a new military doctrine is very important, but we would like to see more concrete decisions, for example on short-range nuclear arms. We hope they understand our message," DAGENS NYHETER's Soviet source said.

Privately the Soviet Union has declared that it could be content with 14,000 tanks (70 percent) if it is allowed instead to have a higher proportion of artillery pieces and aircraft. Hungary has proposed that the Soviet Union should have an average allocation of 66 percent.

The Soviet stance here is also influenced by the fact that the whole situation in central Europe has changed since the negotiations began.

The two sides have long been agreed that in the central disarmament region (Benelux, West and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) each alliance should have 8,000 tanks.

But with East Germany's unification with West Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the rest of Eastern Europe, there will be no Soviet tanks stationed in the area in a few years' time. Fewer than 4,000 tanks belonging to Poland and Czechoslovakia will remain, against the West's 8,000.

"The negotiating mandate speaks of far-reaching reductions to equal levels. This is something different," a Soviet diplomat said.

NATO's response is that it is not NATO's fault if no country wants to have Soviet troops on its territory any longer.

Lushev Addresses Departing GDR Officers

*PM2609142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Sep 90 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] A meeting marking the departure for home of generals and other officers of the GDR National People's Army has been held at the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces Staff in Moscow. They have terminated their service in the Joint Armed Forces' military organs in connection with the upcoming unification of Germany.

The Joint Armed Forces have existed on European soil as a guarantee of peace and security for 35 years, Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, told the assembly. He spoke highly of the contribution made by the GDR National People's Army to strengthening the defense capability of the allied countries and developing friendship and cooperation among fraternal armies.

Kiev Hosts Pact Air Defense Command Meeting

*LD2709174190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1607 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Text] Kiev, 27 September (UKRINFORM-TASS)—A meeting of the command personnel [rukovodyashchiy sostav] of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact member states ended here today. The meeting considered the role and place of air defense in the conditions of the socio-political and economic transformations taking place in the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, and throughout the world.

The participants attended a display lesson at the Air Marshall A.I. Pokryshkin Higher Engineering Radio-technical Air Defense School, Kiev, and visited the Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy Air Defense Military Academy for Infantry Forces, where they inspected the organization of the training process.

Army General I.M. Tretyak, commander in chief of air defense forces and deputy defense minister of the USSR, attended the meeting.

Commentary Assesses Pact Disarmament Meeting

*LD2409165790 Moscow World Service in English
1410 GMT 24 Sep 90*

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] A session of the special commission of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of disarmament was held in Prague on 22 and 23 September. The countries' deputy foreign ministers and chiefs of staff took part in it.

The main question discussed was what must be the permissible level of the various types of weapons and technology the armies of the Warsaw Treaty are to be equipped with. Judging by reports, solving this problem is not that easy. This was recognized after the statement of Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Mr. Robert Harencar [title as heard]. He noted that the Warsaw Treaty organization had undergone changes in recent times and now the countries act in accordance with their sovereignty. According to the Czechoslovak press agency they succeeded in getting close to the same position on the number of planes and helicopters which must remain in the seven member countries of the Warsaw Treaty after the signing of the Vienna agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

However, at this meeting and the one held two weeks ago in Bratislava they were not able to reach agreement on the number of tanks, armored troop carriers, and artillery guns. The Soviet Union is insisting on retaining 40 percent of the tanks and artillery. Other Warsaw Treaty countries feel there should not be more than 25 percent of each type of weapon. So far, there is no unanimity on the question about the principle of sufficient forces and arms. The latest session of the Warsaw Treaty organization shows differences remain and these cannot but have an adverse effect on the Vienna talks between the NATO Warsaw Treaty countries on conventional arms in Europe, the more so since the time and place of the meeting has been set: 19 November in Paris. As the head of the U.S. delegation at these talks, Mr. James Woolsey, noted, the meeting may not take place.

Concern is being expressed in the Soviet Union over the absence of progress being made on the question of conventional forces. The Soviet parliamentary newspaper, IZVESTIYA, for example, feels that, judging by some of the speeches of a few of the Soviet military personnel, they are aiming at a purely military means of ensuring security and not by political means. Is this not in contradiction of our idea about a common European home?

Shevardnadze Continues UN-Related Work in U.S.

Discusses Troops With Genscher

PM2709113990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Meetings in New York"]

[Text] New York, 25 Sep—The "diplomatic day" began Monday [24 September] with a meeting between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher.

Greeting the Soviet minister, H.-D. Genscher expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet leadership for the contribution it made to the recent successful resolution of the external aspects of building German unity. "But that is not the 'end' of our relations," Genscher pointed out. "They will, on the contrary, develop further."

In response to journalists' questions following his conversation with Genscher, Shevardnadze described it as "extremely good, fruitful, and very necessary." There was further discussion of bilateral relations with Germany, which are "really entering a new phase." These relations have tremendous potential, the minister stressed. The development of our bilateral cooperation fully accords with the interests of the peoples of Europe and the world as a whole.

Both ministers particularly stressed during their conversation with journalists that Soviet-German relations have today reached an unprecedented level of interaction and trust. Genscher invited Shevardnadze to visit the united Germany. It is, in particular, a question of the ministers' visiting one or two Soviet garrisons which are remaining there for the time being. "It is very important," Genscher noted, "for the Soviet soldiers to leave Germany as real friends of the Germans."

The ministers conducted a detailed examination of the progress made in the preparations for the Paris CSCE summit, stressing the importance of signing there a treaty on cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe. Other important political documents could also be adopted at the meeting in Paris and further steps outlined in the sphere of disarmament on the continent.

A great deal of time was devoted to discussion of the Persian Gulf situation, and the strict need to fulfill the relevant UN Security Council resolutions was emphasized.

Meets With Baker Second Time

LD2709191490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1850 GMT 27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Kochetkov, Yevgeniy Menkes, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] United Nations, 27 Sep (TASS)—The second meeting in recent days began here today between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Before the conversation started, journalists were particularly interested in what issues would be discussed during this unscheduled meeting between the ministers and whether, in their opinion, the agreement on cutting conventional weapons in Europe would be signed in October as earlier intended.

In the words of the ministers, it is to this very issue that today's meeting will be devoted.

Confers With Albania's Alia

LD2709220990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2133 GMT 27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Kochetkov, Yevgeniy Menkes, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] The UN, 28 Sep [date as received] (TASS)—The first meeting in 30 years between a member of the Soviet leadership, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and an Albanian leader, Ramiz Alia, Albania's People's Assembly Presidium Chairman, has taken place in New York. It lasted about one hour.

During the frank and friendly conversation that took place the sides emphasized their mutual desire to give new impetus to the development of cooperation between the USSR and Albania in the sphere of politics, economics, and culture. They gave mutual positive assessments of the development of the situation on the European Continent and in the world as a whole. The Soviet side welcomed Albania's desire to join in the all-European process.

The sides achieved an understanding about the desirability of an exchange in the near future of visits by the foreign ministers of the two countries.

Statement Issued With EC on Mideast Conflicts

'Full Text' Released

PM2709150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Joint Statement of USSR and EC Member Countries"]

[Text] United Nations, 27 Sep—Here follows the full text of the joint statement adopted at a meeting between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and the EC foreign ministers:

Joint Statement of the USSR and the EC Member Countries The Soviet Union and the EC members have decided to issue the following statement in view of the concern over the fact that unresolved conflict situations in the Near East and Persian Gulf are posing a threat to international peace and security, engendering new crises, fueling an arms race in the region, and leading to an escalation of violence and extremism.

1. The crisis in the Persian Gulf must be settled urgently. Iraq's invasion and military occupation of Kuwait, a sovereign and independent state, have been condemned by the entire international community. These actions cannot be tolerated because they are a violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law and create a dangerous new center of tension in the region.

Proceeding from the principles of the impermissibility of the use of force to resolve disputes between states and respect for the right of each state to safeguard its national independence and territorial integrity, the USSR and the EC countries demand that Iraq strictly fulfill the UN Security Council resolutions and remove its forces from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally.

They express satisfaction at the high degree of consensus among all members of the UN Security Council and the international community as a whole, regarding the need to end the invasion as quickly as possible and to restore the international rule of law.

They believe that this consensus must be preserved for the sake of achieving a political settlement of the crisis, a condition of which is the full observance of the embargo imposed by UN decisions. The Soviet Union and the EC members are fully resolved to continue observing the sanctions prescribed by the Security Council and urge all other states to do likewise. They are also ready to examine additional steps in accordance with the UN Charter. Time is not on the aggressor's side. It merely intensifies the international community's determination to repulse aggression and fully restore Kuwait's sovereignty.

The Soviet Union and the EC members call on the Iraqi authorities to immediately enable all foreign citizens in Kuwait and Iraq to leave if they so wish. They hold the Iraqi Government responsible for their safety.

2. The Soviet Union and the EC countries are also firmly intent on increasing their efforts aimed at settling other conflicts in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, and the situation in Lebanon. The USSR and the EC members stress their commitment to achieving a just, all-embracing, and lasting peace in the region in keeping with the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions.

Seeking to promote security and prosperity in this region, the USSR and the EC members confirm their readiness to cooperate with the region's countries in creating an all-embracing structure and system of norms there capable of ensuring peace, tolerance, stability, and

economic cooperation and development. They will consult among themselves in the interests of achieving these goals.

The Soviet Union and the EC members consider that, in parallel to and in conjunction with the peace efforts in the Near East, practical steps should be taken to create an atmosphere of trust for resolving the problems of the whole region, curbing the arms race, and preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons both by adhering to the corresponding international agreements and by elaborating specific regional measures.

TASS Assesses Statement

LD2709191190 Moscow TASS in English 1848 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS political news analyst Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—A USSR-EC joint statement, adopted in New York during the meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and his counterparts from the European Community member states, could become quite a noteworthy event if only due to the very fact of its emergence: It was not so frequently in the past that the Soviet Union and the European Community so unequivocally declared a similarity of their positions or identity of goals and unity of action.

However, in the current international situation which has been strained to the utmost by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, this joint statement acquires special importance.

The statement leaves no doubt about the determination of the international community and its most widely representative institution—the United Nations Organization—to achieve the speediest settlement of the Gulf crisis, to put an end to the invasion, and to fully restore Kuwait's sovereignty.

If anyone did entertain illusions about possibilities for a political manoeuvre by Iraq, should it find a loophole in the positions of the European countries, this time it appears such illusions should be discarded altogether.

This is the more noteworthy as the known dissimilarity of interests of various states of the continent is indisputable. However, it did not prevent them not only from jointly condemning the aggressor's actions, not only supporting the sanctions applied against it, but also expressing readiness "to consider additional steps consistent with the U.N. charter" as the statement emphasizes.

It is noteworthy that, although the statement was adopted on behalf of Europe and in connection with a specific crisis, it is not limited to purely European interests and the problems covered by it are not limited to those brought about by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The statement includes a pledge to work together to help resolve other conflicts in the Middle East region, such as the Arab-Israeli one, the Palestinian problem, and the situation in Lebanon.

The statement also proclaims the readiness of the Soviet Union and EC member states to cooperate with the countries of the region "in establishing a comprehensive structure in the region and in drawing up to that end a set of rules capable of fostering peace, tolerance, stability, economic cooperation and development."

And finally, the statement can be regarded as yet another illustration and to the same time the outcome of the fact that Europe itself, overcoming decades of political and ideological split, is attaining a qualitatively new level of awareness of its role and responsibility.

Commentator Examines Shevardnadze-Wakil Talks

TA2709202290 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan
1500 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Commentary by Sergey Viktorov from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear Listeners: Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met in New York on Wednesday with the Republic of Afghanistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs 'Abdul Wakil. According to TASS, various aspects of the present situation in Afghanistan, as well as further steps toward normalizing the situation, were discussed in detail in the course of the ministers' talks. Moscow radio analyst Sergey Viktorov comments on this:

The meeting of the Soviet and Afghan foreign ministers to discuss the Afghan problem, during the current session of the UN General Assembly, is a significant event. It was obvious from the outset that international forums were primarily concerned with the Persian Gulf crisis, because Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the resultant international consequences constituted one of the most dangerous crises in recent times. Undoubtedly, this crisis threatens a large-scale war, with the participation of the world's great powers, particularly the United States.

Despite this, Shevardnadze and 'Abdul Wakil met to discuss a solution to the Afghan problem. In their opinion, the Persian Gulf situation should not delay a settlement of the Afghan problem. The Soviet and Afghan sides stressed that favorable conditions for settling the Afghan problem have now been created. Above all, this issue is related to the U.S.-Soviet dialogue that is developing on various matters, including a final solution of the Afghan problem. In the view of the two countries' foreign ministers, another favorable factor is the improvement in Soviet-Saudi relations. The most favorable world conditions, however, cannot replace the efforts inside Afghanistan for resolving the Afghan problem. During his meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, the Afghan foreign minister shed considerable light on the situation within the country. He said that

tension is easing somewhat in Afghanistan. Government forces are maintaining control of the situation and are foiling all efforts by the opposition to resolve the Afghan problem through military means. 'Abdul Wakil noted that at the same time the government is making large-scale preparations for general elections and a referendum.

These remarks by the Afghan foreign minister can be regarded as the government's effort to promote the national reconciliation policy inside the country. Of course, these days the entire world's attention is focused on the Persian Gulf, because it is there that the fate of peace in the region will be determined. However, the meeting between the Soviet and Afghan foreign ministers to resolve the Afghan problem has reminded international forums that this problem should not be forgotten. If this problem is not resolved, a dangerous hotbed of tension will remain in the Middle East.

Italy's De Michelis Notes Soviet, EC 'Unity'

LD2709182290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Report on remarks by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis following the 26 September meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and EC foreign ministers in New York; by special correspondent Andrey Ptashnikov]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] After the meeting in the Soviet mission, I was able to speak with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, chairman of the European Community. He said that for the first time a document has been signed which confirms the unity of views of the USSR and the Community on such a complicated question.

Such unity can only be welcome.

The Italian foreign minister noted that this is self-evident in the general aspiration to overcome the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and that tomorrow such unity can help solve other critical international problems, such as the Near East problem. [passage omitted]

Belorussian Premier Addresses UN on Chernobyl

LD2709073490 Moscow TASS in English 0701 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] United Nations September 27 TASS—Belorussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich who addressed the 45 U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday, described the scale of the Chernobyl disaster.

He called on the international community to help the republic recover from the aftermath of the tragedy. The Belorussian delegation proposed that the current General Assembly session adopt a special resolution reflecting the global nature of the Chernobyl disaster and

draft measures to overcome its local and global consequences under the auspices of U.N. specialised agencies.

Kebich stressed that the Belorussian Government and people would use the declaration on the republic's state sovereignty, which was adopted by the republican parliament in July, to overcome the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Later in the day, Kebich was received by U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. During the meeting, the sides discussed the expansion of international cooperation within the United Nations.

Yakovlev Discusses Powers at Paris Conference

LD2509094790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2109 GMT 24 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Igor Kuleshov]

[Text] Paris, 25 Sep (TASS)—The USSR Supreme Soviet's granting of additional powers to the USSR president is dictated by the situation developing in the country, when "it is necessary to act every day."

This was stated here on 24 September by USSR President Council member A.N. Yakovlev, speaking at a news conference with Soviet participants in the prestigious international public forum "Germany and Europe," to be held in the French capital 25 September.

Although the USSR guests—A.N. Yakovlev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.M. Falin, and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Editor-in-Chief Ye. V. Yakovlev will participate in the meeting from the Soviet side—arrived in Paris to discuss the European continent's future in light of German unification, many of the questions from the foreign journalists were devoted to the situation in the USSR, primarily discussions on the various draft economic reform currently under way. Significant interests was evoked by the decision adopted today by the USSR Supreme Soviet on granting additional powers to the USSR president.

Commenting on this step, A.N. Yakovlev noted that what is involved is economic reform powers, granted for a limited period—namely, the period of implementing a two-year program for switching to a market economy. In this period, a large number of enforceable enactments are to be issued relating to foreign investments, free enterprises, antimonopoly measures, a mechanism for conducting land reform, and many other issues. One ought to note here that these acts will not be final; the intention is that they will be subject to consideration in the Supreme Soviet or in the Congress of People's Deputies.

Replying to a question on the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decision on the impermissibility of granting additional powers to the USSR president, A.N. Yakovlev described this as "more of an emotional reaction than one which proceeds from the actual state of things."

It was in no way, he stressed a question of touching on the sovereignty of Union republics or of exerting any kind of influence on legislative bodies. Nevertheless, such a step by the Russian parliament, in the view of the USSR Presidential Council member, testifies to the fact that people in our country now "are very alert to any hints about the concentration of power in a few hands or in the hands of a group of individuals. The past dominates the consciousness of people and this kind of 'syndrome of the past' evokes an acute reaction to the word 'emergency.'"

Regarding demands for the union government's resignation heard today, in A.N. Yakovlev's view, to change the government now would be an act of suicide.

Among the questions devoted to international policy, most attention, naturally, was paid to the Persian Gulf crisis. The position of the USSR, said A.N. Yakovlev, is well known: We, together with other countries and practically the whole of the world community agree that the action of the Iraqi Government is impermissible aggression, an act which contradicts all the norms of international law and which should not only be condemned but also barred.

However, the question arises here: In which manner should it be barred? The Soviet Union firmly advocates the peaceful resolution of the conflict by political, economic, and diplomatic methods, any means other than war. We feel that a military solution will have catastrophic consequences for the world economy, but the main thing is that it will lead to the deaths of millions of people.

It is necessary to show restraint and patience: It is necessary to do everything to avoid a clash, to settle the conflict, and to bar aggression. Only the united front of the international community can help to achieve these aims.

During the meeting between the USSR and U.S. presidents in Helsinki, V.M. Falin recalled, it was acknowledged to be completely necessary in settling this conflict not to lose sight of either the medium-term or long-term perspective. It is necessary to resolve this conflict so that things calm down in the Near and Middle East and in the world as a whole, that stability grows, and that there are fewer weapons.

Significant time was devoted to the large changes now taking place on the European Continent. We are witnesses, V.M. Falin said, and participants in a qualitatively new chapter in European history. The Soviet Union wants—and it has proceeded from this position over the past months, actively assisting in the unification of Germany—to have good-neighborly relations of cooperation with this country. However, we do not intend to build out relations with this state at the expense of the interests of others or against anyone at all. We regard a united Germany as a partner in the all-European union.

France and the Soviet Union, the leaders of both countries are now seeking opportunities to express the preferential nature of Soviet-French relations at a new stage of historical development, said USSR Ambassador to France Yu.V. Dubinin, who participated in the conference. Hence, the objectively necessary idea of a new Soviet-French treaty was born. Work on the draft of such a treaty is underway. There is also a plan, not yet firmed up; that if such a treaty is elaborated, its signing may be a matter for the highest leaders of the Soviet Union and France.

On the same day, there was a meeting with Georges Marchais, general secretary of the French Communist Party [FCP], and Maxime Gremetz, member of the Politburo and secretary of the FCP Central Committee. This open discussion, V.M. Falin told a TASS correspondent, made it possible to "synchronize watches" in views, assessments, and positions on international affairs, in particular: events in the Persian Gulf; general trends in European development; matters relating to discussions about socialism and the international communist movement; and, the main thing, the prospects for the future.

At a meeting with Elysee Palace Secretary General J-L. Bianco, the Soviet representatives spoke in detail about the present political and economic situation in the USSR, in particular about plans for the transition to a market economy. Topical problems of the international situation and Soviet-French relations were also discussed.

Moves To Establish Mediterranean Detente Lauded

*LD2109164890 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT
21 Sep 90*

[By TASS news analyst Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow September 21 TASS—The idea to turn the Mediterranean into an area of stability and international cooperation has repeatedly been aired in south European countries and has quite a few supporters among representatives of various political forces.

A clearer outline of this project is now emerging, which is borne out by the specific initiative of Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordenez.

Ordenez sent a memorandum to European Community Chairman Gianni de Michelis and the foreign ministers of the other EC member-countries. The memorandum emphasises the successful development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and points to the need to spread the new European detente to the Mediterranean.

Ordenez called for elaborating an act of the Mediterranean Sea, in which the principles of cooperation would be formulated.

The leaders of France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are known to have proposed that a Conference on Security

and Cooperation in the Mediterranean be convened to discuss political, military, social and economic issues, security, environmental protection and also humanitarian problems. In short, its agenda should include the same items, which are the subject of discussion at the Europe-wide conference.

The intensification of efforts by Spain and other members of the four-nation group to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in keeping with the mandate of the Vienna CSCE forum is assuming a particular importance now that the explosive situation has formed in the Persian Gulf.

The meeting, which will open in the Spanish city of Palma de Mallorca on September 24, is expected to involve representatives of the CSCE countries as well as non-European Mediterranean states, which are also concerned over the escalation of the crisis in the neighbouring region.

Evidently, the very fact of holding such a conference in Palma de Mallorca reflects positive changes occurring both in Europe and in east-west relations as a whole. The Mediterranean countries will be able to utilize the vast experience gained during the Helsinki CSCE process to solve their problems.

Enhanced security in that region and the creation of conditions for political stability, specifically by vigorously developing economic cooperation between south European states and their Arab partners, is certain to have a salutary impact on the situation in Europe as a whole because security on this continent is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean.

NATO-Pact Consultation Takes Place in Vienna

*LD2609155790 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT
26 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna September 26 TASS—A regular session took place here today within the framework of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty organization and NATO member-states to work out a declaration on relations between the members of the two alliances.

Participants in the consultations set about specific editorial work which is being done on the basis of three drafts of the document, sponsored by the Soviet Union, NATO countries, and Hungary. A number of provisions of the future declaration were agreed upon.

Next session will be held on October 5.

Commentary Sees U.S., USSR Renewing UN

*LD2809005790 Moscow in English to North America
2200 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] What steps should be taken next in dealing with the Persian Gulf crisis, in case the measures employed to this day prove insufficient? Our analyst Vladislav Kozyakov provides this answer:

[Kozyakov] Iraq must unconditionally meet the two main demands to withdraw all troops from Kuwait and set all foreigners kept hostage free. These two points are stressed by practically all participants in the general debate at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

All the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council, including the one just approved on introducing an air embargo, demand the same. It would, of course, be better for Baghdad to heed the voice of reason and the call of the international community. It would be better for everyone, including the people of Iraq themselves.

In case all political means prove ineffective, other measures should be employed, since law, conscience, and the peoples' vital interests do not allow us to reconcile with the fact of seizure of one country by another. The member countries of the United Nations realize this all too well. The resolution on the air embargo, passed by the Security Council on 25 September, contains a clear warning to the Iraqi Government. Failure by Iraq to abide by the Security Council's resolutions could lead to the Council's further actions in keeping with the United Nations Charter, particularly Article 7—"actions fraught with potentially serious consequences."

As it was from the very beginning of the Iraqi aggression, at the given stage, too, the Soviet Union and the United States are acting in close cooperation. In their latest statements in New York, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the American secretary of state, James Baker, recalled that in keeping with the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Organization could resort to military measures, when and if all other efforts to force Iraq to leave Kuwait prove to be abortive.

As Eduard Shevardnadze said in New York on 25 September, the United Nations has the power to suppress acts of aggression. This right could be exercised if the illegal occupation of Kuwait continues.

Opportunities are available today for the United Nations to return to its sources and make effective the provisions of its charter, worked out with the aim of ensuring peace and security for future generations. For example, Chapter Seven of that charter, entitled "Actions With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" states that the Security Council could take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as could be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

All members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call, armed

forces assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. In accordance with this article, the Military Staff Committee was set up under the Security Council, consisting of the chiefs of staffs of the Council's permanent representatives.

What earlier could not be enacted in the United Nations mechanism, owing to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, today could be turned into an effective means of suppressing the aggression. The provisions of the United Nations Charter open broad opportunities for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, so that they could, along with other countries, work towards ensuring the triumph of international law and justice on our planet.

Parliamentarians Hold Meetings in Strasbourg

*LD2609223590 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT
26 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondent Igor Kuleshov]

[Text] Strasbourg September 26 TASS—Exceptional importance of forming new structures of security and cooperation in Europe in conditions of profound changes now taking place in Europe was noted during meetings of the head of the Soviet delegation with leaders of the Council of Europe. The head of the Soviet parliamentary delegation, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet I.D. Laptev met president of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe Andres Bjork and Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Catherine Lalumiere.

The delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet takes an active part in European debates on security and cooperation in Europe. All participating countries in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, except for the United States, are represented.

An exchange of opinions on the creation of a parliament of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a further intensification of the European process was held during the meeting with leaders of the Council of Europe.

The sides emphasised mutual readiness to upgrade bilateral relations on inter-parliamentary and governmental lines.

Leaders of the Council of Europe expressed the striving to involve the Soviet side more actively in the activity of the council and its organs.

GDR's Modrow Discusses German Unification

*90UF0564A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 23 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Report on interview with Hans Modrow by A. Kuranov; place and date not given: "There Is Always an Alternative"]

[Text] Berlin—A man of principle and honesty and a sensible politician, Hans Modrow invariably enjoys respect among the GDR populace. The majority here perceived it as fitting that it was H. Modrow who, as prime minister, headed the transformatory processes in the republic in November 1989. The "roundtable" formed with his active participation from the representatives of various parties, helped lead into a democratic channel, the previously chaotic movement of supporters of change and prepared the elections held on 18 March 1990.

Without "changing colors" for the sake of continuation of his political career under the new conditions, H. Modrow went into these elections with, as before, the membership card of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS]. He is now continuing to champion the interests of the population of the republic and its forces of the left as a deputy of the GDR People's Chamber and is performing a great deal of work as honorary chairman of the PDS.

On the eve of the completion of the unification process of the two German states Hans Modrow answered questions put to him at the request of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by the IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK correspondent in the East European countries. [Kuranov] How, Comrade Modrow, do you evaluate the situation in the GDR in the final weeks of its existence?

[Modrow] The situation in the republic now is very complex and ambivalent, and the life of many of my fellow citizens is full of problems. But at the same time the present process also instills considerable hope. German-German unification can and should be an important step forward en route to the creation of a peaceful common European home.

True, this does not rule out the natural concern, I would say, both of its immediate neighbors and of other European states, the USSR included. It is well known that the USSR has treated the reunification of the two German states with understanding and support. The aspiration of both the USSR and other countries also to perceive on the part of the Germans an understanding of the cherished aspirations and anxieties of the European peoples is therefore natural.

The events that have been occurring recently in the GDR have become increasingly complex. The socioeconomic and currency union with the FRG, which took effect on 2 July, has failed to justify the expectations preceding it. The GDR economy not only is not undergoing an upturn but, on the contrary, has found itself in a state of intensifying crisis. GDR territory has essentially become the venue for exports of every conceivable Western commodity, but no one is as yet even thinking of making any serious capital investments here.

If we view the progress of the unification process itself, it has accelerated continuously. Political, party and, particularly, election issues have in the activity of the directive authorities taken marked precedence over the interests of the ordinary GDR citizens.

The all-German elections to be held on 2 December will take place under manifestly uneven conditions for the parties and movements participating in them. I refer to the five percent barrier en route to the Bundestag. This puts in a particularly difficult position the democratic forces in the GDR, which at the end of last year contributed to a decisive extent to the accomplishment of the changes in our republic. I would recall that on 18 March, at the time of the elections to the GDR People's Chamber, no one created any obstacles to the parties and movements, those only just gaining momentum included.

It is also difficult to call democratic the process of formulating a conclusive unification treaty. It is noticeable that its wording was compiled in accelerated manner, and if there was any coordination with anyone here, it was only with the FRG Government. Deputies from the GDR People's Chamber, on the other hand, were practically excluded from the work on the preparation of this most important document.

As a result its content will carry over into the immediate future a whole number of problems. Specifically, property relations are regulated in the treaty only to a slight extent. All the questions regarding financing of the five future lands in eastern Germany, now constituting GDR territory, have not been resolved in optimum fashion. There are no essential guarantees for the participation of the country's population—by way of a poll, for example—in the preparation of a new constitution of a united Germany.

It is not only a question of the new state, in accordance with the new constitution, being better than the former GDR and the former FRG. Certain guarantees for oneself and for one's European neighbors should be seen in the basic law. In addition, the basic law of a united Germany also should reflect certain components of the draft constitution that was formulated in lengthy debate at meetings of the "roundtable" by our parties and movements, which effected the democratic changes in the GDR.

I see all this on the eve of the unification of the two German states as a serious challenge and believe that we are not so much at the end of some process but rather at the start of a new development.

[Kuranov] Do you think there were alternative versions of the development of the situation in the GDR during the last nine to 10 months?

[Modrow] Undoubtedly. Let us recall certain recent events. In mid-November 1989 at a session of the People's Chamber, I, as prime minister, proposed in a government statement the creation of a treaty association between the GDR and the FRG. Some time later came the response of Chancellor H. Kohl in the form of a 10-point draft. Finally, a statement was made on 19 December in Dresden at a meeting between H. Kohl and myself concerning the implementation of a version of a treaty association in the future development of relations

between the two German states. In less than two months the draft of such an association had been formulated on our side and presented to Bonn.

All this was aimed at ensuring that the process of unification of the GDR and the FRG progress by stages and in close connection with the process of the formation of the common European home. But the aspiration of a certain part of the population of both republics to speed up the course of events played its part here. The FRG Christian Democratic Union [CDU] headed by Chancellor H. Kohl and also the GDR CDU, without a shadow of doubt, had a similar concept. At some stage the Social Democrats, which had previously advocated a more balanced approach to the development of the unification process, succumbed to the pressure of the Christian Democrats.

But the first state treaty, concluded between our countries on 18 May, graphically demonstrated all the shortcomings and mistakes caused by such haste. Following 2 July, when the socioeconomic and currency union took effect, the GDR essentially lost 80 percent of its sovereignty.

[Kuranov] How do you evaluate the position of the PDS in German society? How do you view the democratic opposition in a united Germany?

[Modrow] The opportunities and prospects of the PDS will emerge primarily at the land elections on 14 October. In accordance with their results, our party will assume part of the responsibility for the development of events on an all-German scale.

The 2 December elections will be of the most importance, of course. Their results will be reflected in the formation of the new Germany to a large extent.

Judging by all the preconditions, the CDU and Chancellor H. Kohl personally have the best opportunities for victory. On the other hand, certain potential dissatisfaction at the development of the unification process among broad circles of the population and, in particular, within social democracy, is clearly noticeable also. Keen rivalry has essentially developed between these two most important parties even now.

Much, therefore, will depend on the position and cohesion of the forces of the left. If they happen to be excluded from participation in the political life of the new Germany, that is, do not get into parliament, this would be a big minus for the development of the democratic character of future intra-German processes. Parliament would not in its activity reflect the opinion of a very substantial part of the community of the country.

I believe that a barometer of the future mood is at the present stage the authorities' attitude toward the PDS. Due respect for and an understanding of its activity are still lacking, in my view. Many instances of the exclusion from participation in public life of people who adhere to a left orientation are being observed. For example,

leaving tens of thousands of graduates of Soviet higher educational institutions outside of the framework of the intensive social process is simply impermissible—given the aspiration to make the new Germany a kind of bridge between East and West.

[Kuranov] How do you see the development of German-Soviet relations following unification of the GDR and the FRG?

[Modrow] The entire course of negotiations between the USSR and the two German states throughout last year, both on matters of unification and on others, I believe created a certain stock of trust and is a prerequisite for the further favorable development of our relations.

The GDR was for many years the USSR's principal trade and economic partner among the CEMA countries, and the FRG occupied the leading position in such cooperation on the part of the USSR with Western countries. I am sure that this mutually profitable interest will continue in the future also.

TASS Observer Comments on German Unification

LD2509063390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1558 GMT 24 Sep 90

[By TASS political observer Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Sep (TASS)—After approval by the GDR People's Chamber and both chambers of the West German parliament of the treaty on unification, it is possible to regard the restoration of a united sovereign Germany as a fait accompli, although the official celebrations are planned for 3 October. This day will without doubt be a worthy reward for all those who in varying degrees continued the efforts toward a settlement both of the domestic and external aspects of German unity, a day of victory for the policy of new thinking and of hope for the continuing improvement of the situation in Europe. And, it goes without saying, that this day will be a festival for the Germans. But, will it be so for all of them?

The will unambiguously expressed by the population of the GDR and the FRG to live in a united state, it would appear, renders this question aimless. However, some trends in everyday political practice provide grounds, indeed weighty grounds, for doubt.

Take those, for example, for whom the unification of Germany means losing their livelihood. These include, in particular, those serving in the GDR National People's Army [NVA] who are due for demobilization. According to plans reported to journalists by FRG Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg, of 90,000 soldiers and officers of the GDR NVA, no more than 50,000 will enter the complement of the all-German armed forces. The GDR border troops, numbering around 20,000, will be completely disbanded. Political motives played a decisive role in adopting such a decision, the minister clarified, without, albeit specifying

which precisely. However, his party colleague, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union Bundestag group, Alfred Dregger, was more frank. In one interview, he stated that the GDR National People's Army is allegedly "a politicized organization," which in his view means the all-German army should not accept into its ranks NVA officers "with a political orientation."

The accord reached during the July Soviet-German summit meeting, and which became one of the components of the final settlement as regards Germany, established the FRG's duty to limit the numerical strength of its army to 370,000 people, and was received with satisfaction by the Germans themselves and by the European public. But today, it is difficult to rid oneself of the impression that the criteria guiding the formation of the regular personnel of the new German army are, to put it mildly, not over-democratic.

Indeed, similar motives have caused the sacking of several thousand staffers of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs, maybe this explains the strange apathy of the East German police with respect to neo-Nazi provocations: They are afraid of gaining the reputation of being "too left-wing?"

Meanwhile, the striving by right-wing extremists from the FRG to extend their activity to the GDR and to create their own organizations there, as acknowledged by Peter Frisch, deputy head of the Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution "really gives grounds for concern." In this respect, it is hardly possible to regard the increased activity of West and East German neo-Nazis, and the recently more frequent provocations and acts of terror against Soviet servicemen of the Western Group of troops deployed on GDR territory, as a chance coincidence.

The unprecedented "experiment" of merging two such politically dissimilar states leaves no room for illusions to the effect that this process can proceed painlessly. However, antidemocratic methods, whatever may have dictated them—party ambitions or political revenge—will scarcely help to resolve problems; they will sooner aggravate them.

Thatcher's East European Visits Reviewed

PM2709085190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent A. Lyutyy: "At the Wait and See Stage"]

[Text] London, 25 Sep—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has returned from a foreign tour during which she visited Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Switzerland. As was expected, the greatest attention here has been paid to her stay in the first two countries.

For the first time in the past 50 years Czechoslovakia received a head of British Government. It is believed

that Thatcher has finally closed one of the most unpleasant pages in the history of relations between London and Prague, bringing to the Czechoslovak parliament a public apology for Britain's role in the Munich Pact. In her speeches she invariably supported the democratic processes developing in Czechoslovakia and strove to obtain first-hand information about the progress of economic transformations. It is no secret that the British government and British business are now adopting a cautious wait and see stance with regard to investments in Czechoslovakia, attentively watching to see how swiftly and confidently the destatization and privatization of the country's economy and the creation of optimum conditions for the investment of Western capital proceed. London has put into operation the mechanism of a "know-how foundation"—expert consultations in the field of the economy, banking, and finance. The five-year program with a budget of about 70 million pounds sterling extends to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, to whose government organs and enterprises British experts have been sent. In Czechoslovakia they are studying primarily questions of privatization.

It may be supposed that people on the banks of the Vltava expected more substantial support from London, in particular direct financial aid. But during talks with President Havel the British prime minister has so far refrained from any specific commitments on this score. In Thatcher's opinion Czechoslovakia should first of all put its own house in order, to wit denationalize a substantial part of its industry and create conditions for free competition backed up by the relevant changes to the country's legislation.

One motive for Thatcher's trip, some observers believe, was the fear of a too close of an economic linkup between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and a united Germany, whose economic might is causing some politicians here discomfort. Whether London will succeed in establishing special relations with East Europe in the future is as yet only a question. But one very meaningful gesture has been made by the British prime minister. In both Czechoslovakia and Hungary Thatcher repeated the idea voiced recently in her speech in Aspen (Colorado) of including them in the European Community as soon as they have firmly embarked on a market economy footing. At the present stage, the British prime minister believes, it is possible to examine the question of these countries' partial, associate membership of the EC. The guest is convinced that the community should not be a club of elite members protecting themselves from the rest of the world.

The idea is attractive. It is not worth saying that it met with support and even enthusiasm in both Prague and Budapest. London links entirely pragmatic calculations with it. Seeking to expand the framework of the EC, Britain would like somewhat to "dilute" Germany's economic might and growing influence in the grouping. At the same time it is not averse to delaying the process of currency and financial and political integration in the "Common Market." Can we doubt that this position of

Thatcher's will meet with no sympathy from Jacques Delors, chairman of the EC Commission, or French President Francois Mitterrand, who are purposefully pushing the EC toward full integration in 1992.

The assessment of Thatcher's visit to East Europe has been made here with an invariable eye on the Soviet Union. London's position on the question of rendering us direct financial aid has so far come down to the statement that this aid will have a point only if a market infrastructure is formed in the USSR. Otherwise the money will "disappear into the sand." But now that the USSR is on the threshold of adopting a radical program for building market relations, this position, according to the newspaper THE INDEPENDENT is being carefully analyzed once again and it is not ruled out that new nuances may appear in it.

Nonetheless, according to an opinion widespread among businessmen here, the Soviet Union must first of all decide on the places where its economic train is in need of lubrication and those places where entire units need replacing. And another thing—who will drive this train? In this connection people here have welcomed with a certain understanding the request to the Supreme Soviet from the USSR president that he be granted emergency power to carry out economic transformations in the country.

Chief of Armed Forces To Visit U.S., Cuba

PM2709160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Toward an Upcoming Visit"]

[Text] Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, will pay an official visit to the United States during the period from 30 September through 5 October in accordance with the plan of contacts along military lines and at the invitation of Gen. C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On the basis of an accord reached earlier Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev will pay an official visit to the Republic of Cuba during the period from 6 through 9 October at the invitation of Division Gen. U. Rosales del Toro, chief of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba.

U.S., West European Visitors To Provide Advice

LD2709074590 Moscow TASS in English 0706 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Gvritshvili and Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Heads of the Michigan (USA) and West European consortia for social and political studies are visiting Moscow for a series of seminars designed to give advice to Soviet specialists and lawmakers on ways to model social processes.

The visit is sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences Innovation Amalgamation, the Soviet Institute for the United States and Canada and the Moscow City Council.

The information back-up for scientific research in the Soviet Union is a hundred times worse than in the United States, meeting organizer Tatyana Yudina told TASS.

"This is probably one of the reasons why Soviet lawmakers and specialists have to 'experiment blindly' and waste a lot of time and effort on useless work. This sometimes prompts faulty social forecasts that lead to mistaken decisions even at governmental level," she said.

"This is what made us invite leading Western experts. The first meetings showed that our parliamentarians are not really ready for this level of discussion," she said.

She blamed training and different research methods.

Discussions will continue early next year and, hopefully, they will be more successful, since those lawmakers who are interested will be better prepared, she said.

Bakatin Leads Delegation to Interpol Assembly

LD2709162690 Moscow TASS in English 1622 GMT
27 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Interpol (international criminal police organisation) membership for the Soviet Union will be considered at the 59th session of the Interpol General Assembly which opened in Ottawa, the capital of Canada, today.

The session is being for the first time attended by a Soviet delegation led by Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, a Soviet Interior Ministry spokesman told TASS.

Notes Importance of Membership

LD2809083690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] The Soviet Union has been accepted into Interpol, the international criminal police organization, in which the law-enforcement agencies of over 150 countries are represented. The USSR's candidature was approved at the annual session of the general assembly, Interpol's Supreme body, which opened on Thursday in the Canadian capital.

Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, emphasized in conversation with a TASS correspondent that membership of Interpol is an objective necessity for our country. It is hard to imagine that without this step, and spurred by the need to step up the struggle against crime, it will be possible to create a reliable free market and to build a law-governed state.

Radio Urges Cutting Arm Supplies to Third World

LD2509204190 *Moscow International Service in Arabic*
1400 GMT 25 Sep 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has been and still is a major supplier of large quantities of arms to various states of the world. But the Defense Ministry does not give precise information on the country to which it sells the weapons, their quantities, and the terms of sale. It is no secret that the Third World countries remain in the forefront of the states which purchase Soviet weapons.

They (?believe) in these countries that the Soviet Union acts properly; that is, it sends weapons to them and especially to the countries which are considered its friends. When Moscow intends to reduce its military deliveries, they accuse it at times of retreating and being unscrupulous toward its friends. This means however that the international situation, which is characterized by the disappearance of the cold war between the two superpower blocs, is not taken into consideration.

Today, a prominent place is being given to diplomacy in relations among nations, and not to the Kalashnikovs or the Uzis or the confrontations between the U.S. and Soviet giants, but to cooperation between them in the search for settling regional armed conflicts.

The cause of tension in many regions and especially the Middle East for decades was to the confrontation between the two superpowers. Each side with the assistance of its friends was tarrying to triumph over the other side and its friends.

This is one reason why Moscow and Washington did their utmost to ensure that the military power of their friends is balanced. As a result of this there were continuous wars which used to exhaust the sides directly taking part in them and also their protectors, the great powers.

We would like to ask the following question: Which is better, to continue to deliver Soviet weapons to the hot spots of the world or to actively search for peaceful means to put out the flames of conflict? Practical life provides the answer to this question. The arms race in any region is not considered an element that gives rise to stability.

The latest example of this is the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict, which has placed the Gulf and the Middle East on the brink of a destructive war; many think that the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait was sudden. But there are many responsible figures who took into consideration that the weapons would be used sooner or later. It is very tempting to some leaders to test the effect of using the modern weapons they had acquired from abroad on their neighbors, especially if these neighbors were much weaker than them.

Is it not better, as far as the Soviet Union and the other major powers are concerned, to stop delivery of weapons to the Third World countries and make joint efforts to achieve mutual and balanced disarmament? This tends to accord with the basic interests of all large and small countries and nations, without exception. Mutual disarmament in the Third World and a halt to the delivery of the latest weapons to them will be a good thing in terms of those heads of state who have a passion for extremist views and expansion and who will not hesitate to make gains at the expense of others thinking that they can escape punishment.

The Moscow Radio commentator believes that such ideas and ambitions will never bring good to anyone.

Commentary Addresses Stopping Weapons Sales

LD2709173890 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
1230 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Commentary by Yuriy Isayev]

[Text] [Announcer] I want to draw the attention of listeners to yet another publication. One of the latest issues of the U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON TIMES says that at present the Nicaraguan Government is feverishly looking for buyers for 150 Soviet tanks and several dozen helicopters. Our military assistance to this Central American country may thereby return to us like a unique boomerang. What do you think? I ask Yuriy Isayev, my colleague, who is an expert on Latin America.

[Isayev] The news is not commonplace, and I would say the situation is not an ordinary one. I am afraid there will not be a boomerang because, as the U.S. newspapers assert, our country has refused to pay dollars for our own weapons. It agrees to receive the tanks at the expense of paying off the foreign debt, but Nicaragua is not prepared to agree to this because Violeta Chamorro, the president of that country, needs real dollars to patch up the holes in the devastated economy.

I would rather say that the given situation is like a scene from an operetta, because it would seem that buyers have been found for our tanks—and at give-away prices, too. THE WASHINGTON TIMES writes that the buyer will most likely be India, which is prepared to pay \$10 million for 150 used tanks.

But the above-mentioned comment has made me reflect on other things, too. For decades we literally packed the countries of the Third World full of our weapons. They were used during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. These weapons can be found both in African countries and in Latin America. For some reason the opinion was—and it exists even at the present time—that arms sales are the most profitable and reliable business. According to Western data, over the last few years we have supplied Iraq with up-to-date weapons to the sum of \$14.5 billion. But the question arises: Where are these dollars? How was the revenue from them reflected in our lives? I think

they had no effect. Life is fairly impoverished; the shelves in the shops are empty.

It is time to change a perception like this and start to think in more humane terms. You see, the benefits would be direct and immediate if we did not produce these weapons at all, and if the money that would have been injected into such production were to be spent on the needs of the economy.

One recalls the wise words of Chekhov regarding the gun that absolutely has to be fired. A recent issue of IZVESTIYA communicated to us that the "Memoirs of Khrushchev," which are coming out in the United States, contain his sensational admissions. During the Caribbean crisis, which blew up because we deployed 42 missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, Fidel Castro wanted to make a preventive strike on the United States, which would naturally have meant the start of World

War II. So, Chekhov was right. And is it not our weapons that are being used in Kuwait today?

And another thing: The conflict in the Persian Gulf could grow into war on a grand scale at any moment. And it is very strange that in such a situation a batch of the very latest Soviet MiG-29 fighter planes is arriving in neighboring Iran. You see, you don't need to be an analyst to predict that in the event of that war on a grand scale, Iran and Iraq will act as a united front against the United States.

Many things in the world have changed in a positive direction of late, and naturally one has to change the perception regarding supplies of weapons. This perception should fade away into the past as an attribute of the cold war, and the sooner that happens the better it will be for the whole of mankind.

United States & Canada

Cheney Criticized for Report on Soviet Power

PM2709151790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Sep 90 Second Edition p 3

[By A. Golts "Our Opinion": "What Worries R. Cheney"]

[Text] What worries him is the Soviet Union, which, he says, despite the political and economic reforms and the reduction of the military budget, still possesses an extensive arsenal of the most sophisticated armaments, and retains the potential for a confrontation with the West. "The facts show that the USSR remains a gigantic military superpower," the Pentagon chief assures one. The U.S. defense secretary was voicing his fears in the preface to the latest edition of the collection "Soviet Military Power," which traditionally comes out on the eve of congressional approval of the U.S. military department's budget for the next fiscal year.

Analyzing the various programs for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the authors of the booklet anxiously point out that there is a growing trend in the USSR for the quality of weapons to take precedence over their quantity. But, one may ask, what is bad about that? Does the modernization of the Armed Forces of the United States follow different laws? Is it not true that the Pentagon's programs to deploy ICBM's, "Stealth" bombers, and SDI programs are part of the same trend?

It is appropriate to mention regarding this the previous U.S. President's well-known idea that states do not distrust one another because they are armed, but arm because they do not trust one another. But the Soviet Union has not given Washington any cause in recent years for doubting its sincere desire to ease international tension and strengthen mutual trust. And how can one talk seriously today about the existence of the "Soviet military threat" to the United States and its allies when major unilateral cuts are being made in the Soviet Armed Forces?

What is it then that is worrying R. Cheney? In his view, the Soviet Union could dispel the U.S. military department's fears by cutting arms supplies to such countries as the DPRK, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, and Cuba. The crux of the matter is that the time is obviously approaching when the USSR, above all the Supreme Soviet, will have to review our approaches to supplying weapons abroad. But it is not for the Pentagon chief to set the terms, because these supplies, as I understand it, only minimally affect (if they affect at all) issues of U.S. national security.

R. Cheney was once asked at a news conference: What does the Soviet Union have to do to get the Pentagon chief to trust it? There are several conditions that have to be met, came the reply. Then you will trust the Soviet Union?—the journalists persisted. Then I will invent new conditions, Cheney replied.

In the end it is all the same to me whether or not Mr. Cheney personally trusts Soviet policy. But the U.S. defense secretary, at a time when our two countries' leaders have proclaimed the end of the cold war and when they are switching to collaboration in the international arena, ought to stop using hackneyed cliches. Even when this is needed to get the military budget through Congress.

Army General Previews Upcoming U.S. Visit

LD2809093890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0735 GMT 28 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovsky]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Sep (TASS)—The official visit to the U.S. by Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, begins on Sunday.

Soviet and American military circles can today take part in building a safe and stable world, Gen. Moiseyev declared here. He gave an interview today to a TASS correspondent in connection with his upcoming visit to the U.S. In the interview he touched on the distinctive features of the current stage in Soviet-U.S. military relations.

The general stressed that not only have relations between the USSR and the United States improved from meeting to meeting between their leaders, but contacts in the military field have developed more and more vigorously. "Today," he declared, "there is more glasnost, mutual understanding, and trust in these relations with the U.S."

In the opinion of the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, since the recent meeting between Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in Helsinki, it has been determined for the first time how our countries need to act with regard to the acute regional crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Speaking about the aim of his visit to the U.S., which starts on 30 September, Mikhail Moiseyev said: "On the basis of a mutual exchange of proposals with the U.S. side, we have already prepared the draft of a new Soviet-U.S. plan of military contacts for 1991-92, which we would like to put into effect from now, during this visit." Apart from that, according to the general, he "would like to continue the conversation about the military doctrines of the USSR and the U.S. that was begun in Vienna in March this year, and also about the possibility of conducting joint military-scientific research in the field of military construction, stability, and security in the midst of a radical cutback of strategic offensive and conventional weapons in Europe."

Replying to a TASS correspondent's question about the statement made last Thursday by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney concerning the forthcoming reduction in the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe to 40,000 men

in the 1991 fiscal year, Mikhail Moiseyev assessed this as "positive and constructive." Moreover, he noted that it was in line with the state of Soviet-U.S. relations in the current stage.

U.S. Experts Urge End to Nuclear Tests by 1995

*LD2709191290 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Full termination of nuclear tests by 1995 is quite a feasible goal the Soviet Union and the United States should strive for, American nuclear disarmament experts believe.

Professor Frank von Hippel, Princeton University, and Ray E. Kidder, the American Physical Society, who for long worked at the Livermore Laboratory dealing with American military technologies, arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, chairman of the board of directors of the International Foundation for the Survival and the Development of Humanity.

Today they were due to speak at a close-door meeting of the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Soviet Parliament's Defence and State Security Committee. Before speaking in the Soviet parliament, the experts were interviewed by TASS.

Until now one of main arguments of the American advocates of a continuation of nuclear tests came to the following: The United States needed new types of nuclear weapons, which were to be tested, in order to repulse a threat on the part of the Soviet Union, Frank von Hippel said. However, now that the cold war is dead, this argument is rendered unnecessary, he added.

Kidder believes that the argument about the irreplaceability of nuclear tests as a means to verify the reliability of nuclear arms is untenable.

There are every grounds to speak of a high degree of reliability of the existing nuclear weapons. Therefore, even in the event of resumption of warhead production according to old drawings, they can be reckoned quite reliable without control detonations, he said.

Besides, measures which do not require nuclear tests can also be taken to enhance the safety of nuclear weapons, for example, to improve conditions for the transportation and storage of armaments, Kidder said.

It is possible to limit oneself to finalising work on new nuclear warheads which are now under development. This will require a small number of nuclear tests (not more than 10-20 in the coming five years) and then they should be stopped, he said.

As a result, the United States would acquire a small but powerful deterrent force that would meet all reasonable requirements of security, Kidder believes.

Both scientists maintain that it is important to secure complete termination of nuclear tests by 1995, since precisely in five years' time a conference is to be held to review the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Businessmen Eye Joint Kazakh Ventures

*PM2809103790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Sep 90 First Edition p 1*

[Report by Colonel A. Ladin under the rubric: "Direct Line": "Purpose of Businessmen's Visit"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—Leaders and experts from major American companies spent all last week visiting a number of oblasts in Kazakhstan. They were there at the invitation of the republic's government. A representative delegation of Kazakhstan's specialists visited the United States previously. The aim of these visits is to create the requisite conditions for mutually beneficial contracts, in particular regarding the organization of various joint enterprises which would enable the republic's economy to be improved at a faster pace.

During a news conference at the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] president's residence it was said that the creation of a Soviet-U.S. joint enterprise to extract and process oil in the Tengiz area (west Kazakhstan) was discussed during M.S. Gorbachev's recent visit to the United States. Matters are now being put on a practical footing. Both N. Nazarbayev, Kazakh president, and Edward B. Scott, vice president of the Chevron Corporation, informed journalists that the new Soviet-U.S. enterprise will have been registered by early next year.

The project to construct grain storage capacities of 35,000 tonnes and 5,000-10,000 tonnes using metal from the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine also aroused journalists' interest. American businessmen would like to find a use for vacant production areas in Tselinograd, Pavlodar, and other cities of Kazakhstan.

The joint enterprises will also produce medical equipment and components for the meat and dairy industries.

Yakovlev on Joint U.S. Lawyers' Conference

*PM2709155990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2*

[Interview with V.F. Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, by S. Pastukhov: "Rights and the Law"; place and date not given—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet-American three-day conference of lawyers entitled "Economic Relations and the Law" concluded its work yesterday in Moscow. Your PRAVDA correspondent asked V.F. Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, to comment on it.

"This event is unprecedented in the history of both our jurisprudence and in our relations with the Americans," the minister noted, "particularly because the conference is on an unusually large scale. Around 500 U.S. lawyers and 2,500 of our lawyers, who came from all over the Soviet Union, participated.

"The conference provoked great interest. M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush sent their greetings to the participants. They both noted that our conference is one of the manifestations of the new USSR-U.S. relations and a development of the foundation that was laid by the leaders of both countries in particular during their latest meeting. Both our president and the U.S. President noted the great significance of the law as a great value common to all mankind on which modern civilized relations can be based."

[Pastukhov] What was discussed during the conference?

[Yakovlev] As a whole, it was devoted to the legislative regulation of economic relations and economic ties, in particular between the Soviet Union and the United States. But the lawyers decided to work on all the most important aspects of the legislative regulation of both relations between our countries and internal relations. Work was organized along four avenues in the main sections. One of them examined the problems of the primacy of the law, the role of the law in contemporary society, and the role of the lawyer in the legal profession. Questions of constitutional structure, and the role of the constitution and the law in the state structure and in the functioning of the state were discussed.

The second section examined economic relations and relations in the domestic and foreign market. These are the relations to which we are intending to transfer in our internal life, and which, naturally would serve as a good means for establishing lasting ties between our two economies. We must have a solid legal base if we are to establish normal business and trade relations, create joint enterprises, and use foreign investments and capital investments, and so on.

The third sphere and the third section were concerned with the law, society and the individual. Together, lawyers studied international legal principles and internal legislation relating to the status of the individual within society. The law and glasnost, the law and working people's rights, the individual's private life and legal protection of it, national minorities and the law, and so on, were dealt with here. And finally, the fourth group of questions—the law and the global problems of the contemporary world, particularly environmental problems, of course.

[Pastukhov] Apart from the consolidation of contacts that we all need in this world both between lawyers and among representatives of other professions, what other positive results will the conference have, in your opinion? Specifically for us.

[Yakovlev] The establishment of professional contacts between a huge number of lawyers is a specific positive result in itself. We now have experience which demands further study and exploitation....

[Pastukhov] And the last question, which it would be better to ask your American colleagues of course, but which I think you too will be able to answer, Venyamin Fedorovich: How did our lawyers look when placed alongside the American lawyers at the conference?

[Yakovlev] Seeing as you ask, I will answer thus: On a number of issues our lawyers are very good specialists and they gave a good impression. The Americans acknowledge this.

China

Sino-Soviet Trade Conference Held in Beijing

LD2609175890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1430 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Report by correspondent V. Kulikov in Beijing; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer Fesunenکو] As of 1 January, onward trade between the USSR and China will be conducted on the basis of freely convertible currency. This creates an entirely new situation in the relations between our countries and the logical question arises: What should be done so that this trade does not suffocate from a shortage of hard currency? This was discussed at a meeting in Beijing which will now be discussed.

[Kulikov] The Nande economic company invited us, journalists, officials of the trade mission and other Soviet institutions in Beijing to take part in their working conference. This the first attempt to establish, I would say, informal relations between Chinese producers and Soviet consumers. Setting up joint enterprises is a promising form of cooperation for the future. This is the unanimous view of both Chinese and Soviet experts. Meanwhile, out of the 4,000 joint enterprises existing in our country there are only 19 which are based on Soviet-Chinese capital. In China there are even less, altogether two. Because of a lack of knowledge of the market, a lack of experience, and a shortage of information, instances occur which were mentioned by Tianjin mechanical engineers. Thus, Japanese firms which are building oil industry facilities in Novosibirsk, order all equipment for this building site in Tianjin in China. After all, this can be done also without middlemen pocketing considerable amounts of hard currency; even more so as today China has something to offer our country. [passage omitted]

The Nande Economic Association [NEA] is made up of 36 enterprises which are producing everything or almost everything, ranging from foodstuffs to electronics.

In offering its goods to the Soviet consumer Nande hopes that much of what you are seeing now on the screen we

can produce jointly sharing resources, technology and experience. This will make it possible to expand the range and raise the quality of these goods and make them competitive on the world market.

Helsinki Group Protests Return of Chinese Pilot

*PM2609134690 London MOSCOW NEWS
in English No 16, 14-20 Sep 90 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Soviets Fury at the Way Chinese Pilot Was Treated"]

[Text] An angry protest at the Soviet government's decision to return Chinese military pilot Wang Baoyu back to China has been made by the Helsinki group of Moscow.

In a letter to MN's editor, they describe the action as "cruel and unfair" and one that has doomed him to face a military tribunal and death sentence.

Wang was forced to land in Soviet territory while aiming to obtain political asylum in the USA, they say. His flight did not endanger anyone's life, and could not be regarded as an act of terrorism or piracy. And the obsolete MiG-19 he used was later returned to the Chinese.

Wang's bid to find political refuge was made because he objected to the policy of the Chinese government—especially the shooting of protesting students, and subsequent executions.

The letter to MN is signed by Larisa Bogoraz, Lev Timofeyev, Aleksandr Neyfakh, Aleksey Smirnov, and Vladimir Golitsin.

Returning Wang to China and a grim fate, they say, is "no way for a civilised state, that has signed the Declaration of Human rights, to behave."

And they add: "What is the worth of our words about the triumph of democracy and new thinking. We have lost the respect and trust of all honest people in the USSR, China, and the world."

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Reports, Comments on Visit by Singapore Premier

Talks End 27 Sep

*LD2709161690 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of the Republic of Singapore left the Soviet capital today at the close of his official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Govern-

Relations Seen as 'Progressing'

*BK2709123390 Moscow in Malay to Malaysia
1200 GMT 26 Sep 90*

[Commentary by Viktor Konov]

[Text] Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has ended the official portion of his visit to the Soviet Union. During his visit, the Singapore head of state held talks with Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Lee Kuan Yew is now visiting Leningrad, the second most important city in the Soviet Union. This is Lee Kuan Yew's second visit to the USSR, the first having been in 1970. Prime Minister Ryzhkov visited Singapore last February. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to Lee Kuan Yew's current visit.

Singapore press and businessmen are closely monitoring Lee Kuan Yew's current visit to the Soviet Union. They expressed hope that the visit will encourage bilateral cooperation. Trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Singapore are based on sufficiently solid foundation, but there is still room for further improvement. Singapore business circles have great expectations for the Soviet Far East.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that during the current visit, Lee Kuan Yew repeatedly mentioned Vladivostok as a port city with very great potential. However, even though Vladivostok is not far from Singapore, the port city and other cities in the Soviet Far East are still inaccessible to regional businessmen. To reach Vladivostok, one has to take a detour route through Moscow despite the fact that an agreement to open an air link between Singapore and Khabarovsk was signed one and half years ago. At the moment, an air route linking the two destinations overflying the air space of several countries has not been finalized.

Generally speaking, Soviet-Singapore relations are now progressing well. This can be seen from many commentaries in Singapore dailies, which have described as successful Lee Kuan Yew's visit to the Soviet Union.

Comparison of Talks With Gorbachev

PM2609134190

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 September 1990 in its Second Edition on page 1 carries a TASS report entitled "M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With Lee Kuan Yew" on the 25 September meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Singapore premier Lee Kuan Yew. The PRAVDA item has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published in the Southeast Asia & Pacific section of the 26 September issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, p 14, revealing the following variations:

Column one, paragraph one, sentence one, reads: [Text] It was officially... (deleting dateline)

Column two, paragraph one, sentence one reads: ...Gorbachev emphasized the independent importance of Soviet-Singapore relations which, to judge by the content of the talks which have just taken place, have good prospects... (adding "independent" and rewording)

Paragraph two, sentence one reads: ...burdened with problems. Modern world politics should... (adding "modern")

Paragraph three, sentence one reads: ...of the crisis essentially coincided. The president... (adding "essentially")

Paragraph four, sentence one reads: ...accordance with its initial function, is able to... (substituting "initial function" for "purposes")

Paragraph five, only sentence reads: ...the results of the official visit and... (substituting "the" for "a")

Same sentence reads: ...their first meeting.

With the prime minister were Goh Chok Tong, his first deputy, and Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng. (adding additional paragraph)

Near East & South Asia

Afghan Rebels Refuse Yeltsin Invitation

LD2709123390 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Islamabad September 27 TASS—Afghan rebel leaders have said they will not accept an invitation by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to visit the Soviet Union. The rebuttal comes in a statement by the Information Ministry of Afghanistan's so-called transitional government.

Yeltsin recently invited several rebel leaders, including Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, to visit the Soviet Union.

Rebel leaders said it was unclear whether Yeltsin's offer signified a turnaround in the Kremlin's Afghan policy or was a propaganda ploy to win Russian voters by helping to release Soviet soldiers kept by rebels.

Soviet POW's will be released if the Kremlin ends its support for Najibullah, pays military reparations, releases all Afghans kept on political grounds and pledges never again to invade Afghanistan, rebels said.

They said they would study Yeltsin's initiative and its possible effect on the war.

Soviet failure to comply with pledges in the past and continuing interference in Afghan affairs makes it impossible for the rebels to accept the offer, they said.

A Soviet delegation visited Pakistan for seven weeks recently to discuss the release of Soviet POW's with Afghan rebel leaders.

The talks resulted in a message by Mujaddedi, president of the transitional government, saying that he accepted the offer and would send a high-level delegation to Moscow for talks with Yeltsin, according to Russian lawmaker I. Andronov, who chairs the Soviet Association of Families of Soviet Prisoners.

Afghan rebel leaders remain divided on ways to settle the Afghan problem.

Mujaddedi, known as a moderate, disagrees sharply with hardline Prime Minister 'Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

Andronov on Afghan War POW's, Yeltsin Proposal

LD2809111890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Ion Ionovich Andronov with correspondent M. Ogorodnikov; place and date not given—live or recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Ogorodnikov] Two and one-half years ago, the owner of this study, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy Ion Ionovich Andronov, set up the Committee for Saving Soviet Prisoners of War in Afghanistan—Nadezhda Hope committee. Ever since, this telephone has been ringing, stories of grief have been continuously heard. The calls come from the mothers, fathers, and wives of those of our soldiers who were taken captive during that long, exhausting, and terrible Afghan war.

Members of your committee have been to Pakistan several times in these two and one-half years. The results have been rather modest; let us put it that way. Suddenly—to be honest, I did not even believe my eyes when I read the TASS report—that since your last trip an accord has been reached on a visit to Moscow by a representative mujahidin delegation for talks with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, on the conditions for the release of all Soviet prisoners of war being held in Pakistan at this moment. What is this? A breakthrough, a ray of hope that the irreconcilables are seeking reconciliation after all?

[Andronov] It is a breakthrough in the sense that, hitherto, the long months of negotiations which I was conducting—I have been there four times—always dealt with the exchange of individual soldiers, one, two, or three. In that long time I managed to help only three Soviet soldiers to return home. Now we are talking about something more, because we are now dealing not with my negotiations, but with the forthcoming negotiations with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, which is a completely different level.

Here before you is a copy of a message from the mujahidin government, the emigre government set up in Peshawar, signed by Professor Mojadeddi, the president of that government, where he thanks Boris Nikolayevich for the proposal which he made. I will not retell it all, as

that is Boris Nikolayevich's business. He will make the message public. I will just say something for the families of the prisoners of war, because they are really calling up day and night from all over the country and asking for information. So, for the families of the prisoners of war I will give just the key information here. It says the following: Your Excellency, I inform you with satisfaction that I am now authorizing a high-ranking delegation to participate in negotiations in Moscow on the prisoners of war and problems of mutual interest.

[Ogorodnikov] Well, comrade viewers, all these photographs and letters will be made public tomorrow on the *Sodruzhestvo* [Community] video channel on the second all-Union program, where Ion Ionovich Andronov will answer your telephone calls. The telephone lines will be open, and he will publicize these photographs at 1535 [1135 GMT] tomorrow.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Namibia

LD2709160590 Moscow TASS in English 1505 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Windhoek September 27 TASS—A delegation of the Soviet parliament was staying in the Republic of Namibia at the invitation of its National Assembly on an official visit from September 23-26, 1990. The delegation was headed by member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Malofeyev.

The delegation was received by Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob and had conversations with Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Z. Kameeta and other officials.

Meetings and conversations were held in the atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding. The sides exchanged information on topical questions of domestic affairs of the two countries.

The delegation was told about the progress of the shaping of central and regional bodies of power of the Republic of Namibia and about socio-economic transformations to consolidate independence won by the Namibian people.

Soviet parliamentarians spoke about practical steps in the USSR towards a radical renewal of all the aspects of the society's life, about the political, economic and legal reforms and law-making activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Coincidence or closeness of assessments of topical questions of the international situation was noted during the debates on foreign policy problems. Namibian parliamentarians express support for large-scale peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union, above all in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. They highly assessed the Soviet Union's contribution to the solution of cardinal problems of the present, as well as settlement of regional

conflicts, including Africa. The Soviet Union's role in the achievement of Namibia's independence was emphasized particularly. Noting the tendency towards the overcoming of confrontational attitudes in the international community and towards the strengthening of mutual confidence and cooperation, the sides declared in favour of all countries, large and small, promoting the consolidation of these positive changes in world politics.

Against this background the sides expressed serious concern over dangerous developments of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict. The need for an early fulfilment of the United Nations decisions on this matter was emphasized.

Parliamentarians of the two countries noted that positive changes are in the offing in southern Africa. They welcomed arrangements achieved by the South African Government and ANC [African National Congress], which opens the road for the beginning of a nation-wide dialogue on a new constitution and elimination of the apartheid system.

The sides expressed mutual concern over the escalation of violence in South Africa, which poses a serious threat for the further development of peaceful democratic transformations in the country. The sides supported efforts towards a political settlement of conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. The Soviet side noted the constructive role that Namibia plays in the quest of the solution to the problems of the south African region.

East Europe

Hungarian President Visits Ukraine 27 Sep

Meets With Ukraine Officials

LD2709202290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Sep 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, arrived in Kiev today.

Arpad Goncz arrived in the Ukraine on an official visit at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. The president of the Republic of Hungary laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier. A conversation took place in the presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet. During the conversation it was noted that this visit marks the start of a new stage in the development of bilateral links between the Ukraine and Hungary.

Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, and Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine SSR, today signed a joint statement which outlines the main directions for further cooperation.

Given Supreme Honors

LD2709225390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Report by UKRINFORM-TASS correspondents Ivan Sayko and Aleksey Trotsenko]

[Text] Kiev, 27 Sep (UKRINFORM-TASS)—Supreme honors were accorded to Arpad Goncz, president of the Hungarian Republic, who arrived in the Ukrainian capital today at the invitation of the republic's leadership. At Borispol Airport the state flags of the Hungarian Republic, the USSR, and the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] were hoisted. A guard of honor of troops of the Kiev garrison was mounted on the tarmac. The orchestra performed the anthems of Hungary and the Ukraine.

The president of the Hungarian Republic became the first distinguished foreign guest to pay an official visit to this major republic since its Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration on Ukraine's state sovereignty.

In a brief statement at the airport, Arpad Goncz stressed: "I am glad to be here on the hospitable soil of the Ukraine. I wholeheartedly wish that our relations develop for the benefit of the peoples of both countries. I would like to hope that our negotiations will pass off successfully and will open up new prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation."

The same day the president of the Hungarian Republic had a conversation with Chairman of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet Leonid Kravchuk, during which the guest was acquainted with the main areas of the republic's political and socio-economic development and with the processes of renewal now taking place.

"We are devoting an exceptionally great significance to your visit," Leonid Kravchuk said, addressing the distinguished guest. "A new stage in bilateral contacts is opening today. We hope that during the visit a new impetus will be given to the development of our good-neighborly relations".

The conversation dealt with a bilateral treaty, agreements on economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, legal aid, protection of the environment, a consular agreement, youth and sports exchanges, the development of border ties, and other important areas of the life of the two peoples.

"This visit will be of historic significance both for the Hungarian and for the Ukrainian peoples," Arpad Goncz noted. "The signing of a consular agreement will, in my view, become one of the promising areas of our further cooperation. The exchange of missions in future is bound to lead to an exchange of ambassadors."

Arpad Goncz laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier in the Eternal Glory Park above the Dnepr. He

honored with a minute's silence the memory of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism.

On behalf of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, a reception was given in honor of the president of the Hungarian Republic.

Holds Talks in Kiev

LD2809113190 Budapest MTI in English 1036 GMT
28 Sep 90

[Text] Kiev, September 27 (MTI)—Leonid Kravchuk has promised to expand the border crossing points, and announced that the Ukraine would like to return to a facilitated system of border crossing. The Ukrainian president said that Ukrainians want to considerably ease the border crossings of Ukrainian disciples for the time of the papal visit to Hungary, scheduled for August, 1991.

At the talks, the Ukrainian president responded favourably to the Hungarian request to allow the erection of a memorial to the Hungarian soldiers who died in the Second World War. At the same time, the Ukrainian leader sought respect for the resting places of the Ukrainians killed in action in Hungary, too.

Regarding the issue of national minorities, Mr. Kravchuk—taking the Hungarian motion somewhat further—offered to work out a national minority charter, which, in his words, would have a favourable effect on the pan-European processes as well, alongside encouraging bilateral relations.

Mr. Goncz commented that the current visit is of historical importance for Hungary also, since it has begun rebuilding bilateral contacts with the Ukraine, as the first of the Soviet Union's member republics. He was of the opinion that the two countries are part of the same historical wave. The two peoples are not rivals in drawing nearer to [word indistinct], rather assisting each other in this goal.

Mr. Goncz proposed holding high-level assemblies within a month, examining the concrete possibilities of building contacts, establishing direct economic relations organized away from through Moscow, and determining military links.

President Goncz requested cultural autonomy for the Hungarians living in sub-Carpathia. Regarding environmental protection, Mr. Goncz proposed that the Ukraine also join in the work of the Budapest-based regional Environmental Protection Centre, and create the conditions of regional cooperation in the area bordered by the Carpathians and the Tisza river.

At a news conference held to mark the end of the talks, Leonid Kravchuk announced that, as an extension of the establishment of consular relations agreed upon in talks, the Ukraine would like to open a consulate in Uzhgorod, subsequently raising relations to an ambassadorial level.

He said the Ukraine plans to open a scientific and cultural institute in Budapest, and considers it appropriate for a Hungarian theatre to be set up in Uzhgorod.

The two presidents signed a joint communique on the results of their talks, on Thursday evening.

Complementing his official talks, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz placed a wreath at the memorial to the unknown soldier, and saw the art collection of the Ukrainian Republic in the Pecherskaya Monastery in Kiev.

The president of the Republic of Hungary will pay a visit to the Ukrainian Federation of Writers on Friday, and will visit the Hungarian Consulate in Kiev. Mr. Goncz is to also visit Uzhgorod.

Joint Communique Affirms Ties

LD2809124190 Budapest MTI In English
1047 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Kiev, September 27 (MTI)—A joint communique was issued on the Hungarian-Ukrainian presidential talks. The communique reaffirms that both Hungary and the Ukraine will strive to uphold and develop neighbourly relations. These, it is added, will not involve the interests of a third party, and will aim to contribute to the building of the common European home.

The document notes that the sides require to be able to determine their countries' home and foreign policy, free from external intervention, in accordance with their right to self-determination. It states that they should be able to set the guidelines of their political, economic and cultural development according to these principles.

Both the Ukraine and Hungary express their commitment in the communique to the observance of international standards, including international regulations serving to guarantee the territorial independence of the states.

The joint communique refers to one of the very significant themes of the presidential meeting, the situation of the national minorities. The document notes that the Hungarians are satisfied that the situation of Hungarians living in sub-Carpathia has improved in recent years, hence considerably increasing the possibilities of bilateral cooperation. Arpad Goncz and Leonid Kravchuk commissioned experts to do further research into issues with bearings on the rights of the national minorities.

At the request of the Hungarians, the joint communique states that the Ukrainian side will examine the possibility of erecting a memorial, officially commemorating those Hungarian citizens who lost their lives in the Second World War. In return, Hungary has agreed to show due respect for the graves of Ukrainian citizens in Hungary.

Joint Hungarian Computer Enterprise Opens

LD2709175890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Sep 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] A Soviet-Hungarian joint enterprise has appeared in Pavlodar oblast. This first joint enterprise came into being just three months ago. Its creation was initiated by the local tractor works, the Vesna radio works which is still under construction, and the Hungarian firm Muszertechnika.

Naturally there is a big demand for Pavlodar computers, but the joint enterprise was designed with a view to assisting the republic's program for the computerization of many sectors of the economy. The enterprise, which is called Probnoinfo, is providing full technical servicing for its products.

A surprise is that here just six people each month assemble output to the value 50 to 60 million rubles.

Demand for the computers outstrips supply. In the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan alone, there is a requirement for at least 200-250,000 of these machines.

Romanian Economic Commission Visits

AU2609184190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1812 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—The proceedings of the Joint Romanian-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission of Economic, Technical and Scientific Cooperation started in Moscow on Wednesday. During the first session in plenum a survey was made of the state of bilateral relations and of their development prospects.

Emphasis was placed on the fine results scored within the cooperation actions and the mutual wish was expressed to expand them. The need was underscored to take firm actions in the shortest possible time to update all contracts under way as a prerequisite for concluding new understandings on bilateral exchanges for 1991.

In a statement to a Romanian press representative Mr. Anton Vatasescu, co-chairman of the commission, minister of state in charge of industrial and commercial activity, said: This meeting should be considered a preparatory meeting of the Joint Romanian-Soviet Commission whose first official session is due in the first trimester of 1991 in Moscow. It is of special importance for our country in consideration of the volume of bilateral commercial exchanges and the character of the goods the Soviet Union delivers to us. We would like to find a legal framework for the delivery of energy in the fourth trimester at the previously agreed levels and try to get a guarantee from the Soviet party that it will continue its deliveries under the new contracts on convertible currency effective starting 1 January 1991.

Romanian Premier Interviewed on Problems, Ties
PM2709134390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 21 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman by special correspondent Ye. Kalyadina, Bucharest-Moscow dateline; date not given: "Petre Roman: December Brought Me Into Politics"—first three paragraphs are Kalyadina introduction]

[Text] He greeted me in Russian, almost without an accent. And with an enchanting smile. Such a smile is usually called "winsome." But I will not call it that. The thing is that some people in Romania consider it to be literally that [the Russian word literally means "bribing"]. The same goes, moreover, for the smile of Ion Iliescu. The opposition, which has become quite adept at verbal games, accuse both the premier and the president of building "socialism with a smiling face." After the "party bourgeoisie" had been frightened in December of last year, the newspaper ROMANIA LIBERA, for instance, wrote, it changed its "complexion" and began "to smile," gaining great success thereby.

I am not inclined to consider the opposition's terminology to be accurate. But 84 percent of Romanians, who support Roman, and 79 percent who support Iliescu (these are the statistics of the latest poll conducted by the Romanian Institute of Public Opinion Research) really does constitute a success. And probably earned by more than just a smile.

The premier received me on a Saturday—a working day for him—in his luxuriously appointed office. He is a handsome, 44-year-old man with Spanish blood (on his mother's side). And I remembered another Roman—the one who appeared before us on our television screens in the December days that shook the world. With circles under his eyes, wearing a sweater, somewhat embarrassed—not what one expected at all.... And now a splendid premier.

[Kalyadina] How does the former polytechnic institute teacher feel in his new job?

[Roman] Yes, I am not a professional. I was brought into politics by the events of December. I cannot say that I feel bad in my new role. Besides, some experienced politicians, especially Americans, have told me that this is the best way of becoming a politician.

Besides, how I feel in politics is not very important. Probably others will ask the question, how politics can tolerate me. I wish to say that in my new activity I have had almost no easy moments. There have been pleasant moments, but no easy ones....

[Kalyadina] That is understandable. The barrage of sarcasm from the opposition press. University Square, which has barely quietened down, and which has perhaps simply retired into its shell. Workers' strikes.... You

are criticized a lot. Well, if you were to look now at your government's activity from the outside, what mistakes would you see?

[Roman] I am asked this question fairly often. Of course there have been mistakes, or, to put be more exact, weaknesses. For example, the excessively facile approach which we have taken regarding the solution of complex social questions (referring to measures such as wage raises, the introduction of a second day off, and the payment of various subsidies—Ye.K.). These steps, especially in the initial period, in January, were insufficiently economically substantiated, and as a result led to negative consequences for the economy. I do to know whether another government or a different political leadership would have managed to be firmer. In any case, this would have been useful. On the other hand, we were subjected to so much political pressure, that occasional instances of weakening were probably natural.

In addition, in our policies we did not come forward with sufficiently clear explanations. People had less idea in Romania than in any other East European country about the political game with multiparty participation. This, of course, did not affect the results of the elections, which, I believe, could not have been better, but the perception of this possible alternative. The Front (the National Salvation Front—Ye.K.), seeking to embrace virtually all political tendencies, did not define itself sufficiently clearly, and it did not manage to become, essentially speaking, as broad a movement as was possible. Unfortunately, we had to master the classic formula of party pluralism very quickly.

[Kalyadina] At one time Romania was trying to find its own independent, specific path to socialism. Is a similar task now being set of searching for a special path, not resembling other paths? Not now, of course, toward socialism.... But in that case, toward what? I came across the following opinion in one of your newspapers: "Romanian society, having decisively chosen the direction of moving toward political pluralism and the market economy is now looking for its own path, the vector of which lies somewhere between renewed socialism and developed capitalism. A battle is being waged between the majority, who believe in the existence of such an original path, and the minority who consider it to be a utopia." What is your point of view?

[Roman] The originality, if it can be put like that, which we tried to define in the conditions which arose directly after the revolution is connected precisely with what I have already been saying. A political movement based on ideology had to give place for a certain period of time to a broad democratic movement. This was a correct and a very fruitful idea. But since, in comparison with other East European countries, Romania emerged at a stroke from a dictatorship whose existence is difficult to imagine at the end of the second millenium, we could not use this model. As a result a situation has now arisen in our country which is typical for a democracy of the

classic type, with certain nuances, and I do not think that it is distinguished by too great originality.

I do not think either that we are talking of a path between renewed socialism and capitalism. I believe that among responsible politicians today, there is no one who would any longer assume responsibility for the choice of one or other extreme. Everyone is trying to define himself in a left-wing or right-wing tendency where both the obvious failures of what was called socialism and the "wild sides" of capitalism are surmounted. We are for a center-left path, as we call it, in which transition to the market economy is directly coordinated with social aspects.

[Kalyadina] Many political scientists today like to adduce parallels between the reforming East European countries and the developed Western countries. Do you have some example in view?

[Roman] We recently came to the conclusion that the situation which Romania finds itself in at the present time closely resembles the position of Austria between 1950 and 1955. I would like us to reach Austria's standard of living, which, from a common sense viewpoint, is possible.

[Kalyadina] On roughly what kind of timescale?

[Roman] The timescale is clear enough. We have conducted detailed research into this. A so-called transition plan for the Romanian economy exists. It envisages approximately two years—although this term will probably be shorter—for the introduction of the machinery of the market economy. Then three to four years will be necessary for the modernization of the economy. In other words, it is possible to achieve a comparable level within five to six years.

[Kalyadina] On the subject of the Romanian choice, I would like to note the following aspect. At one time Romania pursued a policy of keeping aloof from the Soviet Union, which, in my view, helped Ceausescu win popularity, including from the West. Does this requirement exist now—to break away from the Soviet Union?

[Roman] No, such a policy or such a trend in policy does not exist. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, from January up to the present time we have not retreated from the understanding that, from the political point of view, we owe the USSR nothing.

We are very interested in very wide economic cooperation with your country.

At the same time, voices resound in our press and in political circles claiming that there are "secret connections." And although these voices wish to seem the most free in conditions of complete freedom of speech, they are very like the voice of Ceausescu. But they are incapable of influencing us.

[Kalyadina] Perhaps I am mistaken, but, as far as I know, in a recent interview with an Italian magazine you said that Soviet perestroika does not interest you....

[Roman] It would be incorrect to say that perestroika does not interest me. On the contrary, there was a time when I was very interested in it. In the circumstances of the breach which happened in December—I mean the breach with the system of the previous regime—the adoption of a definite line toward perestroika was impossible and undesirable: Because the first years of perestroika did not lead to favorable changes in the economy. And this is because for a long time perestroika tried only to modify the old regime, introducing too few structural changes, especially where transition to the market economy was concerned. This has been acknowledged entirely even by Soviet leaders, especially Mr. Gorbachev, with whom I spoke at the June meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states in Moscow. Now, so far as I can see, this difficulty has "exploded" in Soviet society. In this sense, perestroika really does not interest me. But as far as the evolution of perestroika in the USSR is concerned, this theme is of very great interest to me. Who can remain indifferent to such radical transformations taking place in a country like the Soviet Union? That would be political blindness.

[Kalyadina] Now, if you do not mind, a question which is, I think, topical for many people in my country, and for me as a communist. I have read your statements several times where you renounce—I allow myself this, perhaps rather extreme definition—communism. What was the cause of this? The fact that you were accused of neocommunism? Or was it your conviction that communism is a fiction?

[Roman] I was probably one of the first people in Romania to begin talking about the evil of communism. But unlike those who preferred simply to pelt communism with stones, I considered it necessary to explain its imperfection. In Romania, communism was not ideology, but practice, a system implemented in reality. The communist ideal, on the other hand, remained floating somewhere in the clouds. In its incarnated form as so-called "real socialism," this ideal did not bring happiness to the Romanian people in a single sphere, even in the moral aspect. The latter seems to me to be the most serious point. After all, I lived in a family of communists—people who were prepared to lay down their lives, and proved as much more than once. They were strongly disappointed by the quality of human relations in our society. And if we managed to do nothing even in this sphere, then it is clear that the mistake was made somewhere at the very base.

[Kalyadina] Did you join the party sincerely?

[Roman] Yes. I joined the party in 1965. That was a good time for Romania. There were a lot of us then—people who believed that we could reform the system from within. I was sincere. But from the beginning of the seventies it became clear that we had been mistaken.

[Kalyadina] Where is your party card now?

[Roman] I tore it up 19 December, because it had become clear to me that what happened in Timosoara was a premeditated crime.

[Kalyadina] And what is your attitude to the monument to Lenin which was hurled down from its pedestal and now lies on the city dump?

[Roman] That was the reaction of emotions, not reason.... But there can be no question of this monument's appearing again in the near future in a Bucharest square. We have decided to rid ourselves of ideological dominion. When Lenin becomes a well understood figure and his activity has received an all-round evaluation in the Soviet Union, then it is possible that we too, as individuals, will be able to understand more correctly his role, and then the idea of reassessing his role will reemerge. But at the moment I see heated debates even in your country. Those who are still very devoted to Lenin out of the Bolshevik ideal will not accept a cold-blooded analysis. Whilst those who reject Lenin do not feel the need for scientific historical research either. While these two poles prevail, the truth will not see the light.

[Kalyadina] But perhaps Ilich's place is all the same in a museum and not on a dump?

[Roman] Of course. I repeat, a reassessment of Lenin's personality is possible. But at the present time the social and political conditions for this do not exist.

[Kalyadina] The Romanian people have lived on lies for so long. Do you believe in its ability to sincerely carry out changes today?

[Roman] I am convinced of this. If the language used by political leaders consistently expresses the truth, acceptance of the truth will in the end become society's norm. As far as we are concerned, then so far, I can assure you, we have been consistent in telling the truth. However, the press too often resorts to lying, and this creates confusion in a society that did not know what the freedom of the press is for so many years.

[Kalyadina] The examples of "transitional" leaders in neighboring countries are fairly recent: M. Rakowski in Poland, Hans Modrow in the GDR, P. Mladenov in Bulgaria.... Do you feel yourself in the role of a temporary government or do you expect longer prospects?

[Kalyadina] We are the lawful government and we feel ourselves to be such. But in a democratic society a change of government is normal phenomenon. No one will be offended if a change happens.. It is a political struggle.

[Kalyadina] And do you still have faith in your own forces?

[Roman] Of course.

Economic Cooperation Talks With Romania Held
*LD2709221790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1511 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Text] Moscow, 27 September (TASS)—A meeting of the chairmen of the national sections of the Soviet-Romanian intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation took place in Moscow on 26 and 27 September. There was a discussion of urgent matters concerning bilateral trade and economic relations. The sides confirmed their intention of going over to new conditions in the implementation of economic relations that envisage a transfer, from 1991, to reciprocal payments in freely convertible currency at current world prices and on the basis of conditions accepted in international trade.

An accord was achieved on concluding an intergovernmental agreement on this issue in October. The procedure was determined for developing trade and economic relations between the USSR and Romania in 1991 on the basis of an implementation of all forms of cooperation, including the creation of joint enterprises.

The Soviet delegation was headed by P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Romanian one by A. Vatesescu, minister of state for industry and commerce.

A protocol was signed on the results of the meeting.

Reports Continue on Bulgarian Leader's Visit

Gorbachev Greets Lilov

*PM2809083590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Message from M.S. Gorbachev "To Comrade Aleksandr Ilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council"]

[Text] Dear Comrade Lilov,

I cordially congratulate you on your election as chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council.

I wish you the successful implementation of the course approved by the 29th congress toward the Bulgarian Socialist Party's transformation into a modern left-wing party of democratic socialism which has put itself at the service of the cause of society's radical renewal in the interests of the working people.

I express the certainty that relations between the CPSU and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, imbued with a spirit of mutual understanding and comradely solidarity, will continue to develop for the benefit of our fraternal peoples.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Lukanov Leaves 27 Sep

*LD2709100890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 0830 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Bulgarian Premier Andrei Lukanov left Moscow for home today, following a short working visit to the Soviet Union.

West Europe**Text of Cooperation Treaty With FRG Reported**

*PM2309165190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3*

["Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the FRG"]

[Text] The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

conscious of their responsibility for the preservation of peace in Europe and in the world,

in the wish to make a final break with the past, and, through mutual understanding and reconciliation, to make a weighty contribution to overcoming the division of Europe,

convinced of the need to construct a new Europe, united by shared values, and to create a lasting and just European peace order including stable security structures,

in the conviction that human rights and basic freedoms are of great significance as part of the all-European legacy and that respect for them is a fundamental precondition for progress in the construction of this peace order,

in confirmation of their declaration of support for the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter and the stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and of the subsequent documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

determined to link up with the good traditions of their centuries-old history, to make goodneighborliness, partnership, and cooperation the basis of their relations and to do justice to the historic challenges on the threshold to the third millennium,

on the basis of the foundations which were created in the past years through the development of cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

filled with the wish to develop and further deepen the fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states in all areas and to lend a new quality to their relationship to one another in the interests of their people and of peace in Europe,

taking into account the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany of 12 September 1990, which settled the external aspects of the establishment of German unity,

have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are guided in the shaping of their relations by the following principles:

They respect each other's sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence.

They place man with his dignity and his rights, concern for the survival of mankind, and the preservation of the natural environment at the center of their policy.

They reaffirm the right of all peoples and states to shape their destiny freely and without external interference and to shape their political, economic, social, and cultural development according to their own wishes.

They espouse the principle that any war whether nuclear or conventional, must be reliably prevented and that peace must be maintained and shaped.

They grant priority to general rules of international law in domestic and international politics and confirm their determination conscientiously to fulfill their treaty obligations.

They embrace the principle of exploiting the creative potential of mankind and of modern society for the strengthening of peace and for the expansion of the prosperity of all peoples.

Article 2

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertake to strictly respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers.

They declare that they have no territorial claims against anyone and that they will not make such claims in the future.

Today and in the future they regard the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable as they stand on the day of the signing of this treaty.

Article 3

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirm that they will refrain from the use of or threats of the use of force which are directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other side or are incompatible in any way with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter or with the CSCE final acts.

They will solve their disputes solely by peaceful means and never use any of their weapons lest it be for

individual or collective self-defense. They will never and under no circumstances be the first to use armed forces against each other or against third states. They call upon all other states to join this pledge of nonaggression.

If one of the two states should become the target of aggression, then the other side will give the aggressor no military aid or other support and will take all measures to end the conflict using the principles and procedures of the United Nations and other structures of collective security.

Article 4

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will work toward the considerable reduction of Armed Forces and armaments through binding, effectively verifiable agreements, so that together with unilateral measures, a stable balance of forces at a lower level is created, particularly in Europe, which is sufficient for defense but not for attack.

The same applies to the multilateral and bilateral broadening of confidence-building and stabilizing measures.

Article 5

Both sides will do their utmost to assist the development of the process of security and cooperation in Europe on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and further strengthen and develop it with the involvement of all participating states, particularly through the establishment of permanent institutions and organs. The aim of these efforts is the consolidation of peace, stability, and security and the transformation of Europe into a unified region of law, democracy, and cooperation in the sphere of the economy, culture and information.

Article 6

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to hold regular consultations in order to ensure the further development and deepening of their bilateral relations and to coordinate their stance on international questions.

Consultations at the highest political level shall take place as often as required, and at the least once a year.

The foreign ministers shall meet at least twice a year.

The defense ministers shall hold regular meetings.

Meetings shall take place between other ministers of the two states as necessary on topics of mutual interest.

The joint commissions already in existence will examine possibilities of intensifying their work. New mixed commissions will be set up as required following bilateral agreement.

Article 8

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to considerably

develop and deepen their bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic, industrial, and scientific-technological sectors and in the sector of environmental protection, in order to develop mutual relations on a stable and long-term basis and to strengthen the trust between both states and peoples. To this end, they will conclude a comprehensive treaty on the development of cooperation in the sphere of the economy, industry, science and technology and, insofar as they are needed, separate agreements for particular practical sectors.

Both sides attach great importance to cooperation in training and enhancing the skills of specialists and leading personnel in the economy for the development of bilateral relations and are prepared to considerably broaden and deepen it.

Article 9

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will further develop and deepen economic cooperation for mutual benefit. For the citizens, enterprises, and state and nonstate institutions of the other side they will create the most favorable framework conditions for entrepreneurial and other economic activity which are possible under the terms of their internal legislation and their obligations arising from international treaties. This applies especially to the treatment of capital investment and investors.

Both sides will promote the initiatives of those directly interested which are needed for economic cooperation, particularly with the aim of fully exploiting the possibilities of the treaties concluded and programs agreed.

Article 10

On the basis of the Agreement on 22 July 1986 on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, both sides will further develop exchanges in this field and conduct joint projects. They wish to employ the achievements of modern science and technology in the interests of the people, their health, and their prosperity. They will promote and support joint initiative by researchers and research institutions in this field.

Article 11

In the conviction that the preservation of the natural bases for life is indispensable for flourishing economic and social development, both sides confirm their determination to continue and to intensify their cooperation in the field of environmental protection on the basis of their agreement of 25 October 1988.

They intend to share in solving important problems relating to environmental protection, to investigate damaging effects on the environment and to develop measures to prevent them. They will take part in the development of coordinated strategies and concepts for an environmental policy that crosses state frontiers in an international and in particular in a European framework.

Article 12

Both sides will strive for an expansion of transport links (air, rail, sea, inland shipping, and road transport) between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics making use of the most modern technologies.

Article 13

Both sides will strive to considerably simplify, on the basis of reciprocity, the visa procedures for journeys by citizens of the two countries, primarily for business, economic and cultural purposes and for the purposes of scientific and technological cooperation.

Article 14

Both sides will help comprehensive contacts between people from both countries and the broadening of cooperation between parties, trade unions, foundations, schools, colleges, sports organizations, churches and social institutions, women's environmental, and other social organizations and associations.

Particular attention is devoted to the deepening of contacts between the parliaments of the two states.

They welcome partnership cooperation between local authorities, regions, federal lands, and Union republics.

A considerable role is played by the German-Soviet dialogue forum and cooperation between the media.

Both sides will make it easier for all young people and their organizations to take part in exchanges, meetings and joint projects.

Article 15

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, aware of the centuries of mutual enrichment of the cultures of their peoples and their indispensable contribution to the shared cultural heritage of Europe, as well as of the importance of cultural exchange for mutual understanding of peoples, will considerably develop cultural cooperation.

Both sides will give real substance to the agreement on the creation and work of cultural centers and fully exploit them.

Both sides confirm their readiness to allow all interested people comprehensive access to the languages and culture of the other side and will promote corresponding state and private initiatives.

Both sides resolutely advocate broadening possibilities for learning the language of the other country in schools, colleges, and other education institutions and to this end of helping the other side in the training and enhancing the skills teachers and of making available teaching materials, including the use of television, radio, audio, video, and computer technology. They will support initiatives to set up bilingual schools.

Soviet citizens of German nationality and citizens originating from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and residing permanently in the Federal Republic of Germany who wish to preserve their language, culture, or traditions will be enabled to develop their national, linguistic, and cultural identity. Accordingly, they will make possible and easier, within the framework of the existing laws for the other side to assist such people or their organizations.

Article 16

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will work to preserve the cultural assets of the other party on their territory.

They agree that cultural treasures, which disappeared or were illegally removed, that are on their territory will be returned to the owner of his successor in title.

Article 17

Both sides stress the particular significance of humanitarian cooperation in their bilateral relations. They will increase this cooperation and do so with the involvement of the charitable organizations of both sides.

Article 18

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declares that the memorials set up on German soil which are dedicated to the Soviet victims of the war and tyranny will be respected and placed under the protection of German laws. The same applies to Soviet war graves. They shall be preserved and maintained.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics guarantees access to the graves of Germans on Soviet territory, their preservation and maintainance.

The responsible organizations on both sides will increase their cooperation in these areas.

Article 19

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will broaden the exchange of legal aid in matters concerning civil and family law on the basis of the Hague agreement valid between them on civil procedure. Both sides will further develop the exchange of legal aid between the two states in criminal matters taking into account their legal systems and in keeping with international law.

The responsible authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will work together in combatting organized crime, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, illegal interference in civilian air traffic and marine traffic, the creation or circulation of forged money, smuggling, including the illegal smuggling of cultural assets across frontiers. The procedures and conditions for cooperation between both sides will be agreed separately.

Article 20

Both governments will increase their cooperation within the framework of international organizations, taking into account mutual interests and cooperation with other countries on both sides. They will help each other to develop cooperation with international, in particular European organizations and institutions, of which one side is a member if the other side expresses a relevant interest.

Article 21

This treaty does not impinge upon the rights and obligations arising from valid bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded by both sides with other states. This treaty is not directed against anyone; both sides regard their cooperation as a component and dynamic element of the further development of the CSCE process.

Article 22

This treaty requires ratification; the ratification certificates will be exchanged in the very near future in...

This treaty will come into effect on the day of the exchange of the certificates of ratification.

This treaty is valid for 20 years. After this it will be extended automatically for five years at a time insofar as one of the treaty states does not give notice of cancelling the treaty while adhering to a period of notice of one year before the expiry of the relevant term of validity.

This day... in... in two original texts, each in German and Russian, whereby each text is equally binding.

For the Federal Republic of Germany

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Swedish Defense Minister's Visit Continues

Meets With Yazov

PM2809091190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] Swedish Defense Minister R. Carlsson arrived in the Soviet Union 24 September on an official visit at the invitation of Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council and USSR defense minister.

The guest and those accompanying him were greeted at the airport by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov; Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister; USSR Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov and Colonel General V.F. Yermakov; other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The reception party included O. Berner, Swedish ambassador to the USSR, along with Brigadier General J. Palmgren, defense attache at the Swedish Embassy in the USSR.

The Swedish and Soviet state flags were hoisted at the airport, an honor guard was drawn up on the airfield, and the two countries' national anthems were

On the same day Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov met with R. Carlsson. During the conversation they discussed problems linked with the prospects of creating a stable system of collective security on the European continent and the state of affairs at the Vienna talks on cuts in conventional Armed Forces and armaments, along with questions of bilateral relations in the military sphere.

The Swedish defense minister laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov gave a lunch in honor of R. Carlsson.

Returns Home 27 Sep

LD2709101390 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 0830 GMT 27 Sep 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Swedish Defense Minister Roine Carlsson, who has been in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the USSR minister of defense, left for Stockholm today. He was seen off at the airport by Comrade Yazov and other officials.

Italian Minister Ponders European Defense System

LD2809112590 Moscow TASS in English 1112 GMT
28 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow September 28 TASS—The Gulf crisis served to "reanimate" the old idea of setting up a so-called European defence community within the EC framework.

Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis embarrassed other Common Market members the other day by moving to "swallow up" the West European Union—today's only international body dealing with West European military matters.

The Italian minister's proposal was seconded by his Belgian counterpart Marc Eyskens. They argued that the situation in the Gulf could have developed differently if the 12 European nations had had joint Armed Forces, capable of reacting promptly to changing circumstances. This subject is expected to be discussed in greater detail in Venice this October, during the meeting of the EC Council of Ministers, and in Rome during the December session of the EC Council.

Soviet diplomatic circles believe it is most important today to establish all-European security structures and to overcome the division of the continent on CSCE lines. It is important to step up the process of transforming NATO and the Warsaw Treaty alliances into predominantly political organisations. The CSCE summit, scheduled to be held in Paris this November, is expected to be an important landmark in the creation of a new Europe.

As to the settling of international conflicts by means of European Armed Forces, which are now being discussed, it ought to be borne in mind that the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed on the need to further enhance the United Nation's role in this domain. Soviet proposals to set up U.N. naval forces and activate the U.N. military staff committee must also be regarded in this context.

Lukyanov Receives Luxembourg Parliamentarians

*LD2709133990 Moscow TASS in English 1324 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov received a delegation from the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, led by Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, president of the chamber, in the Kremlin today. The delegation is currently in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

Lukyanov emphasised the significance of the current transition from military-political confrontation to the establishment of constructive cooperation and interaction in Europe. He pointed to the importance of the forthcoming all-European summit.

The two sides expressed confidence that the visit by the Luxembourg members of parliament would promote the further development of contacts, better mutual understanding and greater trust between the Soviet Union and Luxembourg. It will also contribute to deepening the all-European process and to enhancing its parliamentary dimension, they agreed.

Lukyanov told the guests about Soviet perestroika and the role of the Soviet Parliament in it.

Having wished the Soviet Union success in the accomplishment of perestroika, Hennicot-Schoepges said that the integration of the Soviet economy into the world one would meet the interests of the international community and that Luxembourg was prepared to help the process forward.

CPSU Delegation Returns From France, Italy

*PM2809105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4*

["Own information" report: "Delegation's Return"]

[Text] The PRAVDA delegation headed by I.T. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and

chief editor of PRAVDA, returned to Moscow 26 September. The delegation had taken part in the festival of the French Communists' newspaper L'HUMANITE and the festival of the Italian Communists' newspaper L'UNITA.

Yakovlev, Falin Attend French Paper's Opening

*PM2809115590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "PARIS MATCH in Russian"]

[Text] Paris, 26 Sep—PARIS MATCH—the most popular French weekly—in Russian. The very idea seemed fantastic only recently. But today it has become reality. Well-known French politicians, cultural figures, and representatives of public organizations were acquainted in Paris with a special issue of PARIS MATCH in Russian published with the assistance of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

The presentation ceremony held in the Soviet Embassy was attended by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council; V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Thierry de Bosie, state secretary to the state minister and minister of foreign affairs of France; Pierre Mauroy, first secretary of the French Socialist Party; and Yu.V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador to France.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Trade Representative Interviewed on Ties

*PY2709031490 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America
0200 GMT 25 Sep 90*

[Interview with Jose de la Fuente Menendez, Cuban trade representative to Moscow, by (Andrey Alyushin) at the Cuban Embassy Commercial Office in Moscow; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [(Alyushin)] What is the current situation of Cuban-USSR trade relations?

[Fuente] Well, Cuban exports to the Soviet Union are increasing, both in the field of essential products such as sugar, nickel, and citrus fruits, and in the field of new products such as those having to do with public health. So far, we have signed contracts to supply 150 [word indistinct]. These are highly sophisticated pieces of equipment, computerized equipment to carry out very precise diagnosis. We have also signed contracts for the supply of 50 (Suma) systems, which can help diagnose diseases such as AIDS, congenital defects, and other things that will help in achieving a great step in the public health sector. The use of these pieces of equipment has been extended to different USSR republics as well.

[(Alyushin)] Could you also tell us something about Soviet exports to Cuba, within our current trade relations?

[Fuente] Well, we can say that Soviet exports to Cuba this year have been affected by the difficulties it has been facing. This reality has affected the supply of essential products such as fuel, in the first place. Current difficulties in this sector have caused a delay in the supply of fuel. There is a delay in the supply of approximately 2 million tons of fuel. This delay also affects a number of other products we receive from the Soviet Union. As I said in the beginning, we are actively working with different Soviet officials, with officials in the different republics, and with producers and suppliers at all levels to find a solution to these problems by the end of the last quarter in order to conclude this year with the best achievement possible, taking into consideration the situation we are experiencing.

[(Alyushin)] These operations are carried out with the transferable ruble, is that not true?

[Fuente] Yes. All of these operations are carried out with the transferable ruble, which up to this year has been the money used in our trade relations.

[(Alyushin)] Of course, the transferable ruble is not very strong; it does not have the same financial effectiveness as other freely convertible currencies. We know that these operations should be carried out only in convertible currency, as in operations between all other countries. How does this affect Soviet-Cuban trade relations?

[Fuente] Well, an agreement between the two countries on this matter is still pending. As I have said, we are working hard to find a solution to the problem, to find the best possible path for our future work. We are very sure that we will find a satisfactory solution that will help increase our trade relations, which are very important for our country. These relations have developed over the past 30 years with no interruption, and both parties are willing to find a path that will guarantee future development, in the hope that economic integration between our two countries will continue improving as it has in the past 30 years since the Cuban revolution.

Cuban Emigration History, Relations Reviewed

*PM2609135490 London MOSCOW NEWS
in English No 17, 21-26 Sep 90 p 12*

[Article by Aleksandr Makhov: "Soviet Union Must Help Build Freedom Island"]

[Text] Events I witnessed as a student at Havana University in 1980 were seen last summer. Groups of Cubans bombarded foreign embassies with the sole purpose of leaving the confines of Freedom Island (the Soviet euphemism for Cuba - Ed.).

The situation must have reached boiling point because Fidel Castro permitted 125,000 of his fellow citizens to emigrate to a hostile state north of the island and join the 2 million-strong community of Cubans who had left the country when he first came to power. "Let that scum, those criminals, leave," newspaper headlines cried at

that time. The "criminals" included university lecturers, physicians and skilled workers.

And now, ten years later, I am in Miami—"the den of the Cuban counter-revolution", according to Havana newspapers—a city half of whose population is of Cuban extraction. Criminals, bandits, paid agents of imperialism—this is the image of Cuban emigration that has been hammered into us for decades by Cuban and Soviet propaganda. There are, of course, some criminals among the emigres, as there are in any society. But these are few. The majority of those who came to the United States were people with a taste for enterprise—the creative and technical intelligentsia.

Miami has given the lie to other stories created by rich communist mythology. All visitors to Cuba are taken to museums full of exhibits that tell how the country's economy was plundered by U.S. imperialism, and portray the poverty and lack of rights to be found in the island prior to the revolution.

"But did you know that Cuba was one of the most flourishing and developed nations in the western hemisphere in the 1950s?" I was asked by all the emigrants I met, regardless of their social standing. And immediately they would start running through their old arguments: the economy was on the upturn, the country was part of the world market in which its sugar, tobacco and other produce knew no competition.

Thanks to this, and the successful tourist industry, the standard of living was the highest in Latin America, and Cuban workers' social security was better than that of their North American counterparts.... I have to admit that at times I felt they were just replacing old myths with new ones.

"Just look at the statistical yearbooks," I was told emphatically. It was not difficult to find these yearbooks in the Miami University library. Unlike Havana, they are not kept in special depositories.

They show that in the late 1950s, literacy levels in Cuba were second only to those in Argentina and on a par with Costa Rica and Chile; the country ranked second in the region in terms of its educational budget; and, in the development of radio and television (including, incidentally, colour TV), it was unequalled in Latin America.

The Cuban health service was world class; not a single case of scarlet fever, encephalitis or tropical fever was registered in 1958. It has the third lowest incidence of poliomyelitis in Latin America, and the smallest number of smallpox, tuberculosis and syphilis cases.

Cuba was at the top of the regional list for annual per capita income, and for the number of cars, radio and TV sets owned. Inflation was non-existent between 1951 and 1958. So, three decades ago, the revolutionaries got hold of a country with a highly developed economic and social structure.

Most of the people I spoke to had welcomed Castro's entry into Havana. The Batista dictatorship, they explained, had increasingly come to limit economic expansion.

All hopes for democracy were pinned on Fidel's takeover, but it became clear within the space of a year that these hopes were completely misplaced. "We passed straight from one dictatorship to another."

The first wave of emigration began in 1960. Over the years, the flow has fluctuated, but never ended. In many cases, emigration was preceded by imprisonment for "counter-revolutionary activities".

World famous poet Heberto Padilla, for example, was subjected to constant police surveillance and placed in a punishment cell at the state security office, while his friend and colleague Vicente Hechherri spent time in a concentration camp before being allowed off Freedom Island.

The driver of a Cadillac belonging to an emigrant firm in Miami told me that he had spent five years in prison in the 1960s. "What for?" I asked. "Did you oppose the regime?" "No, nothing of the kind. I worked as a truck driver, stayed out of politics, and did not go to meetings. The state security took me right from my work place—I was just dragged out of the cab of my lorry. There was no trial as such. I just thank God I was not shot."

It would be a greater exaggeration to say that the nature of Cuban emigration to the USA is homogeneous. It spreads across practically the whole political spectrum. Emigrants are united only by their refusal to accept the Castro regime, and tactical differences lead to vociferous verbal exchanges which are normal in any pluralist society.

So, the talk turns to Jorge Mas Canosa, president of the Cuban-American National Foundation. Some call him the wisest emigrant leader, while others inimically shrug their shoulders. But on way or another, everyone admits he is the most influential leader of the Cuban diaspora.

"Among the 2 million Cubans who live in the United States are poor people who used to dig ditches and millionaires," says Mas Canosa. "But of all the ethnic groups in the USA, Cubans have the fewest number of poor and the lowest level of crime."

"None of us had a single cent when we left Cuba. We were even forbidden to take personal effects, except for the clothes we stood up in. But the overwhelming majority of Cubans have been able to adapt to life here solely because this society is open and free, and allows people to reach their full potential."

I asked him how much support he thinks there is for the existing regime in Cuba.

"Verbally, everyone supports Castro, but this is always the case under totalitarian regimes. Don't forget that all

the Nicaraguan public opinion polls predicted victory for Ortega, but he lost the elections.

"There is opposition to the existing system, but it has not been formally organised. In Cuba, you just have to mention human rights, and you will immediately land in jail or a mental hospital."

What can be done to help Cuba? "We favour a society with a market economy and political pluralism. When the time comes to rebuild our country, we want to rely solely on our own resources, not on aid from any government, even the USA. Our own resources and capital will be enough for this."

"Our experience in Miami provides an excellent example. Some 2 million Cubans, living here under market conditions, contribute \$30 billion towards the GNP. The GNP of Cuba, on the other hand, with its population of 10 million, amounts to a mere \$8 billion."

"I am sure that, with our spirit of enterprise, we shall be able to revive our native country. I believe that we must repay our debts to the USSR and continue to maintain excellent diplomatic and trade relations with your country, on the basis, of course, of world prices and convertible currency."

Just a fleeting acquaintance with this "other Cuba" shatters many of the stereotypes that we have become familiar with. As we in the Soviet Union change, and rip the ideological blinkers from our eyes, we realise that our friends are no better than we ourselves were yesterday.

So, should we be artificially prolonging their period of stagnation? Now the dogmas have been brushed aside, we must start a large-scale reappraisal of all habitual relations with Havana, before it is too late. Baghdad is pressing from behind.

Supply Shortages Hit Cuban Newspaper Production

PM2809121390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 26 Sep 90 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Only One Newspaper"]

[Text] From 1 October until at least 1992 Cubans will only receive one daily central newspaper of the four hitherto published. The Cuban authorities have decided to drastically reduce publication of newspapers and journals owing to difficulties involved in supplying print industry enterprises with imported raw materials.

"Newspaper publication on Cuba is totally dependent on imported newsprint and other shipments from the USSR, whose technology has been used to set up Cuban newspapers' entire printing base," it was reported in "Information for the People" published Monday by the party's GRANMA. "Uncertainty regarding the future supply of newsprint and a certain degree of instability with newsprint shipments this year have made it inevitable that urgent preventive measures would be adopted with a view to averting a crisis in this sector."

GRANMA, the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee organ, will be the only central newspaper to be published five times a week, and circulated in the capital alone on Saturdays.

Gorbachev Appoints New Envoy to Nicaragua

*LD2709185990 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Yevgeniy Astakhov, 53, Soviet ambassador to the Republic of Nicaragua.

Astakhov graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Foreign Ministry and later from the Diplomatic Academy of the Foreign Ministry. In 1971-1975 he was second secretary and then first secretary of the Soviet Embassy to Brazil. In 1978-1985 he was first secretary, and counselor at the Soviet Embassy to Spain. From 1987 he worked at the central apparatus of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Valeriy Nikolayenko was relieved of the duties of the Soviet ambassador to the Republic of Nicaragua in connection with the transfer to another post.

Gorbachev Congratulates Chilean President

*LD2809111690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1035 GMT 28 Sep 90*

[Text] Moscow, 28 Sep (TASS)—In connection with the national holiday of the Republic of Chile, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev sent a telegram of congratulations to President Patricio Aylwyn in which he wished the friendly people of Chile happiness and prosperity. The telegram expresses confidence that the resumption of diplomatic relations and expansion of all-round cooperation between our countries will correspond to the interests of the people of the USSR and Chile.

P. Aylwyn in his message sent in reply thanked [Gorbachev] for congratulations and came out in favor of the further development of relations between the USSR and Chile.

Supreme Soviet

Committees, Commissions Discuss Draft Laws 28 Sep LD2809062190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Today, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the deputies will be working in committees and commissions. Consideration of a number of draft laws that have been put on to the agenda will continue.

The deputies of the Russian parliament, during sittings of committees and commissions, will consider legislative enactments connected with implementation of the program for transition to market relations.

TV Reports 27 Sep Work of Committees, Commissions LD2709221990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1740 GMT on 27 September presents a 35-minute report on the 27 September proceedings of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. The announcer begins by saying that the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet worked today. Sugar production was discussed with Borisov, chairman of State Food Committee. A desire to bring in Western companies was also discussed.

At 1742 GMT, the announcer says farm reform was discussed with Yemelyanov, deputy chairman of Supreme Soviet Agrarian Issues Committee. Differences between the presidential and government reform programs can be reconciled, Yemelyanov believes. He warns that implementation of the reform program has not been properly thought out. Corrupt elements are conducting "organized sabotage" of the country's economy; food production is greater than in the past, but less is getting through to the consumer. Yemelyanov says he is happy to delegate some of his powers as a deputy to Gorbachev if he uses this authority to good effect. Power is already highly concentrated, however, and little has been achieved, he adds. There is no certainty that the new measures will solve the country's problems. There is a need to step up the fight against crime.

Yemelyanov says the people's deputies have been demanding action from the government on the food problem since the first congress. Resignation of the government is not necessary, he says, but it must accept responsibility and act.

At 1757 GMT, there is an interview with Yablokov, deputy chairman of Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee, on the deteriorating environmental situation. The Committee is "at a loss," he says, because the authorities have not decided on the distribution of functions between the center and the republics. The committee has still not received details on the future development plan, though it is supposed to reach conclusions by next week. Yablokov complains that the government is now seeking to

reopen medical and other factories closed down for environmental reasons without first cleaning up production operations.

At 1802 GMT, Kirillov of the Social Issues Committee is interviewed on trade union rights in the market economy. The unions will perform no political functions in the future. A law on the labor market is needed, says Kirillov. The draft submitted by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions is rooted in the past, when the CPSU had a guaranteed leading role in society. No trade union monopoly should be permitted in the future, as this could easily paralyze the country.

At 1806 GMT, the announcer says the Legislation Committee discussed the conversion of the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, but decisions were postponed until an expert examination is carried out.

People's Deputy A.V. Levashov is then interviewed on the drafts of the law on foreign investment in the USSR and of the foundations of legislation on investment activities in the USSR. Both drafts were adopted at today's meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation and will now be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The two drafts fill a gap in the country's statute books, says Levashov, and are essential to ensure business confidence. "They contain certain provisions that make it possible for us to move towards creating an investment market. The rights of investors are guaranteed and protected. The terms of contracts on investment activities are guaranteed and protected, even in the event of deterioration in the legislation. They make it possible to reinvest profits in the USSR without compulsory conversion of the profits to the ruble coefficient. They make it possible to establish direct investment flows from abroad to the USSR and vice versa. Naturally these two laws cannot solve all the problems connected with the functioning of, in particular, foreign enterprises in the country. For this, amendments will have to be made to sections of the code of laws on labor concerning the employment and dismissal of staff at joint foreign enterprises."

The drafts should be examined in the republican parliaments and combined as far as possible with each republic's program of investment legislation before being submitted to and adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, Levashov continues. "Another advantage of these laws is the fact that they create a normal legal basis for investment activity independent of which program of future state policy is adopted—the Shatalin program, the president's program, the Gorbachev-Yeltsin program, or any other."

At 1812 GMT, the announcer says the Legislation Committee also debated the trade union draft submitted by All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Sebensov is interviewed. He says there is great doubt over the viability of the All-Union Central Council of Trade

Unions plan. The situation in industry is more fluid than the draft assumes. There is need for a trade union law, he adds, though only after the law on public organizations has been in force for some time and the situation becomes clearer.

The report ends at 1815 GMT.

Deputies Discuss Thermonuclear Project 27 Sep
LD2709175590 Moscow TASS in English 1735 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Boris Zverev and Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—The conclusion of the plenary meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Wednesday [26 September] does not mean that the Soviet parliamentarians were given a respite. They worked in committees and commissions of the Union's parliament.

At today's joint meeting of the Commission for the Development of Industry, Energy and Technology and the Committee for Science, the legislators discussed the Soviet Union's participation in the project "International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)". The project must be implemented by the year 2003 by the efforts of the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan and West European countries.

Valeriy Chuyanov, first deputy director of the Soviet programme for the thermonuclear experimental reactor, said that "ITER project" is a result of 40 years of work in the area of controlled thermonuclear synthesis.

He said that work on the blueprints is being concluded. Soviet specialists participated in this work. In four weeks negotiations will be started about the transition to the next stage—the development of project with a feasibility report and creation of prototypes of equipment. Chuyanov said that this will require much larger outlays of the sides.

Deputies unanimously supported the Soviet Union's participation in the project and decided that some 220 million roubles should be provided every year to finance the Soviet part of research. Parliamentarians emphasised the importance of the programme for the future of humanity, as it makes it possible to create ecologically pure and safe source of energy which will have enough fuel to operate for centuries.

Viktor Bushuyev, chairman of the parliamentary subcommittee for energy of the Commission for the Development of Industry, Energy and Technology, said that all Soviet republics should invest in the development of this project.

The population's supply with necessities other than food was discussed at today's joint meeting of the parliamentary Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade and Services, and the USSR People's Control Committee.

"We wish to analyse the causes of the shortage of goods and decide what steps should be taken to ensure that the work of the industry is not put into disarray during the transition to a market," the commissions' chairman Gennadiy Kiselev told Tass.

He said that the participants in the meeting are striving to conduct the discussion with taking into account the planned economic reforms. It is already clear that this process will meet with difficulties. Collectives are cautious of purchasing or leasing enterprises unless they have guarantees for raw materials supply. "Many are psychologically unprepared to operate at a market," the commission's chairman said.

Supreme Soviet Appeals for Kazakh Quake Aid
LD2709145390 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT
27 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—The USSR Supreme Soviet called on local government councils, governments of Union and autonomous republics and all work collectives and the USSR Armed Forces to give assistance to residents of Kazakhstan's districts that underwent devastating earthquakes twice this year—in June and August.

The address of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued here today says that whole villages in the epicentre of the quake were razed to the ground.

According to preliminary estimates, the expenditures for reconstruction work surpass one billion roubles.

Cold weather sets in, there is frost at night, and people in these districts, predominantly women and children, are homeless. Temporary dwellings are being set up in the quake zone.

The address says that the republic's efforts to supply people with food and prevent infectious and intestinal diseases, are clearly not enough. There is a shortage of manpower, building equipment and material resources in disaster areas. Means of transportation are not in sufficient supply. The schedule for the delivery of materials, equipment and technology envisaged by the government decisions for relief to the population of the quake-stricken zones in Kazakhstan are disrupted.

The people of Kazakhstan has always fulfilled its internationalist duty honestly, the address said. It is time to give it fraternal assistance.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Issues Decree on Economic Stabilization
LD2709153790 Moscow World Service in English
1500 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Excerpt] President Gorbachev has issued a decree on urgent measures to stabilize the economy. He asked all government industries to maintain current economic ties

and honor their commitments until the end of next year. This measure is expected to prevent chaos in the economy throughout the transition period. Some regions have been too quick to dismantle the old structures while market incentives are still in existence, said the president.

The presidential decree orders imposing major fines on those industries which refuse to conclude agreements on the basis of existing economic ties. The fines may be as big as 50 percent of the rejected order. The presidential decree orders restoring all vital [word indistinct], including the production of medicines, within a month's deadline. [passage omitted]

Decree Detailed

*LD2709163890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1430 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Text] As the last news bulletin of the afternoon on Mayak Panorama, I will start with the USSR President's decree which has just come through on the teleprinter: the decree on urgent measures to stabilize economic links in the fourth quarter of 1990 and during 1991.

With the aim of stabilizing the economy and the consumer market in the fourth quarter of 1990 and in 1991, I decree:

First, irrespective of their departmental subordination and location, state enterprises, associations, and organizations are in the fourth quarter of 1990 and in 1991 to ensure the preservation of existing economic links and fulfill contractual obligations for supplying raw and other materials and articles. Agreements between the union republics and individual regions must facilitate development and strengthen these links within the country's national economy. The actions of bodies of power and management responsible for the disorganization of economic links between enterprises should be considered inadmissible.

Second point of the decree of the USSR president: To establish that if any bodies refuse to conclude contracts in accordance with existing economic links, apart from the stipulated liability toward the consumer, a fine will be imposed on the supplier of up to 50 percent of the cost of the order that has not been fulfilled and paid into the local budget. The size of the fine will be fixed by the bodies of the State Board of Arbitration. To propose to the USSR general procurator and the People's Control Committee of our country on the basis of existing laws to call strictly to account those people who do not execute this decree.

Third, in view of the extraordinary nature of the situation, to consider it imperative for enterprise leaders as well as work collectives to place the process of concluding economic contracts under direct workers' supervision by countering departmental confusion, parochialism, and group interests with good organization, efficiency, and responsibility for the entire society.

Fourth point of the decree: In connection with the extremely complex situation in the country, union, republican and local organs of state administration should within one month restore the vitally important production of medicines, raw and other materials, articles, and manufactured items that are extremely necessary for the needs of the population. The USSR Council of Ministers and the union republic councils of ministers should take decisive measures to provide these enterprises with material, financial, and currency resources in order to restore their normal functions and primarily for purposes of their ecological safety. In the fourth quarter of 1991 the questions of their further functioning should be considered together with the public.

And the fifth and last point of the decree of the president: If necessary the USSR Council of Ministers will introduce a special work regime for the railways and also the country's other vital national systems.

Signed: Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow, the Kremlin

27 September 1990

Democratic Russia Deputies Hold News Conference

*LD2809101290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 28 Sep 90*

[Report by Aleksandr Ravinskiy]

[Text] There are no Supreme Soviet plenary sessions today as the committees and commissions are working, but an important news conference has just taken place. It was held by the coordinating councils of the interregional group of deputies and the Democratic Russia bloc of deputies. Three documents were circulated among the journalists. One is an address to the electorate which says, in part, that in the press controlled by the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers a campaign of accusations against democrats of a plot aimed at seizing power is being developed.

Who is benefiting by spreading rumors of a plot? In the present situation, it is only conservative and extremists who are dreaming of destabilization. The interregional group of deputies and Democratic Russia have not discussed nor put forward any calls for demonstrations and strikes on 6 and 7 October, USSR Constitution Day. There are grounds for supposing that such actions may be provoked and will play into the hands of those who would like to find some kind of plot as a pretext to impose a state of emergency in the country and rout the democratic forces. There is also here an appeal to the electorate to maintain restraint and calm and not to submit to the calls of conservatives and extremists to demonstrations and strikes on 6 and 7 October.

Another document is devoted to working out a plan of the transition to a market economy, and the third [document] concerns additional powers to the USSR

president. It says the desire itself to ensure the fulfilment of the plan for the transition to a market economy and the strengthening of executive power is perfectly understandable. Just as understandable is the desire to ensure order and discipline in the country. However, realistically, without damaging the president's authority, it is possible to adopt measures to extend powers only with the consent of the Union republics. Therefore, the coordinating council is proposing, first, to prepare a draft of the reform of the political-administrative system, to form a committee of presidents and chairmen of the Supreme Soviet of the Union republics, whose primary task will be to prepare drafts of political-administrative reform, and to ask the committee to convene an assembly of USSR people's deputies. The members of the assembly of Union and autonomous republics would be able to elect their own Supreme Soviets according to agreed quotas out of the number of USSR people's deputies. This assembly would reflect the positions of the republics more fully than the present USSR Supreme Soviet, and therefore it could start immediate discussions of the problem of a Union treaty. Here there is also a point about referring to the Committee for Supervision of the Constitution in connection with the law adopted on additional powers of the president.

Well, I have quoted just a few articles from these documents to let our listeners know what this news conference was about, and its participants also replied to numerous questions put by journalists.

Prokofyev Terms Situation 'Extraordinary'

*LD2809124890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 28 Sep 90*

[Text] Yuri Prokofyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Moscow City party committee, assessed the situation in Moscow and in the country as a whole as extraordinary in his interview with TASS correspondents.

All the signs are there: a fall in production and disruption of economic links with unrestrained rise in wages. Even though there was a good harvest, there is virtually no fruit and vegetables in the capital. The prospects for winter are also well-known.

Yuri Prokofyev called the political situation no less complex. Approximately 20 parties are active in the country; they have declared themselves all-Union structures. However, most parties and movements do not carry out any constructive activities, their activities are often of a destructive nature.

The first secretary of the Moscow City party committee reported that according to the latest data, about 70,000 people left the CPSU in the capital's organisation; in the same period of time 9,000 people joined the party. Incidentally, those joining are mainly young people and there are more representatives of intelligentsia than workers among them.

Yuri Prokofyev reported that the city party committee joined the assistance fund for the unemployed, which was set up at the initiative of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper. The capital's Communists intend to support 250,000 Moscow pensioners—CPSU members—from their own funds.

Popov Criticizes USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies

*LD2709190890 Moscow TASS in English 1851 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondents Igor Agabekov and Igor Gvritshvili]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Dissatisfaction with the work of Soviet parliament to adopt vitally important decision was expressed by the Inter-regional Group of Deputies and Democratic Russian bloc. They worked out and adopted today three documents which express dissatisfaction with the Union parliament's refusal to adopt the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan as the basic plan and doubt about the Soviet president's ability to use additional powers granted him by the parliament the other day.

Submitting for the discussion of deputies the documents "On Drafting the Plan for the Transition to a Market," "On Work of the USSR Supreme Soviet" and "On Additional Powers for the Soviet President", Chairman of the Moscow Municipal Council Gavriil Popov expressed concern over the fact that the working out of the concept of a market economy is in jeopardy. He said this is caused by the fact that the Soviet parliament decided to combine two mutually excluding plans of the transition to a market.

The first plan is oriented at a market regulated by the government which would fix prices. Popov said this would be "a market regulated by bureaucrats". The second plan proceeds from a genuine concept of a market. As a result the country can be left without any plan at all or else it will be stillborn.

Popov believes that the only acceptable version is to use the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan as the basis and to begin to implement it in Union republics, without waiting for the ultimate decision of the Soviet parliament.

He also advanced the idea of forming an inter-republican coordination economic committee which should clearly define the areas to be controlled by the Union Government and by republics, later to work out its own variant of economic restructuring.

Popov believes the Union Government should be responsible for the minimum necessary for overall development.

In his speech Popov sharply criticised the work of the Union parliament. He noted the apathy and lack of discipline in many deputies who stay away from important plenary meetings and disrupt the adoption of laws vitally important for the country.

Popov emphasised that some 700 territorial deputies no longer reflect the present attitudes of their voters.

In this connection he proposed that the supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics elect a certain quota from among the USSR people's deputies from these republics to the USSR deputies' assembly which should number 200-300 people. He suggested that the supreme soviets of republics should set aside resources for the assembly's activity.

He said the assembly should work parallel to the parliament and express concerted opinion of all republics. The main task of the assembly is to prepare its version of the Union treaty.

Regarding additional powers of the Soviet president granted him by the parliament a few days ago, Popov said that this is quite a usual thing for the present conditions. At the same time he noted that these powers should be coordinated with the republics so that they be taken into consideration and fulfilled.

He noted, however, that before granting new powers to the president, it is necessary to know what economic programme will be accepted so as to have the notion in which areas to work.

'Coup' Supporters Exploiting Food Problems

PM2709152190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Vladimir Petrunya "TASS Observer's Opinion": "Who Needs Rotting Potatoes"]

[Text] It is unparalleled in recorded history: By the last 10-day period of September, Moscow had laid in 3.7 percent of its winter potato needs. The figures for carrots, cabbages, onions, and other vegetables were not much better.

It is going to be a hungry winter.

With winter just around the corner, a "City Day," accompanied by great pomp and ceremony, was held in the capital. It went on for two and one-half days...

Festivals are a good thing. People enjoy festivals. But enjoyment against the background of the ominous gleaming emptiness of stores? Against the background of enormous blackened expanses where rye and tomatoes are rotting where they stand, against the background of deserted potato plantations, where blight is devouring potatoes like wildfire?

A festival of hypocrisy? After all, the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, no less, have publicly appealed for the cancellation of "national day"—the October anniversary—this year. They are not in the mood for celebration, apparently.... Why, then, this feasting in a time of plague?

Maybe so that no one, in the frenzy of the dance, will ask the "city fathers" what they have done to provide the

inhabitants of the megalopolis with meat, bread, fruit, and vegetables. No, it will not work to say that Moscow has been deprived of all privileges. Since it has always been a traditional "privilege" to prepare for the winter not by empty words, but by hard work: concluding contracts, sending couriers to all corners of the country, organizing the dispatch of seasonal food to the capital, and monitoring the implementation of contract pledges.

Indeed, the loss of the old administrative springs has broken many economic links, undermined all responsibility, and immediately relegated national economic relations to the level of prefeudal or early feudal barter. But the potatoes are rotting. One knows of instances where trucks carrying potatoes or fruit and vegetables have been blocked on approaching the capital, they have been threatened, and sent back.

Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Ye.Ye. Sokolov said with amazement in Moscow recently that whereas you used not to be able to get rid of envoys from the capital in such a harvest campaign, now you will not find them in a month of Sundays.

What is it—inexperience, irresponsibility, or a stand? I venture to suggest that they are taking a stand. But one wonders why the new "democrats" ruling in Moscow and their intimates would want to do that. After all, they will have to answer for it sooner or later. Not good. On the other hand, ominous problems artificially exploited today, if reshaped with precision at the right moment, could be used, without any great difficulty, as an instrument to overthrow the government, and the president with it.

Why without difficulty? Well, because everyone's patience has run out. And it is easy to blame everything on the government, on the supreme power.

And that is what they are doing, skillfully and, it has to be said, in a coordinated manner. No sooner had the country's Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution giving the president special powers to implement a program for the transfer of the economy to a market footing than certain forces in the Russian Supreme Soviet launched the kind of "protestant activity" that made the mind boggle. What was it based on? On nothing, in fact. On rumor and supposition. Something had been said on television, apparently, something was published in the paper, so let us have protests, actions, warnings!

And although a Presidential Council member publicly announced that the president's powers are only a mechanism for practical action to implement such essential rescue measures, it did not cool the hotheads' ardor. Because they were not getting heated over that. The main thing is to turn up that lovely alarm: Help! Democracy is in danger! Stop the dictatorship!

Then you have a handful of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies (36 people) drawing up petitions and appeals on the evening of 24 September:

The Fatherland is in danger! Let us organize civil disobedience! Soldiers, do not turn your weapons against the people!

So what was this storm in a teacup for? And what is the connection with the potatoes rotting in the fields and Moscow's empty storehouses? Very simple. The answer to these questions is contained in "Action Program 90." It is the skillfully wrought, well-thought-out manifesto of the uncompromising opposition. A program for the seizure of power. The "Russian Democratic Forum," which, for obvious reasons, does not publicize this counterrevolutionary platform, tells its supporters to strive for "democratization" through "organized mass actions"—rallies, demonstrations, pickets, strikes, campaigns of civil disobedience, conspiratorial occupation of buildings, and so on.

It is a call for violent action—to carry out without prior arrangement an "act of transfer of ownership." In other words, capitalism is to be established in the same way as socialism in 1917. But in order to suitably cloud the minds of the masses, this seizure of property must be "fully propagandized through independent local and central media."

It says unequivocally, to avoid any doubt: "land is to be transferred gratis to private ownership." Furthermore—"kolkhozes and sovkhoses will be liquidated." Try and demonstrate the right to choose and you will find your teeth missing, because "it is recommended that teams of squatters, numbering around 50 people, should be organized." And they, the attackers, know what to do....

Everything is provided for, nothing is missed in the systematic arrangements for an anticonstitutional, counterrevolutionary coup. You have a general political strike with a demand for the resignation of the government (that is to say, "pawns" are needed in a political game). Then there is the early dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies (where is the new seaman Zheleznyak [one of the leaders of the 1768 peasant uprising]?). And the disintegration of all existing trade union structures and "nationalization" of trade union (that is, belong to the whole people) property. And the introduction of their own subversive elements into the structures of authority. They also prescribe using ecological disasters for their own destructive political ends.

What is more: look at the wealth of "material" there is for this—ethnic strife and other areas of tension, discontent, and embitterment. The main thing is to skillfully direct all this into a destructive channel. It is simpler to climb the pyramid of power when everything is in ruins.

"It can no longer be ignored"—the USSR President said at the parliamentary sitting on Monday, exposing the political speculation of the opponents of perestroika, who have been taking concerted action against the more effective operation of executive power.

In other words, look at the potatoes, the tomatoes, and the good things that are perishing! It is easier to control

hungry people. It is easier to get them to destroy the "bosses," to organize a witchhunt. To summon them from the corridors of parliament to participate in civil disobedience, to confront a president who has at last resolved to use his power and watch over public order.

Purposeful efforts are still being made to fuel emotions and spread rumors and conjecture. To quote the satirist, "everything has been worked out, systematically."

So what is next—the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies or an immediate program for the accelerated production for barbed wire for new gulags?

Disciplined KGB General Wins Appeal Hearing

PM2709154590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[F. Ivanov article: "Proceedings Instituted"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (No. 227) has already reported that former USSR KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin has filed charges against Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, appealing against what he considers to be their wrongful actions.

Judge N. Romanenkov, member of the Moscow City Court, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent that proceedings have just been initiated with regard to Kalugin's complaint that he was deprived of his pension, and the case is scheduled to be heard 2 October.

The officials against whose actions O. Kalugin has appealed are V. Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB; V. Kholodov, chief of the USSR KGB Planning and Finance Department; and B. Morozov, deputy chief of the Moscow and Moscow Oblast KGB Directorate Finance Department. They have all been notified of the date on which the hearing begins.

Over the next few days the Moscow City Court is to decide whether to initiate proceedings with regard to Kalugin's complaint of wrongful actions by M.S. Gorbachev—in depriving him of state awards.

As expected, it was only on the complaint against N. Ryzhkov for depriving Kalugin of the rank of "KGB major general" that no action has been taken, because that decision was adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers, that is, by a collegial organ, and consequently Kalugin's complaints against one of its officials are unfounded. Nevertheless O. Kalugin has decided to appeal this decision to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Court.

KGB Chief Interviewed on 'Secrets'

90UF0545A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 37, Sep 90 p 15

[Interview with Major General N. Savenkov, chief of administration of the USSR KGB, by EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN correspondent V. Viktorov; place and date not given: "The Secrets Are Secret"]

[Text] [Viktorov] Nikolay Andreyevich, pronouncements have recently appeared on occasion in the press that portray the current Committee for State Security [KGB] as a conservative apparatus that has had few operational changes. What could you say in this regard?

[Savenkov] The increasing interest of the public in the previously classified organization and its operation is quite understandable and easy to explain. We endeavor to meet the needs of the Soviet people for information as far as possible and strive for glasnost not to be episodic in our everyday activities. However, in view of the peculiarities of the work we do, not all of our publications claim to cover all the aspects of the operation of the state security organs fully and profoundly; they cannot respond to all the questions that the populace has accumulated. As I see it, individual "authors" were quick to take advantage of the opportunity and fill the emerging gaps with biased information. Nobody is taking issue with the fact that "the period of stagnation" did not pass without a trace for the KGB. At the same time, professional chekists are bewildered, and at times justifiably outraged, by materials published in the press in which amateur authors who have little idea of the essence of chekist work, to say nothing of professional nuances, attempt to portray the state security organs as some inhumane coercive apparatus that did nothing but persecute "dissidents" and on occasion, from time to time, got involved in "catching spies."

[Viktorov] However, you would agree that for an organization as big as yours the number of unmasked agents of Western special services, which was officially released recently, is clearly not high.

[Savenkov] They asked and continue to ask us similar questions virtually every time we speak at enterprises and organizations in the course of lectures and "round-table panels." The reaction of those present is unequivocal: When they hear a two-digit number in response, they express some disappointment. In the course of this, they altogether fail to take into account the notion that the main purpose of the operation of KGB organs is to prevent especially dangerous state crimes rather than expose them. The people do not always perceive that for our society and state it is considerably more important to prevent operations by real intelligence officers of special services and avert the leaks of state secrets abroad than, say, observe the trials of Tolkachevs, Potashevs, and their ilk, and see the tragic finale of "Seven Semions" or the operation of freeing children in the city of Mineralnyye Vody which ended successfully.

Soviet counterintelligence officers concentrate their attention on preventive work aimed at preventing especially dangerous state crimes and their localization at an early stage. Sensational as it may be, the unmasking of intelligence officers and agents of special services is still not prevalent in the operations of chekists, the complexity and significance of such work notwithstanding. Of course, articles on the unmasking of hardened criminals and the already completed operations by chekists

may be more interesting to read than dispassionate communiqués about the painstaking work of the employees of KGB organs making it possible to avert at an early stage, say, an attempt to hijack a plane, and to prevent casualties, a moral trauma to the passengers and the crew, and financial losses. However, virtually the entire world knows about operation "Thunder," whereas only those who have taken part in the events themselves are aware of other attempts to hijack planes prevented at early stages, as well as many emergencies in industry with potentially grave consequences. I always repeat in this instance that fighting for the lives of people, for the person who has not committed a state crime yet but has come to the brink of it, was the basis of our work.

[Viktorov] Could you give us a specific example?

[Savenkov] As is known, a fundamental restructuring of the foreign economic relations of the Soviet Union is now under way. Thousands of Soviet enterprises, organizations, and cooperatives have already gained the right to operate directly in the world market.

We are concerned about some of our citizens and even entire organizations not interpreting democratization in this sphere quite correctly. Supposedly, we have nothing to protect from anyone now that we have raised the "iron curtain" and let foreigners visit our classified enterprises. However, the secrets are secret.

It is no accident that I brought this up. A meeting of the labor collective was held in March of this year in Moscow at a USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry enterprise, at which the issue of an unbecoming case involving an employee of this enterprise was reviewed. The plot of the event is simple: Having fancied that in our democratic times concealing anything from foreigners does not make sense, a candidate of sciences decided to organize a joint enterprise with them. In his words, having failed to notify the management of the enterprise, security services, and a group of coauthors, he repeatedly got in touch with employees of the office of a commercial representative of one of the capitalist countries, proposing to set up joint production of a device developed at the secret enterprise. Meanwhile, this conversation, had it come about, would have been about a domestic invention that is used especially in modern combat materiel.

What prompted him to take this step? Judging by his explanation, it was not only a desire to make a profit for himself and his design bureau, but also the aspiration to use the invention more completely

for the purposes of the national economy and science.

I do not deny that many elements of a stagnant nature and unnecessary formalism have accumulated in the system of protecting state secrets in our country. This is why it is no accident that many materials that had restricted access at one time have been declassified by a

number of organizations with KGB participation. This work will be continued in the future with a necessary degree of balance.

Now try to imagine what may happen if any person to whom secrets are entrusted decides on his own what to do with them and what may or may not be divulged to foreign representatives. Such a careless attitude towards state secrets, as well as information containing commercial secrets, is not allowed to exist in any state.

Moreover, at present additional counterintelligence and security measures aimed at preventing leaks of secrets and information on the most current scientific and technical accomplishments to the Soviet Union are being taken in the leading capitalist countries. Of course, certain aspects of the issue of protecting secret information may be argued about. However, it makes no sense to debate whether or not we should keep our secrets classified at all. Such protection is not a whim or a concession to spy-mania but a necessity. The draft USSR Law "On Protecting Secret Information," which we hope will be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet at the forthcoming session, will provide a legal foundation for such work and will put an end to speculation and gossip concerning this.

[Viktorov] How did this meeting end?

[Savenkov] The individual in question realized that he had allowed a most grave violation of existing security procedures to occur. He assured the collective that in the future he would not commit similar acts. No criminal charges were filed against this man. There was no corpus delicti in his actions; figuratively speaking, he did not cross the fateful line. Had this happened we would have had to start a criminal case under the legislation in effect.

Going back to the beginning of our conversation, I would like to once again draw the attention of the readers of your newspaper to the fact that important changes have now occurred in the operation of the organs of the KGB. This is exactly what the humanism of the work of the chekists is about—not only to prevent at an early stage a crime that is being prepared but to help those who have erred and persuade them that actions that could harm our country are impermissible.

At this point, I would like to stress that the Law on the USSR KGB prepared for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet is precisely in line with ensuring the supremacy of law in the operation of state security organs and guarantees that the interests of Soviet citizens will be protected. As I see it, the adoption of this law will to a large degree rid our motherland of excessive gossip about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of particular KGB actions and will provide a firm legislative foundation for their work, as is the custom in a rule-of-law state. I am certain that all Soviet people are interested in the adoption of this law, the first one in the history of our state. Among them are, of course, the chekists who, incidentally, initiated the law, because they serve the interests of Soviet society and protect them, as well as the lawful

interests of every Soviet man. They need the confidence of the people and control by the supreme organs of state government; they view this as a guarantee of their success.

[The following paragraphs are enclosed in boxes throughout the article]

From Report Files

In the course of an investigation by the KGB of a criminal case initiated in conjunction with violations in the commercial and financial operations of the All-Union Foreign Trade Association "Raznoimport," it was established that a number of officials have created abroad by means of various machinations "a reserve hard-currency fund" beyond the control of the state. Due to measures taken by the KGB organs, hard currency and imported goods worth more than U.S.\$7 million were returned to the budget of our country.

A panel of judges for criminal cases of the Moscow City Court reviewed materials on A. Logunov, former deputy chief of the Import Department of the Foreign Trade Association "Promzagranpostavka" of the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry, and E. Lyzlov, former department chief in a scientific research institute in Tula, having sentenced them to 12 and 10 years of imprisonment accordingly with the confiscation of assets. Taking advantage of the carelessness of some officials of the Foreign Trade Association "Vneshtekhnika," they conspired with the representative of the Swiss company Messerli K. Bumman to jack up prices for equipment bought from this company to the maximum. As a result of this illegal operation, the state unjustifiably transferred abroad DM162,200. Valuables worth a total of R65,298 were confiscated from the criminals.

V. Lukashevich, chief specialist of the former USSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry, was sentenced to several years of imprisonment for taking bribes from the representatives of foreign companies. The investigation determined that the total sum of bribes which he took came to R52,456, including U.S.\$23,250. Goods and valuables worth more than R34,000 were also confiscated.

State security officers put an end to the criminal activities of A. Ivanov, a former employee of the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, who dealt with processing documents for business trips abroad by the specialists of this industry. Investigative actions taken by the chekists in cooperation with the USSR Procuracy made it possible to return to the state about R460,000, including 123,000 in Vneshtekhnika checks.

Yu. Lykov, former director of the Gazstroy Company, and his accomplices—V. Prasolov, former general director of the Foreign Trade Association "Soyuz-vneshstroyimport"; D. Mikhaylov, deputy director of the association; and A. Nikitin, chief engineer of the Gazstroy Company—who facilitated the signing of contracts favorable for foreign merchants for bribes, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Losses exceeding R10 million were inflicted on the state. In the course of the investigation of the case against the above individuals, foreign companies paid back a large segment of the damages.

Together with the Internal Affairs Administration of the oblast center, the chekists brought to an end the criminal operation of several employees of the Imeni Tarasov Kuybyshev Plant of Electrical Equipment for Motor Vehicles and Tractors who were involved in manufacturing and selling firearms. The criminals were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

In late 1989-early 1990, employees of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic KGB Administration for Transcarpathian Oblast, together with the personnel of the Chop Customs House, prevented more than 20 cases of export through contraband channels of industrial raw materials and standard-grade industrial products of non-ferrous and expensive metals worth more than R4.5 million.

In February 1990, employees of the Zlatoust City Department of the KGB Administration for Chelyabinsk Oblast caught in the act a group of extortionists headed by A. Trapeznikov, who had four previous convictions. Several firearms were confiscated from the criminals, including a small-caliber rifle, a 7.62 millimeter carbine, a pneumatic rifle fortified with a machine gun spring and ammunition for all.

The chekists of Dnepropetrovsk put an end to the criminal activity of a group of individuals who were involved in the theft of refinery products from the Lisichansk-Dnepropetrovsk section of a gasoline pipeline. At the time of apprehension, a considerable quantity of gasoline and other evidence of unlawful activity was seized from them.

KGB personnel in the city of Lipetsk unmasked a criminal group that had turned the Yelets Hydraulic Aggregates Plant into a private source of profit. Investigation of the established episodes of theft and padding, and the criminal negligence of a number of officials and financially accountable employees of the enterprise is under way.

Operations officers of the KGB Administration and the Department for Combating the Theft of Socialist Property of the Kirovskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs in the city of Kuybyshev apprehended a group of criminals who attempted to steal a large batch of sheet aluminum, worth a total of R28,836 at state prices, from the compound of the Imeni Lenin Kuybyshev Scientific Production Association. Court proceedings took place, and the criminals were deservedly punished.

Vlasov's Anti-KGB Interview Assailed

PM2809093790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 19 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5

[USSR KGB Public Relations Center spokesman O. Tsarev "Rejoinder": "Look for Reds Under the Bed!"]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Petrovich Vlasov, a well-known sportsman in the past, recently gave an interview to Radio Liberty. In this interview he made monstrous accusations against the KGB. Basically, according to him, the KGB is a criminal, even terrorist organization that employs criminals who do nothing less than commit secret murders, arrange car crashes and other accidents, inoculate people with diseases, and destroy their immunity. He also totally blasphemously attributed Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov's torment to the KGB.

The KGB could have chosen to ignore these absurd allegations—there are quite a few irresponsible statements made in this spirit nowadays—if they had not been made by a USSR people's deputy, who has a great responsibility to his electorate and colleagues.

What is most striking is the lack of ceremony with which Yu.P. Vlasov, who ranks himself as a democrat, discards the democratic principles he claims to profess. His fantastic accusations are completely unfounded. That is another alarming symptom. A symptom that is appearing increasingly often in attacks on the KGB. Why am I drawing attention to this? Because we have passed through that terrible period in our history when concocted, completely unfounded accusations were brought against individuals and entire groups, strata, and classes. You are perfectly well aware of what I am referring to. Is it really possible that now, in the fifth year of perestroika, democracy in our country is turning into the right to irresponsible slander used in the struggle for power?

Another alarming theory being vigorously expounded—by Vlasov, among others—is that the KGB is omnipresent. Interesting in this respect are his words that KGB bodies—and I quote—"get into the woodwork, the sheets, and the table from which you eat." Here you cannot fail to recall the slogan used during the McCarthy era in the United States: "Look for Reds under the bed!"

Yu.P. Vlasov's interview with Radio Liberty shows that he is totally dismissive of democratic forms of monitoring KGB activity. He classes the Defense and Security Committee, to which the KGB is answerable, as—and I quote—"a mythical Supreme Soviet commission," while, in his eyes, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet itself are nothing other than "a reliable barrier in the way of the country's democratization." Evidently Vlasov is not interested in existing democratic procedures or their improvement. His declared objective is to destroy the KGB. Possessed by this extremist idea, he is free with his conjectures about the numerical strength and activity of KGB bodies.

This is the reason why 1 million KGB staffers, 12 KGB divisions, and even an entire army stationed in Moscow Oblast outside Balashikha featured in his interview. In most people, maybe, this will arouse an indulgent smile for the former weightlifter, but he is perfectly serious. He is equally serious when he claims that his protracted illness is also the result of KGB intrigues.

By piling one fabrication on top of another Vlasov comes unglued in the end. At one point he curses the KGB's total interference in the lives of Soviet citizens, but then he explains the majority's tolerance of the KGB by saying that they have a purely theoretical acquaintance with it. Or take the example where he labels the KGB as a closed organization but, the next minute, evidently forgetting himself, admits that he has learnt much about the KGB's past activity from archive material that the KGB has itself published.

French Daily Interviews Aleksandr Yakovlev
PM2709123590 Paris *LIBERATION* in French
25 Sep 90 pp 19-20

[Interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Presidential Council, by Pierre Briancon on 25 September in Moscow: "Aleksandr Yakovlev: 'USSR Is on Seesaw of History'"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, 66 years old, has been at Mikhail Gorbachev's side since 1983. At the time, as USSR ambassador to Canada, where he was "exiled" for 10 years by Brezhnev, he had been noticed by the future general secretary, who recalled him to Moscow to work at his side. Linked to the intellectuals of glasnost, in the Politburo during the first years of perestroika he embodied the most reforming wing of the leaders of the party, in which he had for that reason become the bete noire of the old guard "conservatives." A member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council, today he is the Soviet leader closest to the USSR president. He answered *LIBERATION*'s questions on Sunday.

[*LIBERATION*] One of the biggest political changes of the year in the USSR is the institution of a "presidential" regime. Now, since one March has the impression that presidential power has not been used. Why, and what in your opinion should be done to make it more effective?

[Yakovlev] Presidential power, which is a completely new structure in Soviet society, is still evolving. For the moment no one knows where this power's upper and lower limits are. Therefore for the moment it is hard to distinguish between presidential power on the one hand and executive power in general on the other. There is the president, the Presidential Council, the Federation Council, and decisions taken in the form of "ukases" by the president. If you were to ask me if there is a very clear line between the functions of the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers, I would avoid giving you a very clear answer. For the moment this line is only dotted in. You will ask me: Why this vagueness? Would it be the lack of theoretical ideas, the lack of imagination? I would answer that in fact perestroika is only beginning.

[*LIBERATION*] In what sense?

[Yakovlev] For five years we have been preparing to face important changes at the level of institutions and at the foundation. At institution level one can see the emergence of what I would call a new type of state.

[*LIBERATION*] What are its features?

[Yakovlev] For the moment it is hard to say: For instance at present there are intense negotiations with the federal republics. What is clear is that the Soviet Union, the "federation," will no longer be what it was. In more general terms, we are only beginning to see the emergence of this new type of state, it is only now that there is a breakdown of the paradigm of Russian history whereby it was people and not laws who governed. We must implement the transition to a rule-of-law state in which it is laws and not individuals that govern.

[*LIBERATION*] And what you call the "foundation?"

[Yakovlev] We are trying to create an atmosphere of national concord on whose basis we could implement the transition to a market economy. That is to say that the economic system which will be established will be completely new. We could obviously try to create a management system out of nothing but for my part I believe that such a system would not survive long. We must advance on the basis of experience, making the essential amendments when necessary.

[*LIBERATION*] In Moscow one has the impression that the system, people, the people, and political structures are very tired. You say that perestroika is only beginning. But the country seems tired, not only of 70 years of Soviet rule but also of five years of perestroika. Does the country seem to you to still have strength enough to continue to "experiment," to debate, and to discuss?

[Yakovlev] Of course I agree with you that people are tired. But I do not think they are tired of the experiment. If we are speaking of the main result of the past five years it must be admitted that it is the huge breach which has been opened up in people's mentality. What is clear is that the overwhelming majority of Soviets do not want

the past to return. Although as you well know there is a big range of opinion in the Soviet Union, from the monarchy to anarchy. But in fact people have lost the habit of monopoly power, of a single type of ownership, of a single and unique truth.

People are tired for another reason: They are tired of the economic setbacks with which we are familiar. Why? I will give you my personal opinion: If in 1984-1985 we had known the real picture of the economy, the size of the budget deficit, the real state of facilities, if we had been informed at that time about what was happening in agriculture, we would perhaps have proceeded differently. The problem was we did not have all the pieces of the picture. Those who had been in power had hidden the reality from us. It was only later that we realized that we had lived for a good many years thanks to the sale of vodka, thanks to petrodollars, but we had been unable to benefit from it, we had wasted these petrodollars, and we kept the bare minimum to survive. And it was obviously with some reluctance that we started massive imports of grain and a great many other things.

[LIBERATION] The people who came to power in 1985—Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov—according to you were unaware of the real state of the country although they already belonged to the leading circles?

[Yakovlev] No, they did not know. But I should like to add two things to my reply.... It would be very easy to blame all the mistakes on the past, on the opposition to change, on "stagnation" (the term used to designate the Brezhnev period). But to tell the truth it would not be fair and with other people I take responsibility for what has happened in the past five years. For a start, there are of course objective reasons connected with the difficulties of any transitional period. We have described perestroika as a revolutionary process and it would not have been revolutionary if it had not been accompanied by events which mean that the country is at present on sort of historical "seesaw."

[LIBERATION] And what mistakes have you made?

[Yakovlev] If we examine the subjective reasons for the crisis, there are many of them. I am not talking about isolated mistakes—the famous decisions on the struggle against alcoholism, against unearned income, and so forth—all that had a harmful effect. But if we take the underlying reasons, there were above all the mistakes made by the government with regard to financial matters. We took decisions aimed at destroying the old management mechanism, we adopted new approaches, freedom for enterprises, decentralized and entirely new relations between enterprises and ministries, the principles of self-financing. All just and necessary measures in principle, but because of our lack of experience they resulted in serious errors and the lack of any control. The result is that in society there is a huge mass of money which is in no way backed up by products or goods. Once again the market is gradually emptying. To use a veiled

expression we say in our country that the market is "unbalanced." In fact shelves and stores are empty. People buy up everything they find because they do not want a worthless currency.

There is another reason for our crisis: It is the party. We say that the party took the initiative with regard to perestroika. But we know and you know that that is not really so. In fact it was a small group of leaders, making use of the discipline of the social body and the climate of monopoly power, using, therefore, the old levers, it was this small group which proposed a new policy. Previously it would happen like this: A new team would arrive, it would propose its program, and in two years it was all forgotten. But this time it was quite different: Two years later there was the January plenum, people began to say: They are in earnest, it really is a case of democracy, all those things which are being established. And what was not appreciated at its true value was the narrowness of outlook and dogmatism of a large part of the apparatus of the Communist Party and the party itself.

[LIBERATION] The party was "punished" in a way by the 28th congress. But the government, responsible for the financial situation you have just described, is still there. In any Western country the result of what you have described would be the government's resignation. Is that your position?

[Yakovlev] According to the rules which have been in use for decades in all Western countries that should be the case. But in our country this is the first time such a phenomenon has occurred. We do not have the solution of the government's resignation. In this totalitarian society built by the party everything happens differently. Logically, yes, the government should resign. But in practice? We have no time. We need urgent economic stabilization measures within the next 100 or 110 days. Who will take these measures? The government?

[LIBERATION] But if it disagrees?

[Yakovlev] That is it. It disagrees with the proposed measures. If we form a new government we have to convoke a congress of people's deputies. But people have already had enough of all these congresses and discussions. What would it mean to change the prime minister and the ministers? It is like a driver who has to change a wheel on a hairpin bend in the mountains.

[LIBERATION] If I can sum up your position, you favor the Shatalin program and you believe the president should put it into operation in his executive capacity. That is very important: In the past we saw our leaders making big promises. Then their generation was dying out and new men were coming in, bygones were bygones, and no one would take on any responsibility.

[Yakovlev] You say the government... but the government does not consist solely of Ryzhkov, it is an enormous apparatus. I would rather be inclined to believe that this apparatus should undergo very big changes. I

think that some ministries should be abolished and their structures altered within the framework of the transition to the market economy. I tried to explain to you at the beginning of our talk the way we see things. At present, at this stage of the reform, it would be useful to use the government apparatus, if only to implement the transition on the technical plane, which is also a very complex task. We need a sort of headquarters in charge of monitoring the implementation of the decisions taken in accordance with the reform. People who would be gathered within these headquarters and would help the implementation of measures like destatization, privatization, the principle of free enterprise, and many other things. For instance, we must create a committee in charge of land reform, perhaps another committee to prevent the creation of monopolies; we must monitor foreign investment policy... But before that there are measures to ensure stability which must be taken, and they are very urgent.

[LIBERATION] Is the government the economic equivalent of what the "conservatives" are or used to be in the political field?

[Yakovlev] I would not describe the government as "conservative." That term is allowed in politics, but the government consists of people who over the years have grown accustomed to managing in an administrative manner, using orders and edicts. It is not their fault, they do not know the meaning of using economic levers. They only know how to distribute.

Shakhray Opposes Decree Powers

LD2609173990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1315 GMT on 26 September broadcasts a 45-minute Yunost program, presented by Mikhail Smirnov, featuring a political portrait of and extended interviews with Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the legislation committee of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet. Smirnov notes that Shakhray is a lawyer by profession and studied foreign parliamentary structures, including Czechoslovakia in 1968. He championed the use of computers in parliamentary voting. He joined the Democratic Russia movement after becoming a RSFSR deputy.

In the interview Shakhray says that republican sovereignty must take precedence over Union laws. "It is no coincidence that the Constitution does not contain the right of the Congress or other supreme bodies of the Union—and it has never had, even in the 1936 Constitution or the 1924 Constitution—the center has never had the right to abrogate a law of a Union Republic. It has always been a statement of fact that a Union Republic is a sovereign state.

"From this fact there arise very simple and obvious conclusions: if the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the Union and the Supreme Soviet of the Union does not have the right to abrogate or halt legislative acts of a

Union Republic, this right cannot be possessed by other Union bodies. Why? It is a very simple and logical system. The Congress is the supreme body. The president, for example, is accountable to the Congress; he can be removed by the Congress; the first president was elected by the Congress; the Congress endows him with his competence and powers. The same applies to the Union Council of Ministers. If the higher body does not possess such a right, can it by the logic of the Constitution give such a right to bodies accountable to it? The Congress does not have this right and it cannot endow the president with this right.

"From this simple thought stems the perfectly evident truth of the unconstitutional nature of the presidential decrees, the unconstitutional nature of the decisions of the other central bodies abrogating and halting decisions of the Union Republics. That is, it is necessary to find other forms.

"We must all remember very well that the collapse of the Union, simply such a collapse, means that a whole group of states is appearing on the map of the world which are not included in the existing system of international relations. They are simply not included with regard to their borders, territories, citizenship. That is, the world community must sit down and find room for these new powers, these new states. Otherwise there may be conflicts, territorial claims, bloodshed, and so on."

Shakhray goes on: "The center is in its death agony. Economic links are falling apart. The credit-monetary system is paralyzed. The people are not being told the real state of affairs with regard to the budget, the debt, the internal and external debts. And I would like to state officially that this debt is several times higher than the government tells the people. It is simply deceiving it."

Shakhray briefly praises the Shatalin economic program then continues. "I am not opposed to the center and, therefore, accusations of separatism, accusations of causing the collapse of the USSR, do not apply to me and to many of my colleagues. These are the accusations that one hears so often. But I proceed from the position that a strong Union, a strong center is possible as a process, is possible as a unification, a voluntary unification of the efforts of the Union Republics. However, the Union leadership considers that this center can be preserved by force, can be preserved by sticking their heads in the sand, and so on. That is, they proceed from the position that something can be preserved while I consider that it must be created.

"This will be a center an order of magnitude more powerful. It will be a unification such as we see in Europe. They are removing customs, removing borders because economic interests require unification. But we are trying to create feudal principalities. That is not where our task lies. We wish to pass quickly through this destructive stage and to create a new economic Union.

"The objective interests of all peoples require that a united economic space should be preserved, that there

should not be any borders within the Union, that there should not be any customs, that there should not be tens of currencies and that there should be one hard, convertible Ruble, that the main thing should not be the property of the republics or the property of the soviet or the property of the territory but your property and my property and our joint property, the property of the enterprise, the property of the citizen, of those who work."

The change-over to private property must be carried out in a civilized manner by people's representatives, he adds.

In the final part of the program, Smirnov says: "What you are about to hear now was recorded late last night. Sergey Shakh-ray came to our Ostankino Studio specially." Shakh-ray then makes the following statement:

"I have felt obliged to do this by the stormy discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet over the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. In connection with this discussion I would like to say the following. The opinion is widespread that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium acted in haste. Is this so? The president's advisers could not but be aware of the existence of the RSFSR law on property. This law establishes that property relations on the territory of Russia are regulated by the laws of the RSFSR. At the same time the decision of the Supreme Soviet bestows these powers on the president.

"Here, again, presidential decrees are made superior to the laws of the RSFSR. The second point of the above-mentioned decision concerns the right to set up new bodies and even state structures. There exists a decision of the congress of Peoples Deputies of the RSFSR on the delimitation of functions between the Union and Russia. The Union is given strictly specific functions of managing certain sectors, for example defense, security, and so on. Consequently, this act of the supreme juridical power on the territory of Russia is also being ignored.

"And as Lukyanov explained at the session, it is proposed that there will be both creations and abolitions and it is not specified that these presidential functions will be extended only to executive bodies. But the explanation we were given was that strong presidential power was essential to strengthen executive bodies. As it has not done this, the USSR Supreme Soviet thus makes it possible for the USSR president to set up or abolish any bodies—for example, courts, the procuracy, authorities, and so on.

"Up to now the Union Constitution has envisaged the existence of only four basic types of bodies and structures: the bodies of power—the Soviets; the executive bodies—the executive committees or governments at republican level; bodies of the court, and the procuracy. It now turns out that the president, alongside or in place of the system of soviets, can create a new power structure. And then what happens to the slogan All Power to

the Soviets? The new state structure requires that changes be made in the Union Constitution. This was not done either.

"Thirdly, we are faced with a paradox. The Union Supreme Soviet is a body which is permanently in operation. It is now in session and will be for several months. That is, it could, itself, operationally adopt all the necessary laws. But at the same time the Supreme Soviet hands to the president the functions of adopting what are in essence laws. Now the president can substitute for the Union Supreme Soviet. So what is this Supreme Soviet needed for?

"Fourthly, not one amendment was passed which proposed coordinating such presidential decrees with the Union Republics. And if they wish to say to us that they are concerned for the sovereignty of the Union republics then why were even such insignificant amendments not adopted?

"In conclusion, I would like to say the following: Not having adopted an economic program, not having guaranteed the interests of the sovereign republics, not having taken account of their legislation, the president is receiving not just in words but in reality extraordinary powers.

"I would like to appeal to the voters of the RSFSR to hold meetings with deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to ask them to explain their position, why they, in the supreme body of power of the Union, ignore the interests of the republic on the territory of which they were elected. I think that the voters have a powerful weapon for influencing their deputies, both Union and Russian. That is to recall their deputy.

"The paralysis of power cannot last any longer. And let the people choose in a referendum, let them determine who—the Supreme Soviet of the Union or the Supreme Soviet of Russia—expresses the interests of the people of Russia."

Smirnov interjects: "I would like to put this question to you. Sergey, are you speaking on your own behalf or have you been empowered to make this statement?"

Shakh-ray replies: "I am speaking on my own behalf but I would like to say that as a Peoples Deputy of Russia, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and chairman of the Legislation Committee, I am aware that these are serious and responsible words."

Kapanets Explains CPSU Budget Statutes

90UN2851A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian

14 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with N. Kapanets, CPSU Central Committee deputy administrator of affairs, by A. Petrushov; place and date not given: "The CPSU Budget: Revenues and Expenditures"—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Many readers are requesting that PRAVDA explain and comment on certain provisions of the new CPSU Statutes, including those concerning monetary funds and party property. Our correspondent has generalized the readers' questions and asked N. Kapanets, deputy administrator of affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, to answer them.

[Petrushov] Nikolay Sergeyevich, as you know the CPSU statutes went into effect at the time of their publication, that is, on 18 July 1990. But the readers are asking how you explain the fact that the 40th paragraph of the statutes did not acquire legal force until 1 January 1991.

[Kapanets] At the 28th congress a decision was made to the effect that the CPSU statutes would go into effect on the day they were published in PRAVDA. Paragraph 40 also went into effect except for the part of it that regulates the new policy for financing local party organizations. This part goes into effect on 1 January 1991. The question of the deadlines for its introduction was the subject of a special discussion at the congress, and the majority of the delegates voted in favor of this decision.

The reasons for the confusion of deadlines? They have to do with the fact that changing the membership dues requires a knowledge of the financial situation of each party organization—from the local to the Communist Party of the Union republic. Without precise information it is impossible to develop approaches to reorganizing the structure and reducing the staffs of the party committees that correspond to the party's real financial capabilities. All this requires a certain amount of time.

Up to 50 percent of the funds from the total sum of membership dues is used for financing the activity of the local party organizations. Consequently, we need a mechanism for using them, and one that would maximally take into account the interests of all party organizations. You understand that it takes time to create this too.

[Petrushov] Under the old statutes, party dues were paid out of the wages. The concept of "incomes" is introduced in the new ones, and membership fees are taken from them. What does the concept "incomes" include and what do we and do we not have to pay from?

[Kapanets] The concept "income" includes the entire sum of monetary funds paid for labor or labor-related activity. Therefore the party membership fees are paid from all wages, honorariums, pensions, increments for special working conditions, bonuses, and other remunerations and payments related to the labor activity of communists. These incomes may also include dividends from shares of labor collectives and other payments received as a result of the distribution of the profit (income) of the enterprise, institution, organization, kolkhoz [collective farm], or sovkhoz [state farm], and also income from individual labor activity, under a family contract, and so forth. Payments in addition to wages for work in regions of the far north are also included in incomes.

But, taking into account the existing practice, it would obviously not be expedient to include all incomes for the payment of membership dues. These include income bonuses and special payments received by Communists for actions under special circumstances when people risk their health and lives (courage displayed in performance of their job or civic duty or during a fire, the prevention of accidents, and so forth) and also one-time bonuses for anniversaries and participation in international sports competitions, one-time stipends, severance pay when discharged, pay for moving when workers are transferred, business trips and payments in addition to regular wages for those who replace the workers who have been sent on business trips, gains from state loans or lotteries, and also incomes received for fattening private livestock and producing other agricultural products on private premises if they are the main source of income.

There is also a need to reinforce in the new instructions a provision to the effect that membership dues are not paid from pensions assigned because of disability or for minors, stipends for mothers with many children and mothers caring for children until they reach the age established by legislation, stipends for people caring for invalids, and stipends paid to workers and employees to compensate for harm caused to them (injuries or other health problems related to the performance of their duties on the job), that is, payments envisioned by social security measures.

As concerns various additional payments, at the present time they are taken into account in the payment of dues. This policy could have remained in place for two or three years, taking into account the significant reduction of income for the CPSU budget and the deficits of the budgets of practically all republic, kray, and oblast party organizations, which remain even under the conditions of the significant reduction of the party organ apparatuses. But as additional incomes are brought in from production-economic and entrepreneurial activity, the local party organs could make their own decisions about abolishing this provision.

In keeping with the instructions from the 28th CPSU Congress, draft instructions for membership fees are being drawn up. We have sent these to a number of party organizations. This work is now continuing. Until the adoption of the new instructions we must be guided by the ones now in effect and the additional clarifications regarding this issue.

[Petrushov] Will there be an initiation fee? What will be the amount of the dues paid by unemployed Communists?

[Kapanets] An initiation fee is not stipulated in the CPSU statutes, although such fees exist in the majority of social organizations. Individuals entering the CPSU will pay only for the expenses involved with manufacturing and filling out party documents. The amount will be determined in the instructions.

As concerns the amount of the dues for unemployed Communists, the party organizations, taking circumstances into account, can determine the amount right down to the point of releasing certain people from any payment at all. After the beginning of this year no fees will be required from disability pensions received by Communists.

[Petrushov] How will the payments be noted on the party cards of Communist pensioners who pay dues separately from their pension and from their earnings?

[Kapanets] This has to be reflected in the general records, but on the party card the wages and the pension and also the dues may be entered in a lump sum.

[Petrushov] Judging from the letters, in certain party organizations Communists have decided to pay dues in their previous amounts, that is, three percent of their earnings....

[Kapanets] During difficult times in the party there have always been Communists who have taken on more responsibility than is required by the statutory norms. Now too in a number of party organizations of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Moscow, and certain regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communists have considered it inadequate for the material support of the party to pay dues in the amount of two percent, and are paying the same amount as before. In these cases the total contribution is recorded on one line, and the corresponding entry is also made on the party card.

[Petrushov] How is the party budget approved, and who approves it for the local party organizations, raykoms [rayon committees], gorkoms [city committees], and okrug party committees?

[Kapanets] The CPSU statutes determine that all party organizations are independent in disposing of their budget, resolving structural, staff, and production-economic issues, and creating, reorganizing, and shutting down periodical publications. The budgets and reports on their fulfillment are approved at plenums of the party committees.

In the local party organizations it would be expedient to approve their budgets at party meetings, and in the larger ones—at meetings of the party committee (bureau) with the participation of the secretaries of the shop party organizations and the party aktiv.

[Petrushov] What voluntary contributions can the party committees accept from other organizations or individual citizens?

[Kapanets] The CPSU statutes approved at the congress stipulate that the monetary funds of the CPSU are formed not only from traditional sources of incomes but also from voluntary contributions of Communists, individual citizens, and other incomes that do not violate existing legislation. This means that Communists, in addition to their mandatory membership fees, and also

nonparty members may, on a voluntary basis, contribute any sum to the party budget. If they wish, these voluntary contributions may be used for the needs of the immediate local party organization or for the needs of the oblast, kray, or republic party organization as a whole or the Communist Party of the Union republic.

Voluntary contributions may also come in from enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, if they make a decision about this that does not contradict existing legislation. From these it is possible to form funds for supporting the party press, especially city, rayon, and interrayon newspapers, funds for financing political measures of party organizations, and so forth.

[Petrushov] Will the party budget be reduced with the introduction of the new scale for the payment of membership fees?

[Kapanets] As preliminary calculations show, the sum of receipts of membership fees in keeping with the new scale for paying them will decrease by 40 percent. Instead of the 1.6 billion rubles [R] that came in 1989, the incomes from dues for the current CPSU membership will be R950-960 million. The losses for the party coffers will exceed R650 million. These losses will also increase to some extent because of the smaller number of CPSU members.

One must take into account the fact that up to 50 percent of the dues coming in will be used for the needs of the local party organizations. Consequently, there will be a significant reduction of the sum used for financing the activity of party committees and party institutions.

With the introduction of the new policy for taxing profits of enterprises, the receipts from publishing activity after the payment of taxes and deductions to the economic incentive fund and the fund for the development of publishing houses will amount to about 200-250 million instead of the 1 billion deducted into the budget in recent years.

Thus the income for the CPSU budget from these two sources will decrease by approximately R1.5-1.6 million. The losses will amount to up to 60 percent of the current income level.

At the same time, because of the introduction new wholesale prices and rates and the increased amounts of contributions for state social security, expenditures on the existing structure and staffs of party organs will increase by R450-550 million.

Unless measures are taken to reduce expenditures, the budget deficit could amount to up to 1.5 billion per year. With this much of a deficit, the party organizations whose structures have a prevalence of rural raykoms and kolkhoz and sovkhoz party organizations and also party organizations of northern regions of the country, where

additional expenses are great and, as a rule, the organizations have small memberships, will end up in the most difficult situation.

Taking into account the fact that wage funds comprise 60 percent of the expenditures of the CPSU budget, it is inevitable that there will be a reduction in the number of staff workers. Consequently, it is necessary to improve both the structure of the apparatus itself and the structure of the party organs, and to consider the expediency of the functioning of certain units of the party committees.

[Petrushov] How do you intend to use the funds the party has accumulated?

[Kapanets] Yes, the party has accumulated funds. They were created over a number of years as an insurance fund whose amount had reached R4.8 billion by the 28th CPSU Congress. As we know, by a decision of the congress, R500 million of this sum was allotted for health measures for children living in the zone of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. A significant reduction of the staff of the party apparatus, improvement of the structure of the party committees, and other measures for saving money, with a sharp reduction of incomes, will not make it possible to balance incomes and expenditures at the present time. Therefore at first, until the party committees have gained more experience in acquiring income from other, nontraditional sources, part of the money from this fund will be used for financing their activity.

[Petrushov] What kind of economic activity can be engaged in by local party organizations, raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, or central committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics in order to supplement the party coffers?

[Kapanets] The CPSU statutes determine that profitable economic activity of party committees that does not run counter to the interests of political work is encouraged. This means that party committees should actively engage in entrepreneurial activity, use the party material base for these purposes, create joint enterprises, including with the participation of foreign partners, and associations, and also finance economic projects which will produce the most rapid and efficient return. Specific forms of entrepreneurial activity should be determined by the party committees themselves, taking local conditions into account.

In order to develop this kind of activity, as they accumulate funds local party organs could create funds for financing entrepreneurship within the framework of the Communist Parties of the Union republics and the kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon party organizations.

The leasing of enterprises to labor collectives and the formation of joint-stock companies, and the provision in the CPSU statutes to give local party organizations up to

50 percent of the membership fees, create a real possibility of using these funds to acquire shares in enterprises, buying part of them, and so forth. If necessary the local party organizations could combine their funds for business purposes and use them to solve problems dictated by the situation.

At the present time certain party committees are already participating in the creation of joint enterprises and in various projects, and they are undertaking other measures for supplementing the party coffers. And this is very important: They are taking advantage of financial opportunities to solve urgent local problems.

CPSU Program, Public Movements Contrasted

90UN2830A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 18 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by I. Zaramenskiy, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Work with Public and Political Organizations: "After a Rejection, Make a Proposal"]

[Text] The center of gravity in the array of political forces and power in our country has shifted, and has not come to the most stable point so far. The party is consequently following the policy of transferring power in its entirety to the soviets; it is also creating ideological and political conditions for actual pluralism and the affirmation of a multiparty system. These contradictory processes are developing against an unfavorable socioeconomic background, which aggravates a situation that is tense to begin with.

The CPSU leadership's policy is being criticized both inside the party and by the opponents of the party on the whole. Criticism by "the party's own" proceeds most frequently from failing to accept changes, fearing the unexpectedly great difficulties of a period of transition under perestroika and an unknown future, and failing to understand that we have to abandon quite a lot in order to take a step forward again. The desire is to hang on to "the guiding role," actually, the right to give commands and unrestricted power without accountability to the people. The desire is to respond to "antiparty" criticism and actions by shouting, or even by bringing criminal charges. However, this cannot be done; meanwhile, they often lack arguments for a debate, and at times the people do not listen to them. Powerlessness breeds anger, anger with the leadership, primarily the center, the Central Committee, which has allowed all of it "to get out of hand" and has failed to give instructions on what to do.

Their irritation is vented in harsh public statements: "Hold the Politburo accountable!", in articles by party functionaries which contain many frightening slices of life and much unhappiness with the situation but little analysis or real, practical proposals on how this situation is to be overcome. One discerns bewilderment behind the "iron-clad" tone of criticism rather than a readiness to act. Public response to this is small because they do

not bolster a constructive attitude in the work of party committees but rather do much to demoralize the party community and sow the seeds of mutual mistrust.

Apathy and the desire to abandon the cause and become wrapped up in one's personal concerns is becoming apparent. Not only "rank-and-file" party members are doing this but also some functionaries and apparatchiks who have yielded to moral pressure or have just changed their "stripes" to something more advantageous at this point.

However, this is not about them but about those who belonged and continue to belong to the party, those who will carry on its development. Anger does not help to perceive the essence of perestroika and choose the main element of it. We must clearly understand that what is happening now is objectively necessary, that it would be happening regardless of all attempts at containment or better planning, or the anticipatory development of a perestroika theory. After all, as the new critics have naively proclaimed, this is all that is lacking to ensure the success of perestroika. However, nobody has said that perestroika is going to proceed painlessly. Perhaps at the outset there were hopes that perestroika would end quickly, but they soon disappeared.

Is it worthwhile to devote our energies to searching for transient mistakes and enemies in our midst? Should we not concentrate for the most part on constructive tasks, on helping with the affirmation of renewed soviets with a full extent of powers and responsibilities, on developing a social and economic policy which the people comprehend and implementing it through the soviets, on a dialogue with all social forces for the sake of renewing our society, on further democratizing the party itself so that it may develop freely?

From among the many factors that will determine the vitality of the CPSU in the immediate future, two should be pointed out: its active compatibility with the new soviets and its ability to cooperate constructively with all social and political forces. The two are interconnected.

Where and how may the CPSU realistically interact with new parties and sociopolitical forces? Of course, in advancing civic initiatives of all kinds, public events, and discussions, and in the coordinated preparation of political actions and socioeconomic programs. While this is an important sphere, it is not decisive. Political activity in the soviets is the main and decisive task. This is exactly where the main tasks of the party are actually accomplished and where the interests of various political forces clash.

The work of the party in the soviets is the logical continuation and crowning of its entire sociopolitical function; the latter is acquiring its true sense and meaning right now.

Unfortunately, one gets the impression that the party committees of all echelons are doing a poor job learning the art of working in the soviets. The communists do not

give thought to this problem or condescend to a dialogue with representatives of other forces in places where their influence and authority are incontestable. On the other hand, the party committees themselves assume the stance of aggrieved parties in places where people who distance themselves from the CPSU have come to the soviets. This situation is absolutely unacceptable. It is the interests of the people and the future of our party that are at stake rather than power ambitions.

On one occasion I happened to deal with a complaint by a USSR people's deputy against the local organs of power which hindered the setting up of an independent voter club. To be sure, the objectives of this club were clear-cut: to run an election campaign as a counterbalance to the official one, complete with resounding "denunciations," passions raging at rallies, and so on. I do not think that the city committee was right in this case either. A genuine initiative will not be killed by a ban, which will merely spur on possessed enthusiasts. This is what ultimately happened.

However, the seeds of mistrust were sown.

It came out in the course of the same conversation that the deputy elected with the help of "informals" has given a lot of promises to the people but does not know how to keep them. He shuns the local authorities, treating them as "apparatchiks." On the other hand, representatives of the local authorities treat him as an outsider. As a result, the voters lose.

I understand that these are losses entailed by the stage of emergence of new forms of work and a new system of power. They are transient. However, we have too many objective difficulties to begin with to allow the accumulation of subjective difficulties due to the inability or reluctance of the cadres to perform in an unfamiliar social environment.

What is to be done under these specific conditions, when some deputies, fearing for their political "image," do not want to cooperate with party committees? After all, we could not take offense, could we? Apparently, it is necessary to offer such cooperation continuously, publicly, and openly with regard to the practical steps that the voters need, and to talk to the people openly about it. The people will ultimately figure out who is aiming at what and concerned with what.

Unfortunately, the idea of a new role for the party has not yet been grasped in many party committees. The situation in the Kuzbass, where the burden of socioeconomic problems has been accumulating for decades, could be a vivid illustration (are the Urals, industrial Volga areas, and the Russian non-Chernozem zone with their woes all that different?). Believing that the oblast leadership was responsible for the difficulties created, the citizens of Kemerovo refused to give a vote of confidence to many party functionaries at elections and did not elect them to the soviet. It is beside the point in this instance whether or not this was fair or justified. One exception was made—V. Lebedev, secretary of the

Oblast Committee for Ideology, recently secretary of a rayon party committee in the city of Kemerovo, became a people's deputy in the oblast soviet. Apparently, the residents believed him, though he was an "apparatchik" as well. Despite its alienation from the obkom [oblast party committee], the oblast soviet elected Lebedev a member of the presidium and chairman of the politically important commission of deputies—"For the Defense of Glasnost, Analysis and Study of Public Opinion, and Liaison with Public and Political Organizations." There was a thread of direct communication between the obkom and the soviet, but not for long. The thread was severed by Lebedev's party comrades. At the suggestion of an obkom commission Lebedev was not elected to the obkom at a conference held a month later because most members considered him, or rather his "ideology," to be the root cause of all the troubles that had befallen the region and the oblast party organization. Allegedly, he failed to work out a political concept and a mode of behavior under unconventional social circumstances and fortify the aktiv with it. It appears he hesitated himself and displayed "spinelessness." In general, the tired old logic worked—someone has got to be guilty and must be punished! We have always been given to search with particular passion and abandon for enemies in our midst. For example, this is what a segment of delegates tried to persuade both the 28th CPSU Congress and the Russian party conference to do.

I agree that in his eight months of work as a secretary V. Lebedev allowed miscalculations and even mistakes to occur, and that the delegates were entitled to make a decision. However, there is no political justification for the decision not to reelect him except, perhaps, for the emotions and misconceptions of the conference delegates. Lebedev's personality is not the issue; at issue is the need to accumulate experience of working in the soviets with all the forces that are represented there, the art of maneuvering and compromise, and, finally, tolerance. Some people cannot do this; some do not like it.

At present we are at a critical stage, when the interests of the cause rather than emotions should be decisive. Today we should think and weigh our decisions. The subsequent course of events in the Kuzbass has confirmed this yet again. Of course, expelling the ideologist-deputy did not bring about the adoption of the oblast soviet decision to audit the assets of the party obkom. However, it was one of the little wedges that widened the rift between the organ of power and the party committee.

At a time when both of them should be pulling their weight and laboring over the many problems of the region, instead the following issue is being resolved: Who is number one in the oblast? The obkom bureau approached the soviet with a request to cancel the decision on party assets as running counter to the constitution and the law. This drew a terse response: There are no grounds for this. The procurator has already interfered in the conflict which nobody needs and which simply provides entertainment for the crowd; yet it is not all that innocuous politically. Be that as it may, the fight

to force the communists out of the soviet is on. Someone needs this, but do the people need it, or the soviet itself, if it intends to work fruitfully for the benefit of the people?

In a number of regions of our country situations have now emerged in which party organizations are losing their decisive influence in the soviets. So far, it is unwarranted to turn this into a tragedy. We should learn the art of real political struggle, compromises, and blocs under the emerging multiparty system.

The vigorous appearance of new public and political organizations and movements in the domestic political arena of our country is a regular phenomenon of *perestroyka* rather than the "malicious scheme of foreign enemies." We should treat them accordingly, in a serious manner. The increase in the number of such organizations has been particularly rapid in the last year and a half, which is associated with the implementation of the decisions of the 19th conference on

reforming the political system.

A law on public associations has not yet been adopted, and a majority of the new political parties have not been registered. However, about 20 political parties have already formed all-Union organs and made their presence known through specific political actions. The intelligentsia, clerical employees, and students and young people are the main social base of the parties being created.

Virtually all the new parties are still going through a stage of emergence, self-assertion, and a search for ways to reinforce their influence on society. They are maneuvering, and not shrinking from the use of social demagoguery to achieve their ends. Many of them have not yet developed their own integrated concepts of the development of the state and society. A kind of "leeching off" the development of democratic processes in the country occurs, whereby they claim all achievements in this sphere as their own while painting the CPSU as an opposing, conservative force.

Despite making their presence known in a noisy and at times garish, rally-style manner, the new organizations understand that each of them alone does not amount to a significant political force at this point. This prompts them to create political blocs and unions of an oppositional nature. The groups of people's deputies are the focus for this unification. The power ambitions of the two sides are quite clearly seen in this instance. One side gains a social base represented by public forces, whereas the other gains direct access to power through deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] parliament. Even the leaders of the Democratic Platform, which has recently split off from the CPSU, attach their political hopes to this. Some people's deputies have directly become members of the leadership of new parties or sociopolitical associations and movements.

Influential deputies, groups, and the mass media have embarked on attempts to form a unified bloc of forces opposing the CPSU; their activities have picked up. Slogans have been set forth demanding that the CPSU "atone," return to the people its "illegally" received assets, transfer actual power to the soviets, and so on. According to grand declarations, the organizational establishment of the opposition within the framework of a forum of the "democratic" forces in the country is scheduled for the fall of 1990; in holding it it is planned to take into account the experience of the East European countries. The removal of the CPSU from power and the resignation of the government are the main perspectives of the organizers of the forum. Holding a "roundtable" with the opposition should become the first step in this direction.

At present, such plans—nothing short of that—are being voiced by essayists in the mass media, by some people's deputies, and by "apparatchiks" of the new parties. What about the people? For now, as they see it, the people are dormant, but they need to be revolutionized in all ways through rallies, protests against shortages of goods, the disintegration of the economy, and so on.

At this point at least two issues arise. First of all, are there forces and cadres, with programs, policies, and arrangements for implementing them, which are prepared to "pick up" power relatively painlessly in order to lead society to some objectives? Close scrutiny shows that there are no such forces and cadres. Noisy criticism of the CPSU, the apparatus, and the government is merely criticism. Real, constructive proposals and mechanisms for their implementation should be available rather than populist declarations. However, what mechanism can there be if in everything the opposition proceeds based on the destruction of the existing organizational, political, economic, and ideological structures? For rebuilding, we would once again face violence and privation and risk a civil and even world conflict. Is this not too high a price for the unsatisfied ambitions of a group of functionaries?

Meanwhile, the party proposes a real program of reforms, arrangements for their implementation, and the cooperation of all forces with a view to the prosperity of society and all nations rather than ideological chimeras. This program of the 28th CPSU Congress has been offered to our society; it comes out against pogroms and barbarity, against destroying what has already been accomplished, and at the same time boldly proceeds to fundamentally dismantle obsolete relations.

It would appear that work in keeping with this program should go on, that it should be continuously advertised, measured against the needs of the regions, and publicly offered, along with compromise variants, as a basis for joint actions with other social forces. However, many party committees are waiting, while the opposition forces continue to accumulate critical materials, the mass of which is already reaching a dangerous, explosive level. Their leaders have decided for some reason that

they have got an historic opportunity. This appears to be a profound mistake. Such an opportunity may be provided only by the people, not a crowd at a rally which ransacks tobacco stands and liquor stores. It will thrash "democrats" and bureaucrats alike, and it cannot become the social base of a serious power. In both the October and February revolutions it was not the mob that won but the working masses fully prepared for fundamental political changes by socioeconomic conditions.

The current changes have been initiated and led by the ruling party. The people on the whole have accepted them. Apart from mistakes, the party has to its credit tremendous experience of work and of organizing people. Having introduced "anticrisis" mechanisms inside itself, the party provides a hundredfold more reliable guarantee for the development of society than the latter-day messiahs. However, in this instance as well the CPSU proposes a dialogue and joint work for the sake of the future. Only those who

do not think or are mentally ill will fail to respond to this!

It would be insufficient to set hopes on the understanding of our opponents. Indeed, an acute sociopolitical and economic situation in our country calls for breadth in interpretation and vigorous actions on the part of all party organizations, be it in the course of mundane work on rescuing the crop, meeting contractual obligations, or convincing people during ideological disputes and asserting discipline in the workplace. Hollow twaddle and demagoguery should be counteracted with programs for meeting the specific needs of the people, which some politicians have forgotten about in the course of fighting for power. These programs should be boldly submitted to the soviets. The lumpen-like aspirations to divide up what has not been produced or the mythical "stolen" riches of the CPSU amounts to a large deception of the people which will not make anyone happy or fill anyone's stomach.

Appreciation is growing of the fact that party committees in all echelons should concentrate on political work with the masses, social forces, and in the soviets. Experience has already been gained in Moscow, Leningrad, Yaroslavl, Siberia, and the far east. This is to say nothing about the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union republics, where this has become an issue of survival.

Party organizations are creating factions in the soviets and trade unions, participating boldly in mass ecological and cultural-educational movements, and conducting a dialogue with dissidents. In general they are adapting to reality and the new position of the party in a renewed society. However, on occasion nostalgia for the past is manifested, for extending "leadership" to all spheres of knowledge and activities, and a demanding voice is heard: "When will the Central Committee state its attitude toward this or that issue?" The "top" does not

have, and cannot have, prepared answers to all questions. Should such answers really be expected in an environment of the supremacy of decisions of the primary party organizations and party masses? The structure of the organizations themselves and the apparatus should be subordinated to the goals that life dictates.

Congress of Eastern Peoples Gathers in Moscow

*LD2809065190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1636 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Sep, (TASS)—About 100 representatives of new national public organizations of the eastern regions of the USSR—of Turkic, Farsi, Caucasian and northern peoples—gathered in the capital to take part in the first Congress of Eastern Peoples. The initiative for holding the congress belongs to Almaz Yestekov, editor of the independent newspaper TURKESTAN which is distributed in an edition of 50,000 in Muslim regions of the USSR.

The organizer of the congress is also author of a draft appeal to people's deputies of the USSR and Union republics, the UN Secretary General and the USSR president. The appeal in particular draws the conclusion that today's ethnic conflicts in the country are the result of the aggressive colonial policy of the Russian empire, the terror of Stalin's repressions and the "cult of the state to the detriment of citizens and nations" which, in the view of Almaz Yestekov, exists in the USSR. The document voices pleas to the USSR president "not to impede the establishment of sovereign rights to their territory of the Turkic, Farsi, Caucasian and northern peoples of the USSR", and to the UN Secretary General "to recognize the right of these nations to represent their interests within the framework of the UN and the Security Council".

The draft declaration of the congress, also presented by Almaz Yestekov, underwent stormy discussion by those assembled. The author of the draft says that the peoples of the East will defend their legitimate rights on the basis of the UN rules, the universal declaration of human rights, and the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and he appeals for consolidation, the attainment of aims by non-violent, parliamentary means, speaking of the interdependence in relations between the peoples of the East and the Russian people. Despite the restrained tone of the document, the discussion was chaotic and excessively emotional in parts.

At present there is no agreement among representatives of the delegations. It is not even clear whether this is the first or second congress; whether or not to count the Congress of Eastern Peoples held in Baku in the twenties. USSR People's Deputy Olzhas Suleymenov, who will possibly lead an assembly of Eastern peoples if this is formed, said: "One feels that many insults have been accumulated this determines today's 'heated' state".

German Congress Organizing Committee Meets

*LD2809002290 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Text] The organization committee for the preparation and conducting of the congress of USSR Germans has met in regular session. The organizing committee, headed by Academician Raushenbach, includes a group of scientists, lawyers, economists, writers, journalists, representatives of different ministries and departments, as well as the leaders of the Society of Germans, resur-rection [Vozrozhdeniya]. The date for the beginning of the congress—there was a proposal for the middle of December—was discussed at the meeting. The members of the organizing committee were introduced to the draft proposal for the methods to elect delegates to the congress, and were acquainted with the provisions dealing with setting up a central council, work on which is still being conducted.

Officials Comment on Volga Germans' Autonomy

*AU2709122490 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Sep 90 p 7*

["R.O." report: "Reestablishment of Autonomy of Germans in the Soviet Union Demanded"]

[Excerpts] Luebeck, 26 September—The CPSU Central Committee is in favor of autonomy for the Germans in the Soviet Union. It is currently working out draft laws which are aimed at the complete rehabilitation of the Germans. The drafts are the bases for a Supreme Soviet declaration on the "reestablishment of the rights of all deported peoples." As regards the German minority, it is necessary to rescind all discriminating decrees. In addition, after the formal rehabilitation of the Germans it is planned that the USSR Parliament will pass a decree, in agreement with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic (RSFSR), that reestablishes on the basis of the Supreme Soviet decision of November 1989 the autonomous state there "where it was in the past, namely at the Volga." This was stated by Mr. Aumann, head of the Central Committee Department for Questions of Autonomy and Nationality Groups and a Soviet German, at a symposium of the "Goetting Work Group" which was concluded in Luebeck on Wednesday [26 September]. The event, which was dedicated to the position of the Russian Germans in the German-Soviet relations, was attended by leading West German experts for East Europe, representatives of the FRG Interior and Foreign Ministries, Soviet scientists, and leading members of the "All-Union Association of Soviet Germans—Rebirth."

However, Aumann once again described the position of the Central Committee, according to which it is currently impossible to reestablish territorial autonomy in the area of the former "Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Volga Germans." The resistance of the Russian population has to be reduced there first. Therefore, the Central Committee advocates an "Association

of Soviet Germans" knowing that this personal autonomy is rejected by the majority of "Rebirth." Party and government are preparing a "congress of all Soviet Germans." In October and November delegates to this congress are to be elected in all areas where Germans live. On 15 December the congress is to decide on the "association." "Rebirth" should participate in it; after all, it does not speak for the 2 million Germans in the Soviet Union but only for 50,000, that is its members. Aumann announced a "CPSU decision" which was taken together with the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers: "We do not renounce the reestablishment of the national territorial state of the Soviet Germans as soon as the necessary conditions have been established in the Volga area."

The Central Committee representative admitted that the party has been forced to correct its course. Now "those who did not think of it six months ago are already sitting on their suitcases." They can "be stopped only with difficulty. Unfortunately, we do not have any arguments. They have some. In the FRG they will live more quietly and better, and they will remain Germans there." In an interview with this newspaper he explained that "mistakes were made" at the Volga when the party cadres there organized the "baiting against the Germans and their autonomy." Now those responsible for this have been relieved of their offices and punished. Scientists of the Marxism-Leninism Institute have been sent to Saratov to provide information and to stop the campaigns of the "Yedinstvo" ("Unity") organization. Oblast party committees and city soviets have been ordered to ensure the organization of the Germans' national cultural life at the Volga. The area construction administrations and the kolkhoz and sovkhoz [collective and state farms] are that all preparations for the resettlement of the Germans in the area of the former Volga Republic are made. The University and the Pedagogical Institute in Saratov should make preparations to start training teachers with German as their mother tongue for the 1991-95 period, and the public education administration has to ensure the building of national German schools. All measures were published in KOMMUNIST, the Saratov oblast party magazine, on 13 September.

In an interview with this newspaper, Mr. Groth, chairman of "Rebirth," confirmed this information. He affirmed that his organization is insisting on territorial autonomy and is making preparations for the "establishment of German structures" which could be taken over in the Volga area. In Ulyanovsk a German college is being built. In the budget for the 1991-95 five-year plan, the RSFSR allocated 1 billion rubles for this purpose. Deputy Premier Bugin will soon negotiate with Volkswagen chief Hahn on the establishment of a German-Russian joint venture for the production of small trucks and buses in Krasnoarmeysk (formerly Balzer). Wolfsburg [seat of the Volkswagen company] has not confirmed this. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry representative Stuedemann stressed that in the past the subject of Russian Germans had

always had to be "hidden" in German-Soviet negotiations. The treaty on the relations between the united Germany and the Soviet Union, which was recently initialed by Foreign Ministers Genscher and Shevardnadze, changes this. Article 15 puts the ways in which Bonn can help on a new basis which benefits the mediating organizations. However, cooperation also has to be provided to the other nationalities, in particular to the Russians, in order to overcome existing distrust. He stressed that the Germans in the Soviet Union must show that the things they get will also benefit their neighbors.

Theft, Speculation Statistics Reported

PM2609125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[PRAVDA-TASS-INTERFAX report under general heading: "Telephone, Teletype, Telefax"]

[Text] According to USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs figures, of the total number of crimes uncovered by staffers of the law enforcement organs in the first half of 1990 some 30.7 percent consist of thefts of state or public property, 20.2 percent consist of speculation, and two percent of bribery. Criminal charges for speculation have been brought against nearly 10,000 citizens. Valuables worth over 9 million rubles have been confiscated from criminals. The highest proportion of crime in the economic sphere is to be noted in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Uzbekistan.

All-Union Lenin Foundation Established

PM2609130990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Senchev: "In Defense of Lenin"]

[Text] Ulyanovsk—The collective of the Ulyanovsk branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum has acted as the initiator in the creation of an all-Union Lenin foundation.

"Valeriy Aleksandrovich," I asked the branch's director, V. Perfilov, "is this only a call so far or have any specific actions been undertaken?"

"The newspaper ISTOKI—our collective's organ—has just been published. The print run of 30,000 copies rapidly disappeared among readers. The point of the publication is to restore the true image of Lenin, to purge his theoretical heritage of dogmatism, to defend the name of our great fellow countryman against shameless slander and discrediting. The newspaper will, we hope, unite around itself philosophers, historians, local experts—all those who by virtue of their conscience and convictions are prepared to counter the anti-Lenin campaign which has been launched in the country. I have in mind not only the barbaric demolition of monuments to Lenin. And not only those articles in journals and the periodical press which accumulate mountains of lies and

deliberate distortions. I have in mind also the fact that our collective in particular is meeting with antagonism in the publication of works connected with Lenin themes. For instance, the Saratov publishing house recently refused to publish a very interesting semifictional historical study by Zhores Trofimov entitled 'Ilich's Mother' ['Mat Ilich'a']."

"How do you see the all-Union Lenin foundation?"

"It is a public organization which would engage in propaganda, publishing, scientific research, and commercial activity. And not least in philanthropy—support for artists, writers, restoration workers, and museum workers."

Gorbachev Sends Greetings to Pioneers

PM2609154390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1

[Message from M.S. Gorbachev "To Delegates to 10th All-Union Pioneers Rally"]

[Text] Young friends!

I cordially greet you, the participants in the 10th all-Union pioneers rally.

At this very difficult but very interesting time we are living with you. The country is engaged in the perestroika of our entire life. The new is being born before your eyes. And it is not happening painlessly. Sometimes you encounter injustice, ferocity, or lies. But that is not what determines the point of the period through which we are living now. Its main content is revolutionary perestroika and the creation of life.

For the first time in the entire history of the children's and pioneer movement in our country you have embarked on the radical restructuring of your organization, have embarked upon it without any outside instructions or pressure. The more initiative you display, the less fear of making a mistake. In setting off on the quest for the new, do not forget to take with you the pioneers' best traditions. Good luck!

May the path to adult life begin for you with these steps! You will create and work in a more dynamic world, which will require profound knowledge and a high degree of morality and culture. Lay the foundation for this right now, embarking on good and interesting deeds.

Carry throughout your lives and augment the friendship and comradeship, good will and desire for cooperation born in your pioneer years. May the sincerity and purity of these feelings remain forever in your souls.

I wish you ardent love for the Fatherland and your native region and the eternal aspiration toward good and justice.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Academy of Science Deputies Election 'Invalid'

LD2709212390 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—The recent elections of USSR people's deputies from the Academy of Sciences here have been recognized invalid, a member of the electoral commission told TASS.

According to the electoral law, in the event of election, two of the four candidates should take the place of the late academician Andrey Sakharov and the seat vacated by Sergey Alekseyev, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, of his own accord.

"Less than a half of all registered votes were cast for the candidates nominated by the entire scientific community," a spokesman for the electoral commission told TASS. "This is illustrative of distrust of parliament rather than of candidates."

The spokesman also mentioned as one of causes of such low turnout the differences that developed between the leadership of the Academy of Sciences and a certain proportion of the scientific community represented at the elections as delegates from institutes.

They issued a statement yesterday, demanding an immediate convocation of a congress of the USSR Academy of Sciences in view of its current critical position, the abrogation of Point 2 of the presidential decree on the status of the Academy of Sciences, which, in their view, enables 300 academicians to manage the funds and equipment.

The scientists also demanded that USSR deputies from the Academy of Sciences report their activities to the scientific community.

The question of repeated elections will now be decided upon by the Central Commission for Election of the USSR People's Deputies.

Economic

Presidential Council Discusses Conversion

LD2809141890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1235 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Report from the USSR Foreign Ministry press center by TASS correspondents Lev Aksenov, Igor Peskov, and Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Moscow 28 Sept (TASS)—Today a sitting of the USSR Presidential Council is in progress in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev. Under discussion is the question "of boosting the effectiveness of implementing conversion of the defense sectors of the Soviet industry."

Vitaliy Ignatenko, the leader of the Soviet head of state's press service, said at a news briefing that Igor Belousov,

deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, had presented a program during the morning sitting for the conversion of the defense industry. Members of the government and leaders of scientific-production associations and institutes of the defense industry are taking part in the discussion. USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev is expected to speak in the afternoon.

Vitaliy Ignatenko announced that the program applies to the period up to 1995 and affects the activities of 550 major defense enterprises in the USSR. It spells out the main guidelines for the reorientation of the defense industry and science toward the development and production of the most important kinds of national-economic output. Specifically, by 1995 it is planned to bring the output of consumer goods up to a maximum value of 270 million rubles, which is twice as much as during the previous five-year-plan period.

Provision is also made for boosting the production of technological equipment for the processing sectors of the agro-industrial complex, light industry, food, medical, and computer industries, communications, television, radio broadcasting, and civilian shipbuilding and aircraft construction.

According to Vitaliy Ignatenko, the speeches noted the need to maximally preserve the sector's scientific and technical potential and to solve the problem of the social protection of its work force. He also announced that the program's implementation will require the detailed working through of specific problems, for which working groups of consultative bureaus will be set up.

Deputy Defense Minister on Military Conversion

LD280904390 Moscow TASS in English 0929 GMT
28 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 28 TASS—"A state programme for arms production conversion has been drafted and presented to the government," Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Vitaliy Shabanov told the TRUD newspaper.

"Under the programme, 422 military-oriented plants will be converted to civilian work by 1995. Fifty-six of them will be fully retooled to produce consumer goods over the next three years and the production of armaments and military equipment at the rest of them will be significantly reduced," Shabanov said.

He said the programme also envisaged motivating highly-qualified staff to stay at converted factories, preserving their unique equipment and the experimental base and developing their scientific-production capacities. The scientific-technical advances in the defence sector will be put to use in civilian industries.

"The remaining enterprises will continue to produce weapons and military equipment in drastically reduced volumes, but taking account of the requirements set for

the development and production of armaments by the Soviet Defence Ministry," Shabanov said.

'Major Accident' Cuts Steel Production

LD2809061990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0606 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Sep (TASS)—A major accident has occurred at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA reports today.

On 26 September, a powerful explosion put a continuous steel-annealing unit out of action. The accident in the sheet-rolling plant happened at night as the furnaces were being fired after a scheduled preventive maintenance overhaul. Two workers were hurt, one of them died.

Unique equipment on which up to 500,000 tonnes of steel were rolled each year, has been shut down.

'Excerpts' of Aganbegyan-Shatalin Plan Published

Part I: Reviewing the Economy

90P50110 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 21 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Abridged version of the Aganbegyan-Shatalin draft program prepared by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "Program on the Transition to the Market: How To Work and Live?"—first three paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] Today RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA begins publishing excerpts of a document whose significance for the future of our country is difficult to overestimate. This is the draft program on the transition to a market in the USSR, drafted on the basis of the program prepared by Academician S.S. Shatalin's group. This draft also takes into account a number of provisions from the USSR government's program, as well as recommendations put forth by representatives of the Union republics and alternative variants by scholars and practical workers drawn up at the concluding stage of the joint commission led by Academician A.G. Aganbegyan.

What is the goal of the editorial board in presenting this material on the pages of a newspaper for the social protection of workers, the special character of which may cause bewilderment among a significant share of our readers? First of all, we want to familiarize RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's readership with a few basic chapters of the draft, which is not only at the center of intense discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet, but is also a matter of huge interest for everyone who is not indifferent to the fate of socialism in our country, and with specific suggestions for getting out of the deep crisis gripping the economy, and, as a result, all spheres of societal life. The second purpose of this publication is to

call the newspaper's readers to an energetic and constructive discussion of the draft program which must be a reliable, well-considered, and well-founded outline of our upcoming future.

We await your letters and phone calls at 257-27-08.

The Crisis of the System

The economic and political instability that the country is presently undergoing should not be viewed as an ordinary, although deep, crisis which may be surmounted using the internal reserves of the system. On the contrary, we are witnessing a general crisis of the socioeconomic system as well as of the national-state system and ideology—a crisis exposing the lack of vitality of existing structures.

This lack of vitality was masked up to the present by the extensive use of human and natural resources; but this type of economic development exhausted itself back in the sixties. During the last two decades there has been a uninterrupted fall in the rate of economic growth. The country's economy has not participated in the present stage of the world scientific and technical revolution, and it has found itself deprived of mechanisms of structural perestroika. The gap in the level of technology, quality of goods, and living standards (by a factor of 3-5) with countries having a developed market economy has reached critical proportions.

Since the middle of the seventies the national economy has functioned for the most part using income from exports of raw materials and energy products, limitation of the population's consumption, and isolation from the world market. In the eighties practically no economic growth was observed and "squandering" of the national wealth occurred: The production apparatus has not renewed itself in many sectors for 15-25 years, soil fertility in a number of regions has decreased by a factor of two to three, natural resources have been used in a predatory manner, and the burden on the environment in a number of regions has exceeded all acceptable limits. A beggarly standard of living for tens of millions of people, the impossibility of satisfying critical needs, and the absence of incentives to work have given rise to processes of physical and social degradation. The country has come close to the complete collapse of the entire socioeconomic system.

The potential for today's socioeconomic crisis accumulated over decades and could not help but show itself in critical, destructive forms. The simultaneity in time of negative tendencies in the economy and far-reaching political reforms was unavoidable—the socioeconomic contradictions appeared openly in the course of the democratization of the political system.

Economic Policy of 1985-1990

In 1985 the direction of economic reforms was genuinely chosen (decentralization, increased incentives to work), but the prolonged absence of a program of radical

reforms, the halfheartedness of the decisions that were made, and the incompetency of the leaders of the organs of economic administration only aggravated the manifestations of the crisis.

These negative tendencies were aggravated by the government's wrongful monetary, financial, and credit policies. And escalation of state consumption while preserving the structure of production unchanged led in essence to the elimination of the consumer market. By 1985 the economy of the USSR had already accumulated significant inflationary potential, which was not manifested because of the rigidity of the financial system. However, between 1988 and 1990 this potential increased abruptly. During 1981-1985 the estimated domestic national debt grew R37.8 billion (rubles); by comparison, over the next five years it grew no less than R400 billion. Considering that by the end of 1989 the net foreign debt of the USSR had more than doubled in comparison with the 1984 level, one may come to the conclusion that over recent years the state has, in essence, "been living in debt" and is already on the verge of bankruptcy.

Additional financial resources received as a result of emission were pumped into the investment sphere, which was already distinguished by its hypertrophied levels. The overwhelming majority of additional capital investments was frozen in uncompleted construction and in inefficient production, which gave rise to a powerful inflationary wave. Beginning with 1988 the situation in capital construction may be characterized as an investment crisis which no appropriations will help to overcome any longer. The commissioning of social and cultural facilities has decreased most significantly, and plans for housing construction are being frustrated.

An abrupt increase in centralized expenditures on social and cultural measures, although it was directed at increasing the standard of living of broad segments of society, in fact had the opposite effect inasmuch as it was also wholly financed through emission. Under these conditions a nominal growth in the income of the population is quickly "eaten up" by inflation and the deficit is simultaneously increased.

The state budget suffered substantial losses because of changes in world market conditions for oil and other raw materials. Cleaning up the consequences of technological catastrophes (Chernobyl) and natural disasters required large expenditures. A no less serious factor in the destabilization of the financial system was the uncontrolled growth of balances of monetary assets on the accounts of funds for economic stimulation (FES) of enterprises between 1987 and 1990. The budget sustained huge losses as a result of incompetent decisions relating to the anti-alcohol campaign.

The assets of the fund for the development of production (FRP) grew especially quickly—by a factor of almost 10—during this time. The balances of assets in the fund for financial incentives (FMP) and the fund for social

and cultural measures and construction of housing (FSKM) tripled. All the markets are feeling the pressure of this money, especially the market of production assets. The fundamental reason for such a situation is the preservation of "soft" budgetary restrictions while the state refuses to immobilize the free balance of the profits of enterprises.

Inflationary financing of the additional expenditures of the state in the absence of objective statistical information permitted maintenance of the illusion of change for some time. And social dissatisfaction is all the greater today in the period of an extremely brutal financial crisis. Control over the growth of the money supply under today's conditions is already impossible without extraordinary measures.

From 1989 through the first half of 1990 the government proposed three programs for reform. The last one did not evoke much confidence, and, as a result, new approaches are necessary.

However paradoxical it may be, the stage of the 1985-1990 years was objectively necessary for society so that it would recognize the lack of viability of the existing socioeconomic system and work out a program for a transition to another model of development. A significant tendency toward inertia in social development does not permit us to avoid a period of "reevaluation of values," but the accumulation of knowledge and ideas during that period are necessary for the subsequent reforms.

The situation is such that to slow down now would be akin to death.

The Various Choices

The acuteness of the economic and political crisis and of ethnic and ideological contradictions deprives the country's leadership of room to maneuver and narrows the circle of possible alternatives for the further development of events. At present the political and economic center has, in essence, three choices of actions:

1. Reacting to events and fighting negative process after they have already gathered momentum. A policy of half-measures and gradual reforms in the sphere of economics.
2. A type of "recoiling," leading to the restoration of centralized administration of the economy (directed planning of production and funding of material resources, strict limits on income, and elimination of all new forms of organization of economic activity).
3. An acceleration of preparations for and implementation of radical economic reform, the goal of which is to create during the next 1.5-2 years the foundations for a market economy that is able to develop on its own and is oriented toward satisfying the demands of the people.

We will examine what will happen should the country's leadership pick each of these choices.

1. Gradual reforms. The opportunities for acting in this fashion have almost been exhausted, inasmuch as the process of the disintegration of the economic system will continue if this variant is chosen and dozens of autarchies will appear within the borders of oblasts and national-territorial formations. The exchange of products between them will take the form of barter transactions. As a result it will be necessary to choose between hyperinflation and direct immobilization of monetary assets belonging to the population and enterprises. The slump in production will deepen and many major enterprises will come to a halt as a result of a lack of component products. A severe shortage of consumer goods and materials required for production will only be alleviated through imports, but the country will most probably be refused new credits. Collapse of the major city centers and a decline in the production of a marketable surplus in the most productive agricultural regions will begin. The consumer market will be supplanted by rationed distribution and the "black market."

The economic failure will be aggravated by the absence of a unified program of action. Each republic, and then each territory (and finally each rayon), will try to pull itself from the crisis on its own, which is ruinous to an economic system that is integrated and overly monopolized.

The political consequences for choosing this course of action are the final disintegration of the Union and clashes on nationalist grounds in regions that are ethnically diverse. Contempt for the law will encompass all spheres of society's life.

2. The possibility of a return to an economic system in the "1984 model" should be viewed as very real when it is considered that it has many adherents both in the organs possessing power and among certain groups of the population who have grown weary of the instability of living conditions. Many people still do not totally recognize the self-destructiveness of the old economic and political system, which caused a great country to be bypassed by world progress. A mounting crisis took place in the centralized type of economy during the period from 1970 to the beginning of the 1980's, so one would therefore have to return to the management system of the 1930's-1950's. It is clear that it would be impossible to achieve this without wide political repression, and the historical development of humanity has proved the inefficiency of an over-centralized economy.

3. Radical economic reform. The need to move to another type of social system is dictated by the universality of the laws directing the economy and society as a whole. Attempts to seek out a different, unique path so that a single country may cheat the logic of historical development are inevitably doomed to defeat. Nevertheless, in the overall context of actions, it is necessary to take into consideration the specifics of our multinational country.

At the present time, we have conditions that favor radical restructuring:

- Understanding by broad social segments of the essence of the process of social and economic life has reach a level which permits the development and implementation of a package of reforms (political and economic, and of the national-state system);
- A great preparatory effort conducted over the last 2-3 years permits us to develop a detailed program of economic reform in a short period of time as well as the legislative acts and the normative and methodological documents necessary for its implementation;
- Military opposition has been reduced, and a streamlining of foreign economic relations and direct aid from foreign states permit the formation of reserves necessary for the successful institution of reforms.

However, the implementation of any reforms at the present time requires not only the political will of the leadership of the country but also the agreement of the republics, coordination of their activities, and the trust of the people.

The Goals of Reform and Principles of the New Economic System

The main goal of reform is the economic freedom of citizens and the creation on this basis of an efficient economic system able to guarantee dynamic development of the national economy and a dignified standard of living for the citizens of this country once it has caught up to other countries.

Mankind has not succeeded in creating anything more efficient than the market economy. The market economy creates strong incentives for man to realize his potential and to increase labor and economic activity, and it sharply accelerates scientific and technical progress. The mechanisms of self-regulation that are characteristic of it guarantee the best coordination of the activities of all economic bodies, the rational use of labor, material, and financial resources, and balance in the national economy. It is apparent that only a transition to an economic system based on market relations will permit the resolution of the most crucial of the country's problems, which have accumulated across decades, organically unite our economy with the world economy, guarantee the growth of production in accordance with the needs of the workers, thus guaranteeing the economy's social orientation, eliminate shortages, and grant access for our citizens to all the achievements of world civilization.

A turning point, painful but necessary for the fate of the country, must take place. It consists of replacing state guardianship, living at others' expense, unwarranted leveling, apathy, and mismanagement spawned by the command and administrative system with freedom of economic activity and responsibility of each citizen for his own welfare as well as hard, well-organized labor and rewards in accordance with the results of that labor.

The market mechanism is the sole mechanism which permits one to unite different states and their economic systems. Therefore only a transition to the market will permit us to create a foundation for the voluntary association of sovereign republics within the bounds of a renewed Union.

Part II: Transitioning the Economy

90P50113A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Second part of abridged excerpts of the Aganbegyan-Shatalin program on the stabilization of the economy and transition to a market: "How To Work and Live?"]

Logic of and Stages in a Transition to a Market Economy

General Concept

The transition from a command economy to a market economy conforms to common laws which everyone must take into account.

This process includes, on one hand, deep institutional changes affecting the structure of socioeconomic relations as well as production, and on the other hand it presupposes implementation of stabilizing measures, especially in monetary, credit, and financial spheres and in pricing.

Work should be carried out in the following directions.

1. **The normalization and reestablishment of the consumer market**, supplying it with goods and services for the population. This for the most part will remove social dissatisfaction, for it will signify the improvement of living conditions for all layers of the population. This will also raise confidence in Union, republic, and local organs of authority, which will greatly ease subsequent measures in the course of the transition to a developed market economy. The normalization of the consumer market will reestablish people's material self-interest and strengthen incentives for economic activity—the main engine of economic growth in the new conditions.

For this to happen, on the one hand, measures to "tie up" excess money held by the population and to close off channels for reissuing it are being undertaken. A tight (restrictive) monetary, credit, and financial policy aimed at limiting the amount of money in circulation is necessary. A flexible price formation policy, the gradual removal of state price controls, and the transition to free price formation in accordance with supply and demand, without which the functioning of the market mechanism is impossible, will serve this purpose. The removal of price controls in conjunction with a tight monetary, credit, and financial policy will not lead to high rates of inflation.

On the other hand, in order to normalize the consumer market, the implementation of a special system of measures for the active support and strong stimulus of

production, the sale of consumer goods and services, the expansion of loans, and the use of hard currency funds for the acquisition of consumer goods from abroad has been proposed.

2. Denationalization of the economy, privatization, and development of entrepreneurship. Denationalization is understood as removing the functions of direct economic administration from the state, transferring the appropriate powers down to the level of the enterprise, and replacing vertical ties with horizontal ones; this may take place even without changing the owner.

Privatization means changing the owner by transferring or selling under various conditions state property to economic entities which will henceforth use it in economic activities, bearing full accountability in terms of property for their results.

Denationalization and privatization strengthen the regime of commercial accounting and self-financing and are in this sense an important factor in financial recovery. They also create guarantees for the development of entrepreneurship, which permits our enormous reserves to be engaged and on this basis improves the economic situation of the country. The entrepreneur is one of the key figures of the market economy; he is interested in getting out and utilizing reserves and opportunities.

3. Formation of a market and a market infrastructure and new mechanisms for establishing economic ties and developing entrepreneurship. During the transition period, use of state orders and limited distribution of products manufactured for them is required in forms which would not obstruct development of market relations in order to maintain material balance in the most important sectors of the economy.

This presupposes the demonopolization of the economy and elimination of organizational structures which have arisen within the bounds of the command and administrative system and which are obstructing development of market relations. This is a most important prerequisite for entrepreneurship, competition, and a transition to market pricing.

In the formation of a market, the creation of a strong system of social support and guarantees for the population, which would ease people's adaptation to market conditions and would protect socially vulnerable layers from the difficulties of the transition stage, acquires key significance.

4. Implementation of an active structural and investment policy which, relying primarily on economic methods, would ensure the necessary structural changes in the national economy in the direction of its social reorientation, of accelerated development of the production of consumer goods and services, of reduction of losses, of increased flexibility of production, and of receptivity to changes in demand and to technological innovation.

The accelerated creation of a legal base should be provided for each of the enumerated directions and an enormous organizational effort should be carried out at all levels of state power and administration.

The premise of this work, however, is not so that forces of a small number of specialists will do everything for everyone, teaching and giving orders. The principle feature of the market which substantially eases the establishment of the structures appropriate to it is that they arise naturally and as the result of an activity of millions of people which does not need to be planned in detail. This is the pledge of success of the program for the transition to a market economy.

As opposed to preceding concepts, this present program takes into consideration a fundamentally new political situation: The declaration by the republics of their sovereignty does not permit us to develop a program from the center that is unified in all details. Each republic has the opportunity to develop and implement its own program of economic reform on the basis of an analysis of the specific socioeconomic situation and its own view of its basic problems with regard for ethnic and historical peculiarities. The process of reform is already heading in this direction.

The common nature of the goals and problems which must be decided by the republics as well as existing technological, financial, credit, and other ties dictate the need for a coordinated choice preserving a common mechanism and logic for the transition to a market economy. The republic organs may conduct all this activity completely independently on the basis of common principles. Coordination and synchronization of their actions will heighten the efficiency of the reforms and reduce possible losses.

A system of reforms is also preferable which would satisfy the economic interests of each of the republics, efficiently determine the necessary regulating activities of the Union organs, mutually coordinate scales, forms, and pace of basic reform measures in the republics, and lay the economic basis for a future system of relations between republics.

Time does not wait for us. In the course of a relatively short period encompassing approximately 500 days, for which the country's leadership may still receive a vote of confidence, reforms will be implemented which will open the road to the development of market relations and will ensure a visible improvement in the economic situation and in the lives of people.

The First 100 Days—A Program of Emergency Measures (From 1 October to the Beginning of 1991)

The first day—the President of the USSR and the leaders of the republics announce the introduction of legislative acts consolidating the basic principles of economic reform:

- equality of rights of physical persons and corporate bodies at any economic activity except those forbidden by law;
- normalization of the consumer market, supplying it with goods and services for the population; the support and encouragement of production and the sale of these goods and services;
- denationalization of the economy: the transfer (sale) of a portion of housing and land assets to ownership by citizens, the reorganization of large state enterprises into joint-stock associations, and the privatization of small enterprises of trade, food services, and consumer services;
- the removal from criminal and administrative laws of articles stipulating punishment for entrepreneurial activities; amnesty for those convicted under these articles together with an increased effort to fight crimes against property, to provide measures to ensure public security, and to strengthen law enforcement organs;
- emergency powers for the president of the USSR and for the highest representatives of authority of the Union republics in the realm of monetary and financial policy.

An interrepublic economic committee is formed under the president of the USSR with the participation of authorized representatives of all the republics in order to implement the program for the transition to a market and to establish an effective leadership for the implementation of reforms.

It is recommended that before the end of 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the supreme soviets of the Union republics adopt a package of legislative acts necessary to the functioning of a market economy and postpone the review of other draft bills during this time. In the event that the necessary acts cannot be adopted in a timely manner, they will be put into effect by temporary Edicts of the president of the USSR and by the presidents (of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets) of the Union republics.

From the first days, the implementation of the program begins with the implementation of a comprehensive system of measures for stabilizing the national economy, including;

- measures for improving finances and monetary circulation;
- measures for stabilizing mutual deliveries and preventing a drop in production;
- measures for denationalization and privatization, including land reform;
- measures for stabilizing foreign economic ties.

The idea of the package of measures designated for the first 100 days is to succeed in reducing the budget deficit to planned levels and to implement successful measures to tie up the money supply. It is assumed that the actions of the Union republics are coordinated and that the population demonstrates its trust. With these prerequisites it would be possible over a short period of relatively mild measures to convert the economy to a qualitatively different state and prepare it for the entry into the market.

However, if these prerequisites are not provided, far more severe and painful measures are required, and it is necessary to be prepared to apply them.

Days 100-250: Liberalization of Prices and Severe Financial Restrictions

After implementation of the emergency measures of the first 100 days, the situation in the national economy will change.

Under these conditions, the task of the second stage will consist primarily of maintaining what has been achieved, easing the transition to the new conditions, consistently encouraging the positive potential of reform, and creating favorable conditions for the formation of a full-blooded market.

The main actions of this stage are to remove state price controls on a wide circle of output for production and technical use and consumer goods and services and to restrain inflationary processes by means of financial and credit policy. During this period the budget deficit must be reduced to zero with no change in the size of the total money supply. At the same time the scales of denationalization and privatization of small enterprises are broadened and a market infrastructure is intensively developed.

The first results of the emergency measures and the liberalization of prices show up in a noticeable improvement in the consumer market, especially with regard to goods sold at prices of supply and demand. Prices will be higher than today's state prices but far lower than those on the black market. The more strictly and consistently measures are carried out in the realm of financial and credit policy to eliminate panic buying, the lower the increase in prices will be. Goods will be readily available. This is the first positive result of reform which may occur, and it must be achieved without fail.

In the process, an increase in the volume of sale of consumer goods through accumulation of reserves and foreign aid must play an important role. The rational distribution of commodity resources according to time of use and territory of the country will have substantial significance. The creation of special channels for their delivery and storage is required.

At the end of the first six months of 1991 indexation of income with regard to changes in retail prices is carried out. In the event that the price index exceeds a certain

level, indexation may be performed on the basis of the first quarter (the forecasting of price increases will be determined at the time of the start of the reform).¹

A consequence of the increase of the interest rate on loans, limitation of the money supply as a whole, and the introduction of a new tax system will be that producers will come up against a shortage of money and difficulties in selling their output. This will force them to pay more careful attention to the demands of the consumers, especially in unmonopolized sectors, and to support existing economic ties with steady customers. A decrease in barter will begin in instances where resources may be purchased at market prices. The possibility of a decrease in the volume of production in a number of sectors should be taken into account.

In the first months of this period work is completed on the placement of state orders and distribution of output produced for it for the third and fourth quarters of 1991.

The removal of administrative control over prices on the next group of goods takes place with regard to the specific situation on the market and is accompanied by measures to regulate finances and credit. Further measures to reduce the budget deficit are undertaken.

The transfer of a significant portion of income from Union to republic and local budgets will lead to a situation where they have the task of deciding how the appropriate sums are to be distributed—by continuing to pay subsidies in the previous amounts or by reducing them, freeing prices, and compensating the population for the increase in prices through a system of indexation or other methods.

The Union republics and local organs of power may temporarily freeze prices on goods in great demand in the event that they rise inordinately and introduce rationed distribution of a number of goods with compensation from their budgets to producers and trade for losses as a result of this process.

In the period between 100 and 250 days, an **active policy of denationalization and demonopolization of the economy** and encouragement of entrepreneurship is carried out.

Republic committees and a Union fund of state property intensify the process of denationalization of the economy. The number of joint-stock companies created on the basis of large state enterprises rises to 1,000-1,500 by the end of the period. The process of selling shares of restructured enterprises is invigorated and for the most part the proceeds go toward paying off the state debt. Along with the issuance of stocks, other forms of denationalization of property are applied: A one-time redemption, deferred payments purchase, leasing with subsequent redemption, and foreign investment.

The process of denationalization and privatization must be especially active in trade and food and consumer

services where it is necessary to eliminate state monopolies as quickly as possible, create conditions for competition, and forestall the possibility of abuses in the distribution of commodity resources, such as the creation of an artificial shortage.

By the end of the period up to 50 percent of small production and nonproduction stores and food services stores may be privatized in various forms.

It is also necessary to quickly carry out the process of eliminating outdated administrative structures and disbanding monopolistic concerns, associations, and establishments constructed on the principle of horizontal integration where the technological ties between them are not rigid.

The first stage of land reform should be completed by spring of 1991.

It should be expected that, in connection with a possible increase in prices, enterprises will wish, under pressure of their workers, to compensate for the losses connected with this by increasing income. It is possible that there will be social conflicts which may force us to compromise. Inflationary pressure will be maintained as a result.

In order to forestall an undesirable turn of events, it will be necessary to secure social agreements concerning control over the growth of income as well as have in readiness a package of measures to consolidate control over the money supply which the president of the USSR could apply by using his emergency powers.

Days 250-400: Stabilization of the Market

The main task of this stage consists of achieving for the most part stabilization of the market of both consumer goods and means of production while broadening the sphere of market relations and establishing a new system of economic ties.

The intensive process of denationalization continues. By the 400th day up to 30-40 percent of the basic fund of industry, up to 50 percent of construction and automotive transport, and not less than 60 percent of trade and food and consumer services should be transformed from state property to joint-stock companies, sold, or converted to lease holdings. Liquidation is completed for organizational structures which carried out the functions of administration for enterprises which have been transferred to new property relations.

The anti-monopoly policy is intensified. On the basis of legislation which has been adopted, the anti-monopoly organs of the Union and republics adopt rulings on the dissolution of the majority of administratively created production associations, concerns, and associations which may qualify as monopolies, and they establish control over the activities of technological monopolies.

During this period the majority of work takes place to create conditions for competition between domestic producers to the degree that it can be conducted without a

major restructuring of production. Opportunities to do this will be limited in connection with a reduction in the volume of investments under conditions of severe financial and credit limitations.

Contradictory processes will take place in the economy at this time. On one hand, one may expect an increasing saturation of the economy with goods. The market infrastructure will develop at an accelerated pace, and the influence of entrepreneurship on economic activity will increase. Use of material resources should become more economical, and production reserves will shrink. Disengaged resources will replenish the market of production assets, and they will contribute to its stabilization.

On the other hand, it is possible that there will be an intensification of crisis phenomena summoned up by the dismantling of the command and administrative system, unstable prices, and restructuring of economic ties, as well as financial and credit policy. One should expect a worsening of the slump in production, especially in basic sectors, construction, and machinery construction, as a result of the curtailment of investment activity.

These phenomena must not be viewed as purely negative inasmuch as they will testify to the beginning of structural changes in the national economy in which the share of these sectors is significantly hypertrophied, in part because of the support of inefficient production. The developing processes of economizing on resources will limit demand for semi-finished goods.

At the same time, these phenomena will give rise to a deterioration of the financial situation and the ruin of a number of enterprises. The problem of employment will intensify, especially in regions dominated by mining and heavy industry. The task of the appropriate organs will consist of helping not the enterprises that produce unneeded output and gobble up valuable material resources, but the people who work at them. The organs will have to ensure their employment, retrain them, and help them to adapt to the new conditions.

During this period the burden on state employment services and public works programs (which should have been prepared during the first stage) will increase. Support of small entrepreneurship should contribute to an increase in jobs.

Another course of events is not ruled out. Support of a severe financial and credit policy does not succeed. In this variant of development, inflationary pressure increases inasmuch as the situation on the market will favor an increase in prices on consumer goods, which in its turn will call up a wide demand to increase income.

The development of competition and entrepreneurship by this time may still have not achieved a scale enabling them to stabilize the market.

A stabilizing factor under these conditions could be a sudden broadening of the housing market, housing

reform, as well as reform of wages, restructuring of relations between enterprises and local soviets in the social sphere, completion of the liberalization of prices, and the introduction of a domestic convertible ruble.

The creation of a housing market is a necessary element in the transition to a market economy. It permits entry into circulation of one of the most important goods able to absorb a significant portion of the population's effective demand, assisting in the long-term plan for balancing the consumer market and intensifying the stimuli of labor activity.

A restructuring of the wage system is also needed. The idea is to abolish regulation and establish a state minimum wage for enterprises of all forms of property ownership that would be based on a calculation of a minimum consumer budget with regard to the new level of living expenses and, on the whole, on a broadened circle of goods and services purchased at market prices with personal income. A realistic minimum wage will be an important means of social protection.

In coordination with these measures, the republics and local organs conduct efforts to take from the enterprises the excessive and unevenly distributed burden of maintaining facilities of the social sphere. The local soviets take upon themselves a significant portion of expenditures on these goals, connected primarily with construction of housing.

The necessary prerequisites for this will be established. As a result the entry of enterprises into market relations will be eased and their competitiveness is increased.

In coordination with the aforementioned measures, reform of pricing should be completed. State control over prices should be removed from approximately 70-80 percent of products and services by the end of 400 days. It is proposed to maintain control on basic primary resources (oil and petroleum products, natural gas, and some types of ferrous and nonferrous metals) and a limited list of critical consumer goods (some types of bread, meat, milk, sugar, vegetable oil, basic medicines, school books, transportation fees, and fees for several municipal services).

The prevalence of supply-and-demand prices in conjunction with a balanced budget creates the prerequisites for resolution of a key problem of the transition to a market economy—the problem of a domestic convertible ruble. The essence of the problem is to give the opportunity to all domestic enterprises and foreign companies operating on the territory of the USSR to freely sell and buy at market rates the hard currency necessary to carry out routine economic operations.

Domestic convertibility of the ruble opens wide possibilities for the influx of foreign investments which are so necessary to the country for restructuring and technical retooling as well as for developing competition on the domestic market and overcoming monopolistic practices. It may be stated that under the conditions of our

country this is the decisive prerequisite for bringing the market mechanism to full speed at the next stage.

Important steps toward convertibility of the ruble are already made at the initial stage of reform, during the first 100 days. However, during this period it will still be quite limited in terms of functioning and categories of purchasers. This is connected with the fact that firm state prices will be maintained on the majority of goods and that the hard-currency market will only be making its first steps.

Introduction of convertibility of the ruble includes:

- development of a hard-currency market (hard-currency auctions, exchanges, and dissemination of hard-currency operations in the network of commercial banks);
- introduction and adjustment of new customs tariffs and taxes on exports which would ensure the approximate correspondence of domestic and world prices, in the process forestalling the possibility of speculation on the difference in prices; they would also permit a substantial decrease in the volume of restrictions and licensing.

Days 400-500: The Beginning of the Expansion

The basic goals of this period are to intensify stabilization of the economy and finances and speed up formation of the competitive market environment necessary for full functioning of the mechanisms of self-regulation that are proper to the market.

The center of gravity of work during this period falls on significant progress in denationalization, privatization, and demonopolization of the economy and on activating a structural and investment policy.

The prerequisites should be established for a noticeable intensification of economic activity, primarily in the sectors of light industry, the food industry, the agricultural sector, and sectors of the services sphere. On this basis will a way out of the economic (and structural crisis) be planned.

In the event of the successful implementation of the measures planned for the first 400 days, the situation in the national economy will change radically. By the end of the last stage practically all the basic conditions will have been created for the reliable functioning of the economy: Balanced prices and budget, a modern banking system, and a hard-currency market.

Denationalization and privatization are accelerated. By the 500th day no less than 70 percent of industrial enterprises, 80-90 percent of construction and automotive transport, wholesale trade of output for production and technical uses, retail trade, and food and consumer services should be transformed from state property to joint-stock companies, sold, or converted to lease holdings. Funds and Committees of State Property sell off

shares belonging to the state to corporate bodies or physical persons either directly or through special companies.

Republic and local organs of power carry out an anti-monopoly program: Support of small enterprises is intensified, and secondary production lines are spun off to become independent enterprises and are developed. Foreign competitors begin to operate on the domestic market. Customs tariffs protect domestic producers.

Conditions which have arisen after development of housing reform will contribute to the formation of a labor market. Registration will be repealed. Amendments to labor legislation will be introduced. Creation and consolidation of independent trade unions as the defenders of the interests of the worker and unions of entrepreneurs and administrators must be encouraged in every possible way. On the basis of agreements between them under the regulating role of the state, the creation of a mechanism for organizing the labor market and social control over changes in income and prices is possible.

Development of a financial market leads to the need to introduce a tax on income from securities and from transactions with them.

As competition, entrepreneurship, and stabilization of prices develop, the opportunity to soften the pressure of financial and credit limitations grows. A reduction in taxes on profits is proposed; it will contribute to an increase in business activity. One should also expect a decrease in the level of interest rates and reserve demands of the Union Reserve System. This will permit an increase in the size of investments.

Large-scale structural restructuring of the economy develops; the economy now has the opportunity to rely on the market mechanism and on attracting foreign investments, technology, and management experience. It will take a long time, but by the time the Program is completed the real prerequisites for an expansion of the economy will have been created.

In this manner and as a result of implementing all these measures, in a short period of them the foundations are laid for a new economic system which, without extraordinary measures on the part of the state, will orient production toward satisfaction of personal and social demands, create effective incentives for labor and entrepreneurship, ensure saturation of the market with various goods at stable prices, and lay the foundation for the prosperity of the country and of all peoples living in it.

Footnote:

1. According to preliminary estimates, the retail price index under the realization of a program of monetary and financial recovery will be 1.12 in the first quarter of 1991 and 1.19 in the second quarter.

Part III: Applying Economic Theory

90P50115 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 25 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Third part of abridged excerpts from the "Program on the Stabilization of the Economy and Transition to a Market," prepared on the basis of the program drafted by Academician S. Shatalin's group: "How to Live and Work"]

[Text] 1. Living Standards, Social Safeguards, Labor Remuneration

Traditionally, programs for a transition to a market economy presuppose a greater or lesser, lengthy or short-term fall in individuals' living standards. Analysis has shown that another concept of the program is possible also. Conditions for the stabilization of and, subsequently, even a rise in living standards will be created in the transition period.

It is a question not simply of a transition to market mechanisms of economic relations. A more meaningful goal is being set—shaping a socially oriented economic system and replacing declarations of social priorities with mechanisms of their realization which are precise and clear to every citizen of the country.

What is the purpose of the social orientation of the proposed system? Primarily according the managing subject, whoever he be: the outfit of a state-owned enterprise, a farmer, a private businessman, **freedom** of economic activity and enterprise.

The other side of the freedom that has been gained is the **personal responsibility** of each for his family, for the outfit in which he works, and for the society in which he lives. Whereas the principal social function of the totalitarian state as principal proprietor was the redistribution of part of the national wealth it allotted the people, the task of the new managing subject is the creation of this wealth, and not only for himself but also for society. This means that an increase in the labor activity of the workman will be an important guarantee of a growth of his living standard, and the efficiency of the economy as a whole will create the prerequisites for the maximum possible level of general well-being at a particular stage.

A characteristic feature of the new system is the guarantee of equal opportunity for each citizen of the country. This will be realized via a system of government **social safeguards**, which will incorporate forms and levels of support for various groups of the population legislatively enshrined by the state.

Thus a socially oriented market in this program means:

- freedom of economic activity as the basis of an increase in the living standard plus responsibility plus a developed system of social safeguards;
- social partnership between the citizen and the state, consumer and producer, and employee and employer.

In the transition period the program provides for a set of measures which need to be implemented in the republics for the purpose of the creation of an efficient and ramified system of social safeguards reaching each citizen.

Pertaining to the social safeguards now are: a minimum wage; a pension; scholarships; benefits, including for temporary disability; the right to labor; the right to free education and medical services; allowances connected with work conditions; the right to housing; the right to a vacation.

Considering the social focus of the reform, the point of departure should be the elaboration of a **minimum consumer budget**. It will be a most important social safeguard since the minimum income levels will be determined on the basis thereof. Proceeding from the current methods, the standard per capita minimum material sufficiency budget for the USSR as a whole in 1988 was put at R105 per month. Approximately half of this sum is accounted for by expenditures on food, almost 20 percent on nonfood commodities, and 14 percent on services. Approximately R3 per month are allocated for satisfaction of spiritual requirements.

Under the new conditions the calculation of the minimum consumer budget should be based not on beggarly requirements and the minimum levels of their satisfaction but on the opportunity afforded each member of society by the economic system to live decently even at the minimum income level.

A central issue behind changes in distributive relations will be the **reform of labor remuneration**. Wages are the principal component of the entire system of social protection, and its most important task is to secure the conditions of the expanded reproduction of workmen's labor, professional and social attributes.

The new system of remuneration should as a matter of principle be constructed so as to ensure that with its help the question of the exploitation of the labor of millions of working people in the country be removed from the agenda for good. World experience has already shown in practice that the higher the degree of development of market relations, the lower the level of labor exploitation. The incorporation of the free workman in a system of professional movements skillfully defending his interests, social and labor safeguards created by the state and realization of the citizens' right to property and income therefrom preclude the uncompensated confiscation of that produced by labor.

The enumerated conditions dictate the main directions of the reform of remuneration, which should be conducted in the republics before the end of 1991. Having made the minimum consumer budget the basis, it is essential to fundamentally restructure the current wage-rate system. It should contain wage rates and salary schedules of the minimum amount differentiated mainly according to qualifications. Sectoral differentiation in the wage-rate system will be eliminated. This will

increase the incentives to an upgrading of qualifications and will also create for the workmen conditions of confidence in social protection. In addition, this will contribute to the more rational utilization of labor resources.

Work conditions (underground, harmful, dangerous and so forth), territorial included, should be considered with the aid of a system of coefficients to these wage rates and salary schedules approved by the state.

The wage rates and salary schedules are guaranteed and binding on enterprises of all forms of ownership. This is the limit below which the remuneration of workmen may not fall whatever the results of economic activity.

The amount of labor remuneration calculated according to minimum wage rates and scales is included in production expenses for purposes of taxation.

The total amount of an individual worker's monetary income will, in the new conditions, be drawn from: 1) unearned pay; 2) funds paid out of profits; and 3) income received from stocks and other securities. It will be regulated only through a progressive tax with an unlimited maximum ceiling.

The introduction of such an income system presupposes a unified base both for producers and for sectors in the sociocultural sphere.

Thus, in so much as a **minimum consumer budget that is adjusted for inflation** will lie at the foundation of the wage system, so too will the system of labor remuneration be protected to a significant degree from inflation.

In the transitional period, before a price reform is carried out, **republican systems of income indexing** may be implemented ahead of time, including income indexing for enterprises of all-Union subordination and financing. Wage income in the state sector, pensions, scholarships, allowances, and other monetary payments from social funds will be subject to indexing. In the private sector of the economy, compensation for price increases will be conducted within the framework of labor agreements. The goal of indexing in the transitional period is to maintain the real content of the population's monetary incomes at a level of social safeguards set by the state.

The program intends by the end of 1990 to strengthen through economic and legal methods the social protection of the population, especially for those living on low incomes, and for large families, invalids, pensioners, and students.

In the event of inauspicious trends developing and also given deliberate curbs on nominal income, commodity interventions, for which stocks of inexpensive consumer goods, imports included, will be held in reserve, will be made. As a result an increase in real income may be secured even given a nominal reduction in income thanks to a growth in the purchasing power of the ruble.

Certain groups of the population should under the conditions of transition to market relations be the target of special social programs. It is primarily a question of the elderly and invalids living alone and independently and also orphaned children and large families. Satisfaction of their vitally important food, housing and medical needs and other types of service should be ensured via such programs. It will be necessary at the regional level (the local soviets) to create special services for the implementation of such programs with the extensive enlistment in their activity of public and religious organizations.

2. The Labor Market

It is essential to make the right to labor the basis of all characterizations of labor activity as the most important right of the individual.

Upon organization of the labor force market the main goal should be concern to free people from compulsory labor. Citizens' right to the voluntary nature of labor, freedom to move around the country's territory and outside it and to freedom of choice of the place where they work, regardless of its territorial location, forms of ownership and work practices, should be written into law. All types of socially useful activity should be recognized in legislation as being equally necessary to society and equally accessible to the citizens. Any type of activity which is not in conflict with the constitution and which is associated with satisfaction of personal and social requirements should be classified as socially useful.

The program is geared to ensuring the formation via Union and republic legislation of an organized labor market, which implies the following:

- first, the presence of conditions for a voluntary choice between employment and nonemployment in social production and free choice of occupation and type of activity (other than those which could be injurious to the health and safety of other citizens) with regard for both individual interests and social requirements. In other words, freedom of the supply of manpower;
- second, freedom to hire and fire employees for all employers (in the shape of state institutions and establishments, cooperatives, tenant outfits and so forth), given obligatory compliance with the rules of labor legislation and protection of the citizens' interests in respect to employment guarantees, conditions of work and its remuneration. In other words, freedom of demand for manpower;
- third, free movement of wages and other legitimate types of income, given observance of the guaranteed minimum established by law. Regulation of the upper limit of income only via a tax system based on a progressive scale.

In turn, a special mechanism should be created for the realization of these goals incorporating the following basic components:

- a broadly accessible system of vocational guidance, training and retraining;
- a developed network of employment services undertaking locally the regular registration of job vacancies and persons seeking work, decisions on questions of the payment of benefits to the unemployed and other types of assistance to them, advice and brokerage services for the citizens in finding work, assistance to enterprises in hiring workers and the solution of other personnel problems and in the development of personnel planning;
- national and local data banks on the demand for manpower and its supply;
- special programs for stimulating the growth of employment in labor-surplus areas and assistance in finding work for individual groups of the population experiencing particular difficulties in this respect (youth without sound professional training, women with children, invalids, persons who have served time and so forth);
- a system of the study and forecasting of the state of the national and regional labor force markets;
- a mechanism operating on a democratic basis of the formulation of a general strategy and specific scientifically substantiated programs of the regulation of professional training and employment.

The employment service under current conditions should play a key part both in providing enterprises with the necessary personnel and in helping the workers find jobs.

Together with the colossal strain in the economy from the shortage of the necessary manpower there are at the present time in the USSR in practically all sectors and professions approximately 2 to 2.5 million unemployed. In addition, it is estimated, approximately 20 percent of workers and employees change their jobs annually, losing on average approximately 30 days.

In the 1990's the country's labor resources will be replenished by young people (over 42 million persons or 26 percent of the total numbers of the able-bodied population). It will thus be necessary to find work for approximately 22 million school graduates and approximately 20 million young specialists who have graduated from higher educational institutions and secondary technical educational institutions.

Account has to be taken here of the demobilization of servicemen and conversion and the structural reorganization of the economy and also the very painful problem of refugees (forced migrants). The overall load on the employment service could in individual years be very substantial. Tens of millions of people will be in need of jobs.

One of the most important functions of the employment service is providing in conjunction with other interested parties guarantees and compensation for employees

released in connection with the reorganization and liquidation of enterprises. A broadening of the possibilities of preventing unemployment and a broader set of means of supporting those who have lost their jobs are an objective necessity.

When making a decision on the large-scale release of manpower, management notifies the territorial employment authorities and the employees themselves of this ahead of time, within the established timeframe (2-3 months). Those being cut are paid compensation from the employer's resources for loss of work in the form of a discharge benefit for the period established by legislation (4 weeks, for example), regardless of whether the employee has been found a new job in this time. Persons of pre-retirement age are accorded the right of early retirement on pension. A version of the joint financing of pensions from the resources of the Pension Fund and the Employment Fund up to the time when the employees reach retirement age is possible.

In the event of a new job not having been found in the period that discharge benefit is paid, the able-bodied citizen acquires the right to unemployment benefit. The introduction of a payment of unemployment benefits on the order of 70 percent of the average monthly wage for the first 3 months following discharge, 60 percent for the next 3 months, and then 50 percent for a year may be recommended as a possible option.

When planning a mass lay-off, which could sharply upset the balance of the labor market, it is essential to afford the employment services the right in conjunction with the local soviets to postpone for a period of up to 6 months the decision on the release or take advantage of the right to veto the release decision. Wages for this period should be paid either wholly from the Employment Fund or on a parity basis with the enterprise.

The system of social protection applies to all working people. For the first time an economic program takes account of the specifics of individual social and demographic groups of labor resources whose competitiveness is for objective reasons limited.

The system of social support should consist of two parts: social payments (pensions, unemployment benefit, other forms of social assistance) and social benefits facilitating the search for work and, consequently, a steady income (reserved jobs, acquisition of qualifications, special terms of remuneration and work practices).

In this connection it is expedient: to extend the list of pursuits in which the use of women's labor is prohibited; to establish for the enterprises and organizations quotas for the hiring of graduates, proceeding from the situation which has taken shape regarding employment of the youth and the development prospects of specific enterprises; to finance an expansion of the current network of specialized enterprises, an increase in the demands made on the conditions of invalids' conditions of work and the establishment of allowances in respect to its remuneration.

3. Housing Reform

A housing reform is one of the key aspects of a transition to a market economy. Its objective is to create a housing market which will make it possible to exercise the right of every family and every member of our society who is of full age to elect a mode of improving housing conditions which is the most acceptable to them.

The transition to a market is also compelled by the tremendous extent of unsatisfied effective demand for housing. According to the available estimates, it comes to between 70 and 75 billion rubles. Out of this, those on waiting lists for cooperative housing account for 7 billion rubles, and those who are not on the waiting lists but would like to acquire cooperative housing account for another 12 billion rubles. The funds which [the populace] would like to allocate for individual construction right away amount to more than 25 billion rubles (without loans). Demand for repairs and improvements in the individual housing stock comes to another 3.5 billion. Finally, those who live in the state housing stock are prepared to pay additionally more than 25 billion rubles for improving their housing conditions.

It is impermissible to ignore this tremendous effective demand. At present, up to 50 percent of demand for housing is switched to other goods, thus making a balance in the consumer market substantially more difficult to achieve.

The following main principles of the housing reform are proposed.

- 1) The right of each citizen and family to acquire and hold housing as personal property, sell it, and bequeath it without any restrictions;
- 2) The right of citizens and families to freely elect a mode of meeting their demand for housing: their own house or apartment, joint ownership in a cooperative, rental housing;
- 3) Fees paid for housing in keeping with its full market value, taking into account its quality and location;
- 4) Social guarantees to low-income families in the process of exercising their right to housing by way of providing them with free and reduced-rent housing in the municipal (state) housing stock;
- 5) Acknowledging the right of individuals on waiting lists to preferential conditions for the allocation of housing.

It is proposed to implement the housing reform in stages in 1990 through 1992.

At the first stage (October 1990—March 1991), the legal foundation and socioeconomic infrastructure of the housing market will be created. The transfer of certain categories of state housing to the citizens as their property for a symbolic payment will begin in the process of selling this housing.

At the second stage (through the end of 1991), some of the newly built apartments will be sold at full cost or on credit; the system of loans for housing construction will be reorganized. New procedures for the allocation of housing to individuals on the waiting lists and low-income families will be established. The next stage of the reform will be prepared.

At the third stage (end of 1991—1992), the payment of fees for housing based on its full market cost will be introduced, with the expenditures of the populace being compensated through the adopted system of indexation. Extensive privatization of the state housing stock will get under way. The housing stock of ministries, as well as that of enterprises, will be transferred or sold to the local soviets, renters, or specialized commercial companies to be held as their property.

The main work on implementing the housing reform will be done by the local soviets. The republic and central organs provide a legal foundation and financial support for the measures carried out.

Transferring certain categories of the state housing stock to renters as owners free of charge or selling them for a symbolic fee will become the first step in privatizing the housing stock.

Renters may be given some of the housing stock free of charge in keeping with the norms set by local soviets, with the remaining segment of housing above the norm being paid for. The sale of housing for a symbolic fee is possible. Such sales of housing with seven percent of the due tax on the residual value of the apartment, or at 10 rubles per square meter, may eventually raise 10 to 20 billion rubles, and per family, it will amount to between 500 and 600 rubles for apartments whose the market value ranges between 10,000 and 30,000 rubles. The transfer of housing to owners will trigger mass exchanges, that is, buying and selling the housing, now personally owned, with a quite official payment of the difference in housing prices by those who improve their housing conditions.

Local soviets may establish deadlines for the transfer or symbolic sale (for example, before 1 July or 1 December 1991). In the future, buying out apartments will only be possible at market value.

Changing the system of current payments for apartments in the houses of the state and public housing stock in keeping with the rules set forth by the republics is a necessary condition for intensifying the process of transferring and buying out apartments as personal property. In the process, the following may be the guiding principles:

- to introduce increased payments for excessive floor space effective 1 October 1990;
- to establish in 1991 differentiated levels of rent for citizens residing in separate apartments depending on

the size of the overall useful space occupied, the quality and location of housing, but no lower than the costs of operation;

- to envisage an opportunity for reduced rents to be paid by families which live in communal apartments, on premises which do not meet requirements for apartments, and payments for residence in dormitories, as well as payments for apartments by families with per capita incomes of under 80 rubles who do not have the [minimal] social norm of floor space;
- to abolish the normative acts adopted which give the right to additional floor space and rent reductions to the employees of state offices and enterprises, professional, party, and other public organizations, military command personnel, as well as reduced rental payments for members of the boards of attorneys and physicians practicing at home;
- to develop and implement in 1990 regulations on the leasing of housing in the non-state housing stock which provides for setting rents by agreement, with the right of the local soviets to place an upper limit on these payments.

Simultaneously with raising rents and rental fees, it is necessary to provide for indexing the incomes of the population, including a revision of the minimal wage, and indexing retirement benefits, grants, and scholarships.

It is necessary to resolve the issues of the accumulated obligations of the state, i.e., of individuals on the waiting lists, as well as to change the principles and forms of the free provision of housing. To this end, the following solutions are offered to the local soviets:

- all individuals on the waiting lists are given the right to either remain on the list or be removed from it with a conditional monetary compensation (for purchasing a dwelling in the market) from the funds of the local soviet; its amount should depend on the duration of being on the waiting list;
- the system of free provision of housing will be changed with a view to using for this purpose inexpensive municipal housing allocated in keeping with stringent residential-space norms;
- the republics may change criteria for qualifying for the waiting lists themselves: the level of per capita income, availability of residential space, or income and availability combined;
- the least protected groups of the population (retirees, the handicapped, and the sick) enjoy priority in the allocation of municipal housing;

The acquisition of all new housing for a fee is an important principle of the housing reform. It is proposed to introduce this principle gradually, taking into account the social complexity of its implementation under the conditions of our country.

As early as 1991, some of the newly built apartments and houses may be sold at full cost. A system of providing loans for the acquisition of housing should be put in place, including that of the local soviets. As a rule, it is necessary to provide loans for a small downpayment, for a period of up to 30 years at a 6 to 7 percent annual interest rate. Calculations indicate that the sale of 1 million apartments, that is, one-third of the amount now commissioned, may yield 32 to 33 billion rubles in current prices. It is foreseen that the sale of approximately 1 million rooms in state apartments in 1991 for the improvement of the population's living conditions could generate about 9 billion rubles.

In 1991, the transfer of the housing stock of ministries, together with maintenance services and their material facilities, to the local soviets will begin.

Some of the stock will be transferred or sold to renters, housing associations and cooperatives, as well as to specialized commercial companies.

The successful development of the housing market is only possible on the basis of a sharp increase in the volume of housing construction. To this end, it is necessary to develop special republic and all-Union programs.

4. The Social Sphere

When changing over to a market economy it is important to support and consolidate the nonmarket sector, that is, those branches and kinds of activity which in principle cannot be oriented toward commercial criteria but whose existence and performance are vitally important to the society. The nonmarket sector occupies an eminent place in the economy of any developed country and its condition largely characterizes the level of the country's development and the degree of its civilization. The nonmarket sector includes: health and education, culture and art, protection of nature, and so forth. Here we are talking for the most part about the social sphere.

World practice has irrefutably proved that the social sphere exerts tremendous influence on the functioning of the market sector.

In the transition to a market economy and in conditions of a tight financial policy, branches in the nonmarket sector could end up in jeopardy, even though the majority of them are in a critical condition anyway. Taking this into account, it is necessary to have a clear-cut policy with respect to them:

It will be based on the following principles:

1. Refusal to lower the level of state support for branches of the nonmarket sector. Funds for financing them are allotted taking into account possible price increases (indexation of budget allocations) or in fixed proportions of the sum of budget revenues.
2. Maximum mobilization of nonstate, public funds for maintenance and development of institutions of the nonmarket sector.

3. Commercialization of some of the activity of these branches, which can thus be changed over to a market economy without detriment to the society; clear legislative delimitation of the status of commercial and non-commercial organizations.

4. Organizational and economic restructuring of the activity of institutions of the nonmarket sector in order to provide for more effective utilization of the resources allotted to them.

In the area of **public health** there must be consistent adherence to the principle of universal availability of therapeutic and prophylactic aid and the development of a network of free state medical institutions that take responsibility above all for satisfying the essential needs of the population, that is, nonelastic demand, with respect to which consumer choice is either impossible or is reduced to a minimum.

With respect to other medical services the population must have the opportunity to select various means of applying for them through noncommercial institutions or commercial enterprises of a medical profile which will offer better-quality services for pay and engage in all kinds of "medicine for healthy people" and also service for those who need no treatment but general care.

The development of services for social assistance, which would be concerned about caring for people who are incapable of taking care of themselves, is one of the most crucial tasks both of public health and of the local authorities and the broad public.

State financing of public health will be provided both in the form of direct allocations for maintaining medical institutions and in the form of payment of patients' accounts at established rates, which will enable them to select the institution (paid or nonpaid) whose services they prefer to take advantage of, taking into account the amounts of the compensated part of the expenses.

Another important form should be medical insurance, which presupposes financing expenditures on treatment, prevention, and care from special insurance funds formed from budget allocations and contributions of enterprises and citizens. Insurance funds can be an influential protector of the rights of workers in cases where someone is to blame for the harm to their health (harmful productions, inadequate safety techniques) by making the guilty parties pay for the expenses of restoring the health of those who have suffered. They can also be economic controllers of expenditures on public health and the quality and level of payment for medical services.

In the area of **science** the state finances basic research and also, in conjunction with interested parties, long-range developments that are capable of revolutionizing technology in important sectors of the national economy.

In the area of **education** the state will provide for the financing of a network of institutions for secondary and specialized secondary education and also vocational and technical training and retraining of personnel and higher educational institutions. But it will be necessary to restructure the organization of the work of the latter in such a way as to motivate both the teachers and students to sharply improve the quality of their work. Local organs will have the opportunity to introduce special taxes on the population for educational needs. It is also necessary to encourage the enlistment of funds from enterprises.

For purposes of increasing the motivation of students in the higher school to have high-quality occupational training and improve their material support, it is necessary, in addition to paying stipends, to expand the practice of granting long-term loans for the time of study to be repaid after the study is completed.

In the area of **culture and art** we shall follow a policy of support for the preservation and restoration of our cultural and historical heritage, aesthetic education, creative research, and the development of the cultural independence of the population. In a situation of rapid transition to the market, the role of economic support from the society and the state for socially important kinds of activity in the sphere of culture and art increases sharply.

The following are necessary as immediate measures:

1. To develop and adopt a program of immediate measures for preservation of national cultures, centers, objects, and organizations of culture of national significance, to provide for maintaining the work of libraries and museums at the proper level, and to allot additional resources for this.

2. To encourage in all ways the expenditure of funds on culture from non-budget sources. There must be tax breaks for patrons: enterprises, organizations, and citizens who turn over funds for the development of the social and cultural sphere.

We must radically restructure the system of state financing of the development of the sphere of culture. This means rejection of the practice of financing the very existence of state cultural institutions without respect to the direction or nature of their activity or whether or not they are responding to real needs. Funds allotted by the state for the development of culture must be concentrated in special-purpose centralized and regional funds and be allotted for the implementation of concrete programs and projects on a competitive basis.

Part IV: Stating Needs of Plan

90P50118 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 26 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Final installment of abridged excerpts of the "Program for the Stabilization of the Economy and Transition to a

Market," prepared on the basis of the program drafted by Academician S. Shatalin's group: "How To Work and Live?"]

[Text] Economic Relations in the Union of Sovereign Republics

The desire of the people for economic and political sovereignty is expressed in the adoption of declarations of state sovereignty (independence) of the republics and of legislative acts strengthening their economic independence.

Attempts to turn the clock back are hopeless; the sovereign republics believe that their common goal is the fundamental restructuring of unitary political and socioeconomic structures.

At the same time, the processes of transforming the national-state structure of the USSR, while basically positive, are accompanied by bitter conflicts and significant economic losses. The situation in which neither the Union organs of administration nor the republic governments possess the full powers necessary to conduct economic policy is extremely dangerous for an economy functioning as a centrally administered system.

Acknowledging the similarity in their fundamental problems of socioeconomic development and taking into consideration production, financial, credit, trade and other existing ties as well as the need for coordinated actions in the implementation of economic reforms, the sovereign states must unite in their efforts to move out of the crisis.

1. Economic sovereignty and equality of the Union republics.
2. **The basis of the economy are the physical and corporate bodies** which increase their property and, consequently, the national wealth. The basic role of the state in the economy consists of conducting macroeconomic policy, forming a market infrastructure, and guaranteeing social protections to the citizens.
3. All sovereign republics make up a **unified economic region** and conduct a coordinated policy to form conditions for free entrepreneurial activities by all economic entities (enterprises, commercial organizations, and private persons) and to defend the market.

Economic Sovereignty of the Union Republics

The executors of state regulation of the economy are the Union republics and the Union, in accordance with the authority entrusted to them by the republics. The organs of administration of the Economic Union function in accordance with the authority entrusted to them by the republics.

The sovereign republics have the exclusive right of legislative regulation of ownership, use, and distribution of all national wealth situated on their territory. The land, its minerals, the inland and territorial waters, the

continental shelf, the air space, and other natural resources as well as the economic, scientific, and technical potential it has created are the possession of their people and the material basis of state sovereignty of the republic. The sovereign republics have the right to their own share of the wealth that has been created.

Functions and Powers of the Sovereign Republics

All functions and powers of the sovereign republics proceed from their legislation and the efficient division of functions of republic and Union administration.

In accordance with this, the Union republics, as sovereign states, bear fundamental responsibility for the economic development of their own territories, carry out economic policy based on separation of the jurisdictions of the republics and the Union, and independently create a structure for administering the national economy.

The Allocation of Economic Functions Within a Unified Market Economy

A unified market is created on a voluntary and mutually advantageous basis. The republics that form a unified economic region have a common monetary system, organize a unified customs system to protect the all-Union market, and agree on prices to be regulated at the state level.

For the creation of a unified market, the republics delegate the following powers to the organs of Union management:

1. Implementation of coordinated credit, monetary, and hard-currency policy directed at strengthening the purchasing power of the ruble, the only legal tender on Union territory. A ban on limitations on the movement of monetary resources outside the Union.
2. Development and introduction of unified customs regulations ensuring protection of the all-Union market. A ban on the use of quotas, limitations, or customs barriers against the movement of a coordinated list of goods inside the Union.
3. Regulation on an all-Union scale of prices on key types of raw materials, output, goods, and services; all sovereign republics will come to an agreement on the list of these.
4. Development of a strategy of foreign economic policy. Formation and use of an all-Union hard-currency fund and execution of the obligations of the USSR to the international community.
5. Organization of unified patent and meteorological services, services for unified times, measures, and weights, the establishment of all-Union standards and introduction of international standards, and organization of all-Union statistics and of a unified system of bookkeeping.

In addition, in the common interests of socioeconomic development, the republics transfer the following issues to uniform control:

1. Creation of economic conditions to maintain defense capabilities, provide for the state security of the Union, and fight organized crime.

2. Development of long-term predictions for the economic and social development of the country and formation and implementation of major national economic programs at the all-Union scale.

3. Development and implementation of measures on an all-Union scale to provide for the ecological security of the population.

4. Development and implementation of measures on an all-Union scale to implement a policy in the sphere of social protection and support for citizens.

5. Administration of those spheres of activity and specialized programs which by their character require unified leadership at an all-Union scale such as:

- the most important basic research;
- defense programs;
- a unified energy system;
- main railways and trunk pipelines;
- nuclear energy;
- space systems and research;
- an all-Union system of communications, information, and information science;
- a state all-Union system for averting and reacting to emergency situations.

State organs for administering naval and air transport and fishing hand their authority over to newly-formed transrepublic joint-stock companies. With the agreement of the republics, such companies may also be created in other spheres.

With the goal of resolving tasks that are common to the sovereign republics, they form property jointly owned by all the republics (Union property). Resolution of questions of the creation and administration of Union property is carried out on the basis of agreements...

Administrative Organs of the Union

Depending on their nature, the structure of the economic administrative organs of the Union may be formed in accordance with parity representation of all republics or on a federative principle of design.

The Budget of the Union

The procedure for forming and making use of the budgets of the sovereign republics is determined by legislation of those republics. They independently develop and utilize a system of taxation, collection, and obligatory payments.

The budget of the Union is formed by means of a Union (federal) tax levied on enterprise profits. The tax rates are established by agreement with all republics. This will permit the Union to plan its expenditures based on expected revenues and to bear responsibility for its financial policy...

Unity of Actions in Surmounting the Crisis

The sovereign republics do not see any other way to surmount the crisis of the socioeconomic system than through economic reform based on the creation of a market economy.

They affirm the impossibility of improving the present situation under the existing administrative structure of the USSR national economy. The structure of the Union's administrative organs should be created in accordance with established principles.

Each sovereign republic, independently and on the basis of a coordinated concept, is developing a set of measures for the transition to market relations and is defining a sequence of steps in the establishment of a market economy. With regard to their own specific conditions, the republics are establishing the most efficient means of using production and economic potential, carrying out structural reforms, and creating basic market institutions. At the same time, the successful implementation of economic reform is possible only on the basis of efficient coordination of the actions of all the republics.

Military

Missile-Carrying Sub Decommissioned in Baltic

LD2809100390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0900 GMT 28 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 28 Sep (TASS)—The flag has been lowered on the sixth and final Soviet missile-carrying submarine in the Baltic which carries a set of ballistic missiles. Known in the west by the name 'Golf,' it has been taken out of service in the Baltic Fleet and disarmed at one of the Baltic Fleet's naval bases. A whole group of missile-carrying submarines has now ceased to exist.

Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, commander-in-chief of the Navy, noted the importance of this event in a conversation with a TASS correspondent. He said: "The days when the flag was lowered in the Baltic on the first ship of this class are memorable ones for me. The statement by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in

Helsinki last autumn on the USSR Navy's elimination of nuclear weapons carriers in the Baltic is thereby consistently fulfilled."

Republic Decisions Pose Problems for Draft

PM2509133390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy under the rubric "Armenia: Political Situation": "Fall Draft Under Threat"]

[Text] So who is going to defend the homeland? The question rang out in the quiet of the hall and was left hanging in the air. It contained no hint of bombast or rhetoric. Only concern, only frustration at the uncertainty and ambiguity of the position of workers in the Armenian military commissariats, headed by Major General A. Arutyunyan, military commissar of the republic. A year ago many of them had received rewards in this very same hall for efficient organization of the draft.

What about this year, after the disruption of spring recruitment and on the threshold of the fall tension? No, no one is threatening to penalize the officers, who perhaps feel bitterest of all today. They are competent and efficient. No, it is something else. Not everything in today's situation depends upon them. Nominally the military commissariats exist, work, and maintain their vast documentation, but in reality they recall in many regards an electric motor without drive belts: The torque is not transformed into power.

The USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the upcoming fall draft has still not been adopted yet, but Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, had his reason for meeting preemptively, so to speak, with both the officers of military commissariats and the leadership of the republic. In the spring Armenia's supply of draftees to the military department fell short. In the fall this shortfall could double, and it turns out that the plans issued from above will come into conflict with a situation which is like a barrier in the way of the recruits.

A little background to this barrier: On 3 May an extraordinary session of the republic Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution which suspended the draft for active military service and simultaneously absolved from criminal responsibility young men from Armenia who had gone AWOL from their units. This double-barreled shot, so to speak, put the military commissariats into a precrisis situation. The formal pretext for the parliamentary decision was the discriminatory policy against draftees from Armenia alleged to exist in the Soviet Army. The fact that this does not, to put it mildly, correspond to reality can be taken for granted. But that is not the issue here. By dint of long and arduous negotiation it proved possible to draft out of several thousand young men... 411. Some remained to do their service in Armenia, the rest were sent to the district training center.

The parliamentarians promised to return to the fate of the fall draft somewhat later. But this "somewhat later" is taking as long as their marathon session, whose end is not yet in sight. And all the time there is no decision. And it is not known when there will be. The military commissariats' problems, running one into the other, cause trepidation to the most steadfast optimists: The courses for military training officers, whose cadres are leaving the training sphere in droves, are being disrupted. The material base of the training establishments has been substantially depleted since bandit formations began a real hunt for weapons. Two-thirds of the rayon and city military commissariats have no draft centers. Many doctors on the draft commissions have essentially been left idle. And yet all the aforementioned problems are not global in nature, but stem from the main question: Is there to be a fall draft in the republic?

The situation that is shaping up is not ideal. But the scenarios suggested today are purely speculative. In particular, V. Manukyan, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, sharing the alarm of the military commissariat officers, expressed his personal opinion at the conference. The crux of it is that some draftees could swell the ranks of the renewed Armenian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] forces, some could remain in the republic to perform their service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, and some could be sent to the country's military colleges and then return home, after acquiring officer specialities, to lead the future national military formations. "What parliament decides is how it will be," Vazgen Mikazlovich observed. "And for its part the Council of Ministers will do everything to implement the deputies' wishes."

It is difficult to predict the parliament's future decision. But we did have the opportunity to hear the opinion of its representatives in the shape of members of a group of deputies. We heard variations on familiar themes: about the universal nature of anti-Armenian feelings in the Armed Forces, about guarantees for Armenian military servicemen's lives, about the link between the draft and the problems of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Emotional, vigorous, but... unconstructive. True, a proposal emerged that the whole draft be sent to local garrisons to perform their service. However, this too comes from the realm of fantasy.

"Where can I billet them all?" Lieutenant General N. Pishchev, chief of the Yerevan Garrison, quite reasonably asked. "I do not have enough accommodation, nor is there the need here. And later on soldiers acquire their most important specialities in training subunits stationed outside Armenia."

It is necessary to talk about the emerging structure which is regarded by many in the republic as the model for the future "military setup." There, at the republic draft center, where the conference was held, we got acquainted with Militia Colonel G. Galstyan, commander of a special regiment within the Armenian MVD. More than 1,000 young men who have already performed service in

Armenia will soon come under his command. Four battalions with weapons and equipment. They will have high salaries and all the benefits due MVD military servicemen. Plus five separate companies which will ensure the security of Armenia on its borders with Azerbaijan are being formed.

I met with a number of volunteers in the draft center courtyard (part of the center's premises have been allocated for the new regiment). Solid, mature men with beards wearing various military or paramilitary uniforms. Some had come out of ideological considerations and some decided to try their luck after the disbandment of the vigilante combat detachments. Colonel Galstyan's head is awash with problems. The recruits have grown unaccustomed to discipline and tend to be disorganized; difficulties have already arisen with skilled cadres, the training base, and much else. According to the officer's estimate, the rough cost of the regiment will be within the range of 35 million rubles. No one knows when the new structure will turn into a real rather than nominal formation. But sizable publicity has already attended it.

But the worries of Major General A. Arutyunyan, Afghan veteran and military commissar of the republic, seem to exist in a vacuum of ignorance. He too hopes for a wise decision by parliament, but there they, for their part, do not consider questions of the draft to be a priority. A vicious circle. There has at any rate been one bit of progress, in my view: It is proposed that Army representatives also be included in the parliamentary group in charge of questions of defense and internal affairs—for consultation and the elaboration of a compromise decision. This idea also met with understanding from L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet.

We have examined only one side of the coin. The other side is who will replace the soldiers and sergeants originating from other regions who will be discharged from the territory of Armenia this fall. The closer this date gets, the more sustained deputies' pressure on troop commanders becomes, the more categorical parents' letters to their soldier sons demanding that they quit the barracks and return home while "still in one piece" become, and the more voluble the travelers who speak in Yerevan on behalf of the parliaments of Russia, the Ukraine, and other republics and who insist upon their representatives serving in "their" own home and the withdrawal of troops from the explosive regions of the Transcaucasus become. I was also told about the difficulty of the situation by USSR People's Deputy Major General M. Surkov and Colonel Yu. Bobrikov, division

commander of the USSR MVD, whose subordinates have formed a living buffer between the two formerly fraternal republics. What will happen if you remove this (admittedly, purely psychological) buffer in today's still, alas, hopeless situation? If the worse happens, bullets will again fly through the vineyards, stripping the vines, agricultural work in the fields guarded by the military will again come to a halt, homes will be deserted again out of fear, and women and children on both "sides" will rush to take refuge in the homes of relatives and acquaintances in nearby villages.

What am I driving at? The fact that the situation concerning the fall draft in Armenia cannot be seen in isolation, outside the context of the similar situations obtaining in those Union republics whose parliaments have placed an "embargo" on the drafting of their young men into the Armed Forces and which are demanding with all their might the creation of national military formations. You would have carabineers, "Zaporozhets cossacks," and "imperial guards," and God knows what else. You get the impression that the people's deputies are seeking with the determination of Klondike prospectors to stake out this claim in the legislative field as quickly as possible. Stake it out and only then consider who will clothe, feed, train, and arm these armies? But will the less than modest republic budgets sustain such a gigantic burden, a burden which is within the means only of our common union? Let us recall that just one special regiment in Armenia runs to 35 million.

"Enough of amateurish decisions where the country's security is at stake," said Lieutenant General N. Pishchev in a fit of temper. "What are our parliamentarians in Moscow and in the capitals of the union republics waiting for? Or will the sight of empty barracks at the end of the year give them satisfaction?"

Many, too many rhetorical questions now hang in the air over the Armed Forces, our most stable state institution, as we—the military—love to stress. The fall draft will only exacerbate these problems and force responsible people finally to make responsible decisions which will prevent our military machine, which awaits reform, from further buffeting. But will it force them? Oh, how many grounds for doubt there are.

And meanwhile one's ears ring with the question of the military commissar in Yerevan who asked, his voice crying in the wilderness: "So who is going to defend the homeland?"

Who indeed?

Baltic Republics

Objections Made to Estonia's 'Economic Border'

LD2709205990 Moscow TASS in English 2046 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn September 28 TASS—The first reading of the bill "On Economic Border" was held at the Estonian Parliament.

According to Minister Raivo Vare who made a report on the bill, an economic border between Estonia, on the one hand, and Russia and Latvia, on the other, plans to be set up in order to create conditions for stabilising the domestic market, to control immigration and eradicate crime.

According to Deputy Yevgeniy Kochegarov, a frontier guard officer, it has actually been proposed to create a state border, separating Estonia from the rest of the Soviet Union, under the guise of the economic border. Kochegarov believes that the intention to protect the domestic market in such a way is nothing but another administrative measure based on isolation principles.

Bans on sending by post the goods, that are in short supply, from Estonia to other regions, the selling of these goods to the population on the presentation of a passport and the distribution of goods according to special coupons did not help stabilise the market.

Kochegarov called in question the government's intention to spend no more than 1.5 million roubles on the creation of the "economic border." He maintains that the cost of this operation will be much higher.

Some other members of parliament shared the opinion of Kochegarov. They suggested that by the second reading the government submit to the parliament an estimate of possible expenditures. Many of them fear retaliatory actions on the part of the Russian Federation and Latvia.

Since, according to the rules, a parliamentary discussion can be held only after the second reading, the main debate on the bill is still ahead.

Gorbachev Meets Latvian Leaders in Moscow

LD2709110690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0933 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Sep (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR president, met Ivars Godmanis, the chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, in the Kremlin on Wednesday [26 Sep]. Ilmars Bisers, the first deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, and Janis Peters, the Council of Ministers' permanent representative in Moscow, also took part in the talks which lasted for one and one-half hours.

In the statement that was distributed today by the press center of the permanent representation of Latvia in the Soviet capital, it says that USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has spoken "in favor of further political and economic cooperation among the republics in the form of a Union of sovereign states in which the maximum independence of the republics is envisaged in resolving the internal economic problems and the implementation of foreign economic ties."

In his turn, the leader of the Latvian Government noted that "in advancing toward any form of economic or political association, complete restoration of the political sovereignty of the Latvian Republic is an obligatory precondition." The Latvian Republic, he said, is coming out in favor of maintaining and deepening economic and cultural ties with the other republics. Ivars Godmanis spoke in favor of the need to develop them by means of interstate agreements which would at the same time "in no way restrict the state sovereignty of the Latvian Republic," according to him.

The USSR president, the report says, stressed that "the people of Latvia must make the choice for themselves between the two roads for the development of future relations between the Latvian Republic and the USSR: The Latvian Republic as a participant in a union of sovereign states, or the Latvian Republic as an independent state outside the USSR. While a majority of Latvians fully recognize the idea of a de facto sovereign Latvian state, the road toward acquiring actual independence has to be followed by elucidating the attitude of all those other nationalities living in Latvia to this idea by means of a referendum, and then gradually adjusting relations between the Latvian Republic and the USSR on the basis of the principles governing relations between two independent states."

The Latvian side stressed that the state of interethnic relations in the Latvian Republic at this moment does not represent an obstacle to the formation in a democratic way of the Latvian Republic as a de facto sovereign state. It is necessary to find a common formula that will be able to facilitate the recognition of the Latvian Republic as a politically sovereign state in Moscow and other world capitals. At the same time, economic and humanitarian links between the Latvian Republic and the USSR, as well as its other individual republics, must not only be preserved but also continued at a new level.

In the course of the conversation, the demographical and ecological problems of Latvia were touched upon as well as issues of life in the Army and the problem of grain for fodder deliveries into Latvia, all of which had been singled out in a joint letter by Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet; Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers; and Anatoliy Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, addressed to the USSR president.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his wish that the joint work in order to bring points of view closer together should continue by democratic means.

'Violation' of Latvia Declared Unlawful

LD2709192690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1745 GMT 27 Sep 90

[“Statement by USSR Procurator General”—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Sep (TASS)—A statement by the USSR Procurator General was issued here today. It says:

“On 26 September, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, in violation of the USSR Constitution and the USSR laws ‘On the USSR Procuracy’ and ‘On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Constituents of the Federation,’ which confer on the USSR the exclusive right to establish a single public prosecution [prokurorskiy nadzor] system in the USSR, adopted the law ‘On Public Prosecution in the Latvian Republic,’ and on its own authority appointed a procurator for the republic and his deputies.

“The USSR Procuracy states that the decision of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet is unlawful. The question of declaring the law to be invalid has been lodged with the USSR president. I confirm that the powers of procurator of the Latvian SSR will continue to be exercised by V.B. Dauksis who was appointed by me in accordance with the USSR Constitution.

“For blatant violation of the Law on the USSR Procuracy, republican procuracy staff members Ya.V. Skrastins and A.L. Raups, and the procurator of Riga E.V. Zactins, who have displayed a lack of principle and careerism, are dismissed from procuracy organs by order of the USSR procurator general.”

“V.B. Dauksis, procurator of the Latvian SSR, and the procurators subordinate to him are instructed to steadfastly discharge their constitutional obligations as regards ensuring supervision of the precise and uniform enforcement of the laws independently of any local bodies whatsoever.

“Any attempts to obstruct the performance of these functions will be seen as a most blatant violation of law and as infringements of the constitutional foundations of law and order within the country.”

Latvian Deputies, Baltic Commander Exchange Views

LD2709182390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1707 GMT 27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 27 September TASS—Colonel General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military district, expressed satisfaction with the results of a meeting

held today between representatives of the Baltic Military district and the leadership of the Latvian Supreme Soviet and parliament deputies.

At the meeting there was an exchange of opinion on problems connected with the army formations' stay on the territory of the republic. There was talk in particular of the need to define the status of the Army, to promptly inform the population of forthcoming troop movements, and of holding joint ecological checks. The problem of deserters was also touched on.

Answering journalists' questions, Fedor Kuzmin said: “I am satisfied with the conversation. There was mutual understanding on many questions.”

The usefulness of the meeting was also noted by deputies who consider that such dialogues will help reduce the number of mutual complaints and relax the tension which has arisen between society and the army. But, they stressed, a number of problems will have to be solved on an inter-governmental basis.

Republican Conferences Begin in Tallinn, Toompea

LD2709100990 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
0900 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Today and tomorrow there is a conference taking place in Tallinn of present republican government leaders and government representatives as well as of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian government leaders. There are delegations that have either arrived or are about to arrive in Tallinn from nine regions. After lunch a conference devoted to economic cooperation and problems of integration will open on Toompea in the hall of [word indistinct]

This morning Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Government, continued his consultations with delegations which have arrived for the conference. Edgar Savisaar met Apas Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Kirgizian Council of Ministers. They discussed developing interregional direct links and the need to conclude bilateral economic agreements. [passage omitted]

Before lunch the leader of the Estonian Government also met Aleksandr Khomyakov, leader of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] delegation. He is the first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Committee for Economy.

Coverage of Lithuanian-USSR Independence Talks

Moscow Ready To Negotiate

AU2709161990 Paris AFP in English 1603 GMT
27 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, Sept 27 (AFP) — Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov proposed Thursday [27 September] that negotiations between Moscow and Vilnius on

Lithuania's bid for independence open here Tuesday [2 October], the semi-official news agency INTERFAX said.

Mr. Ryzhkov made the offer in a telephone call to Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene on the instructions of President Mikhail Gorbachev, who met with Mrs. Prunskiene last Tuesday, the agency said.

Preliminary talks have been going on since late June, when the republic's parliament declared a temporary "moratorium" on its declaration of independence following a Moscow-imposed energy blockade.

Earlier in the day the republic's president, Vytautas Landsbergis, told a news conference in the Lithuanian capital that he believed the "Kremlin has realized" that Lithuania's "determination to gain full independence is unbending".

Asked about the sweeping new powers parliament gave Mr. Gorbachev last week, Mr. Landsbergis said he believed in the Soviet president's "political sense and good will".

In other developments, Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis met with Mr. Gorbachev at the Kremlin Wednesday and said afterwards he was pleased with their talks.

However cooperation between Riga and Moscow could take the form of an "economic association" only on condition Moscow first recognized Latvian sovereignty, he said.

Landsbergis Views Negotiating Issues

LD2709165290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1309 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Speech by Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] I would like to voice several thoughts about matters concerning our foreign policy. You have already heard that the issue of the Baltic states' independence has been raised at the UN General Assembly. [passage omitted] Latvian Foreign Minister Jurkans is there at the UN General Assembly and keeps in contact with representatives and ministers of the world states. Soon Saudargas, our foreign minister, is also going there. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in the sphere of our eastern policies.... Perhaps we can phrase it thus. You must have already heard that on 1 October [date as heard] the negotiating delegations are to meet in Moscow. We, the negotiating delegation, had a session today and a communique has been prepared. It must be clear that this should be a consultative conference about the conditions for negotiations. At best, at this conference we should achieve the conditions for negotiations; we should discuss and coordinate the conditions for possible negotiations.

I would ask the deputies and journalists not to mislead unintentionally the public here and in the world by presuming that negotiations are already beginning.

As we know, the decision of our Supreme Council has stated clearly at which point this process becomes official interstate negotiations. We should observe this precise wording because this is politically significant because you probably remember that the U.S. Congress is again to discuss granting to the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status and that this, apart from other issues, is provisional on the progress of serious negotiations with Lithuania.

So we must not term any talks as negotiations in order not to mislead public opinion and the Congress.

Apart from this, we may also remember the Estonian experience when the meetings of their delegation with the Union delegation were called negotiations at the beginning, and when they were later cut short it was explained that in fact there has been no negotiations.

I would like to remark that this will also serve as an explanation. We talked it over at the delegation's session and decided—besides, the prime minister herself wanted this, and she is very busy at the Council of Ministers—that now it is not worthwhile for her to come here and talk about the latest conversation with Gorbachev because it is already history. Events continue to develop, there is more recent information. It could perhaps be interesting. However, this is not of the utmost priority at the moment. We agreed that I will explain she is working at the moment at the Council of Ministers.

There is yet another point that I would like to raise, and this is what I would like to say. Of course there will be various attempts to hamper both the processes. The one which is taking place in the West can become very intensive, the process of factual recognition of the Baltic states and the proximity of establishing diplomatic relations which was earlier clearly stated by Secretary of State Baker is no longer a question of the remote future. There will be attempts to discredit our countries, our policies, and our life.

In addition to what I said some days ago, I should mention a very deplorable anti-Semitic publication in MAZOJI LIETUVA, a Klaipeda newspaper. Most probably the world will view this as a stain on Lithuania: This is what the attitude is, what the thinking is. One can frankly say this is looking in the Black Hundreders' manner for aspirations in the Jewish nation to rule the world and Lithuania. Well it is written in an appalling manner; you can read it. The lies in it about some people such as Saulis Saltenis may make some laugh. However in fact these things are not funny because these things will be turned against us as a country on the road to independence demonstrating anti-Semitism. The aim of such publications should be clearly seen and described. I would even say that the hand of the old security has been clearly shown. [passage omitted]

Meeting Reportedly Set for 2 Oct

LD2709134590 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow September 27 TASS—Preliminary agreement has been reached about a meeting between Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene. This meeting is expected to take place on October 2 in the Kremlin, TASS has learnt.

A detailed agenda for the forthcoming meeting is being worked out.

Landsbergis Assesses Situation of Lithuania

90UN2862A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
24 Aug 90 pp 1-2

[Report by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, to a meeting of the Special Session on 21 August: "On the Domestic and Foreign Political Situation of the Republic of Lithuania on the Threshold of Negotiations With the USSR"]

[Text] Respected deputies, respected ministers! The few observations with which I wish to begin our discussion of the first item on the agenda will be based on the fact that our foreign and domestic policy are not separate subjects, although they might seem that way at first glance. Real life ties them very closely together—at times even painfully close. In many instances the domestic and foreign situations are interdependent. However, I will try to analyze them separately. To be understood, it would be best to distinguish between near and distant foreign countries—that which we previously understood as "abroad."

The near foreign country, which to a significant degree still determines our life, is the Soviet Union. Its largest part, the Russian Federation, has itself started down the path of sovereign self-determination. Foreign countries that are especially near to us are the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia. Existing on a level of Baltic states as three sovereign states, and formulating a certain inter-republic and at the same time a common foreign policy, we affirm ourselves not only on the political geography of the present but also in the international concept as newly existing Baltic states. Existing, of course, under special conditions which the world sees in various ways, and perhaps does not always comprehend in the same way.

And now for our policy and political relations with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Attention is riveted to the problems of the negotiations and to the course of negotiations; to some extent this may obscure other aspects of these relations—such as those between political forces, particularly democratic forces, as well as cultural and economic bonds. In short, those which are not necessarily decided by way of state negotiations. If we are to speak about negotiations and about how this

problem looks at a certain distance, then I believe that our course for parallel negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation was fully justified. The situation in that quite dynamic and changing country, the Russian Federation, is already becoming and will become increasingly a political and economic reality, and the Soviet Union in a sense is becoming and will become something that is not quite clear. Here is the question which we were able to sense when we were thinking about the upcoming negotiations. Its essence is in the fact that we will not be conducting negotiations with ourselves. Lithuania really does not exist in the Soviet Union, not matter what the Soviet Union may think about it. Nevertheless, during the negotiations there is a need to come to agreement about this in a certain sense. Latvia and Estonia are not in the Soviet Union either, which the Council of Baltic States has made perfectly clear in its official statements, including one on the eve of the meeting of heads of state in Washington to the effect that no agreements concluded by President Gorbachev with regard to credits or transportation bind the Baltic states or are of a legal nature; and in one of the last documents as well when, in the name of the Council of Baltic States, the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the three countries requested that all 12 republics of the USSR report whether they have any claims on Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia. We know that Moldova has declared in advance that it fully recognizes Lithuania's independence and does not have any territorial or other claims on it. The responses from the other republics which may or may not arrive—we have foreseen such a possibility—will be very important to us. At present we have received one not very direct response from the deputy chairman of the Belorussia Supreme Soviet containing a proposal to begin bilateral consultations. This means that the sphere of our foreign policy also extends there, and we should create a certain group endowed with powers which will concern itself with clearing up such questions at the very same time, apparently that negotiations will be held with the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union.

Our intention to probe, prepare, and conduct negotiations on two parallel tracks is also based on the fact that the activity of the Russian Federation, its dynamism, and its wish to be a politically influential force also provides incentive for the leadership of the Soviet Union. Even though, as the journal NOVOYE VREMYA states, the leadership of the Soviet Union is in essence not prepared for negotiations with Lithuania. As the political commentator has noted, there is neither a concept nor a mechanism by comparison with what can be observed on the part of Lithuania.

Nonetheless, one may say that the negotiations are already close. The question is how much effectiveness we can foresee and how much we can on our part, by our efforts alone, make them fruitful so that they will be negotiations not for the sake of negotiations but for the sake of results and so that some issues will immediately be chosen as the starting point. The aforementioned

journal in particular is probably the first to give a sober presentation of the mistaken policy of the leadership of the Soviet Union, especially of the party leadership, with regard to Lithuania which is based on illusions and instigation of the foreign-speaking population. The journal suggests that this not be done. Of course we interpret the goal of such actions as both tactical and destabilizing. But we are no longer accustomed to treat that as a certain reality of our situation and our partner. We have opposed destabilization of the domestic situation in Lithuania as much as we could, and we will try to do this in the future.

When we discuss negotiations with the Soviet Union in Lithuania, in the Baltic countries and abroad, one asks whether we will try as we should for negotiations on the principle of "three-plus-one" or whether we will attend them the way we have already agreed and are preparing ourselves according to the principle of "one-plus-one." In this instance the situation need not be viewed as problematic or a choice between alternatives: either-or. We said earlier, I think, and now I believe that we can adhere to it that the best variant would be "three-plus-one." But we do not consider it necessary to categorically refuse if our partner in the Kremlin stubbornly proposes or, in other words, does not hear our proposal and speaks only about "one-plus-one" negotiations. In any case, the Council of the Baltic States has not received any official answer to this proposal which has been repeated several times. But even while preparing ourselves for "one-plus-one" negotiations we should be looking ahead, and I am preparing to introduce this proposal into a draft decree on the creation of a delegation to the effect that observers from the Baltic countries will be, at the minimum, either part of our delegation or appointed under our delegation.

As for distant foreign countries with which we are also developing various ties, including political and diplomatic ties, we usually view them as a problem of recognition versus nonrecognition. Our opponents like to imprecisely emphasize and disseminate the opinion that the Republic of Lithuania is not recognized in the world. We should say, if only for ourselves and not for those who state such things, that many states responded right away by mentioning their basic recognition of Lithuania. Such recognition was never withdrawn, and it is a question only of the recognition of a government versus diplomatic recognition with the establishment of official contacts. We should recall that even diplomatic recognition of a government is a process which clearly evolves to our benefit. Such is the situation both in Washington and in the capitals of Europe: Previously official visits were often at the parliamentary level, and now more contacts are at the governmental level; this means practical recognition which is, perhaps, not so far from final and official recognition.

It is said abroad and repeated here that diplomatic recognition will only take place after we come to an agreement with the Soviet Union. If you consider reality and the fact that the Western countries still pay attention

to whether the Soviet Union is frowning or not, such an impression may be created. But the situation has changed in recent weeks inasmuch as the Western countries are beginning to consider something that we noticed and stated earlier: It is no longer completely clear what the Soviet Union is and what its central power will have for prerogatives. As a result there is certain progress in the policy of states with regard to Lithuania indicating a certain tendency to move gradually toward full recognition without even considering the reaction of the Soviet Union. A good example of this is the official statement of Sweden, inasmuch as it is a country which has always paid keen attention to the moods of the USSR: Now it recognizes the will of the people or society of our republic as it is expressed by the votes of the public and the rulings of parliamentarians who have been elected freely and democratically. With broadened official contacts at the level of states, we address ourselves to international organizations and wish to take part in them or at least in common measures. One of these is the meeting of the council of northern states jointly with parliamentarians of the Baltic countries designated for September.

I would like to stress something that I have already mentioned before in my speeches: The legal mention of Lithuanian sovereignty and the new reexamination and recognition of its state sovereignty is connected most of all with the elections that took place in Lithuania. They have been recognized as democratic and free, and their results underlie everything that we have achieved and are trying to achieve.

As a result, various statements—whether they issue from the Kremlin or are disseminated in the Lithuanian countryside—are directed against the competence and authority of the Lithuania Supreme Council and are dangerous to the very foundations of our struggle for independence. This must be considered by everyone who witnesses others or sometimes himself indulges in discrediting the Supreme Council in significant or insignificant ways or raises doubts such as: Are the decisions and pronouncements of the Supreme Council an expression of the genuine will of the people of Lithuania? I was somewhat surprised at the questionnaire of the residents of Moscow which they began to distribute in Lithuania in the name of our government. They say that its distribution has been halted. This strange questionnaire hid many opportunities, even apart from the questions, for raising doubt about whether the acts of 11 March express the will of the people of Lithuania.

When we speak about participation in international political life and in the contacts of society, peoples, and states, we should not forget about such a vitally important matter as overcoming various ongoing blockades. There is the blockade on the activities of banks and those obstacles on the way out to the international banking system. Therefore, I would like to remind you that the question of banks, which has been proposed but not yet finally included on the agenda, is not merely a common question of economic reform. It is a fundamental issue of

the political consolidation of the independence of Lithuania as a state—a question of participation in Europe and in the world. The obstruction of our foreign ties and borders pertains to those blockades which still exist and which were applied not two months ago but in 1940 and 1944-1945. We used to be accustomed to it, and now the legal and I would say spiritual reality existing after 11 March reveals this blockade to us in a new light. Earlier a compliant attitude was fostered in us—if someone established any sort of contacts with the West, it was by the grace of the powers in Moscow or their representatives in Lithuania as though it were under their jurisdiction. Now each such instance, when we must make a request, and especially when we are refused, insults our state dignity. We have remembered and realized our right.

This is a basic question of sovereignty concerning which discussion has been underway, directly or indirectly, with President M. Gorbachev for several months. The indirect discussion consists of the struggle for position in world opinion, and that struggle is going in our favor. But it still cannot be emphasized enough that if we cannot control our borders, then we already have a clear act of usurpation and continuing injustice or even aggression. Of course we hear at times about the possibility of coming to agreement, but we also hear threats. For example, they say about Estonia: How dare it declare that the Constitution of the Soviet Union is invalid on its territory?!

This issue should be fundamental, one of the main ones in preliminary consultations in preparation of negotiations. To put it another way, there can be no talk of blocking entry to Lithuania of people we need, people who are consulting with us or helping us in the negotiations. Negotiations concluded with the overseer of a jail are not the kind of negotiations we are seeking! This was also discussed at a meeting of leaders of Lithuanian communities in Switzerland which was the political portion of another measure—the 37th week of Lithuanians of Europe. I believe that you read that declaration made in Einsiedeln concerning the sovereignty of Lithuania, its borders, and contacts with the world, and concerning the illegality of the actions of the Soviet Union in that realm.

Now you also know that this issue will be actualized by social and democratic forces on 23 August, the day of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop or Stalin-Hitler pact. It will be an act of aspiration and of the right of Lithuania to open itself to the world and to Europe. It will be an act of all Baltic countries and all the other countries of East Europe who want to see us beside them. Taking part in it on the Polish side will be people from various foreign countries, mostly young people, as well as politicians and parliamentarians. We need for our parliamentarians to take part in this action as well, even though it is a social event.

There is a need to speak concretely and in a businesslike manner with regard to internal policy and the problems

we will be discussing. We need to make decisions because the economic destabilization and the political destabilization go together as interrelated processes. They may stimulate one another.... The unprecedented growth of corruption, inflation, demoralization of the trade system, and incapacity of the organs of internal affairs are no secret to anyone. The population's resentment is cunningly directed not against the producers of goods, not against the sellers of goods, or against the speculators or the organs of internal affairs who are unable to catch and restrain them, but against the legislators. For all I know, this is not just an inability to make sense of things but a deliberate attempt to lead the people astray.

Of course the main thing is not for us to worry about what to say to defend our prestige and to ward off absurd accusations that we have had to hear before now to the effect that it is our Supreme Council that is guilty of the blockade, not the inhuman decisions made by the politicians of the Kremlin. Now one may hear that the Supreme Council and its leadership are also guilty of the shortage of goods. We could ignore this and leave it to the consciences of those who disseminate such ideas, but we have to bring order to the situation itself, and specifically to the political and economic situation.

Next is the issue of control of the border. These are borders which are quite vigilantly guarded so that political figures who are friendly to us may not pass, but which are completely open to the withdrawal from Lithuania of great wealth and to unrestrained speculation. I am speaking of the border with the West. We must also begin to concern ourselves with our border with the East—Estonia has already been doing this for some time and Latvia is beginning to do so. Economic control is needed there as well. Certain decrees have already been adopted on this question long ago. We probably do not need new ones; we need to make sure that the old ones are enforced.

Truly, a foreign military power has shown opposition to our attempts to introduce minimal control over the export from Lithuania of goods or other property. We absolutely must do this now, without waiting for either the beginning of negotiations or our second session. Who should carry this out? Does the Ministry of Internal Affairs have enough forces, or is it necessary to appeal to society?

Do we renew, at the level of a legal decree or at least of an advisory decree, the act to attract volunteers that was begun previously by a social organization? Do we consider even a partial voluntary implementation of the law on the defense of the kray this autumn? It would be a way of finding out whether there are men in Lithuania who believe in independence and who want it and can come to the aid of their kray.

Stealing goods from warehouses and directly from the thresholds of stores, shipping them out of Lithuania, shipping in sacks of rubles which are again used to

purchase goods which are then shipped out of Lithuania again—there is no use appealing to the consciences of people who act this way; it is necessary to speak candidly and bring criminal action against them and show that we are a functioning power. If the executive power needs help, I believe that the Supreme Council will grant it the authority. We can again appeal to those thoughts which we had when it was necessary to unite all our efforts—of the government and the Supreme Council—to withstand the blockade.

Today I must also speak about the need for a special organ to fight the chaos in trade and speculation inasmuch as this chaos has both a political motive and a political result. A mechanism must be created for this fight, otherwise we are not worthy of having been elected. I am speaking about this as a reminder: If the government needs such help it will come, but there must be results. We must not forget that we are under siege, in danger, we stand at the threshold of an important political struggle of negotiations. We need unity and the support of the people who stand behind us. But the opposing party, wishing to win the negotiations, is undoubtedly trying and will try to ensure that this will not happen. Here I must also speak about our domestic political life and about what is happening in our society, about activities directed against the Lithuanian state which we regard with tolerance although they are financed from abroad from another state, and apparently are financed in unlimited amounts. And of course, about our naturally existing domestic opposition and about how we could use a genuinely existing opposition to the degree that it helps us to find more acceptable solutions. Many of the laws which we discussed at length here and which we finally adopted have demonstrated that at times this is useful. And how should we act so that this domestic opposition will not shake our basic positions....

I could say still more about the various concepts of agricultural policy and the various attitudes toward reform. This concerns many of our citizens, and they sometimes do not understand very well why discussions are being conducted and what kind of decisions are being made. On the other hand, certain efforts are being made to ensure that these decisions are understood wrongly. I could even talk about such things as the appeal to think about new elections to the Supreme Council. Perhaps it is not worth returning to that episode in our political life. It seems exaggerated and already outdated, but even that is our reality and it reflects much. Permit me to limit myself to these observations.

Prunskiene Defends Achievements of Cabinet

LD2709224390 *Vilnius International Service in English*
2130 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] The Information Service of the Lithuanian government has released the opinion of Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene on the distrust shown by certain

sections of society to the government and on the much-spoken-of governmental crisis in Lithuania. The Lithuanian prime minister said that those sections accused the government of being inactive while its members were labeled as Communists and Soviet-type nomenclature.

Kazimiera Prunskiene argued that it was proper to assess the work of the government not by some concrete deeds but rather by its general direction of activity in achieving the ultimate goal: the consolidation of Lithuania's independence. She said the government was already completing work on drafting a program of activity which would involve a comprehensive, radical restructuring of the country's economy.

The Lithuanian Parliament managed to soften the effects of the deep economic crisis that had hit both the Soviet Union and Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskiene pointed out. Concurrently, the government did a lot of ground work in preparation for talks with the Soviet Union.

The whole world is waiting for the outcome of these talks so that it could recognize Lithuania's statehood and start collaborating with us, Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene said in reply to accusations that her cabinet was inactive and in a state of crisis.

Lithuanian Party Meeting Airs Problems

LD2709212890 *Moscow TASS in English* 2108 GMT
27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius September 28 TASS—Problems connected with the political situation in Lithuania and further actions of the pro-CPSU Lithuanian Communist party (LCP) were considered here on Thursday at an enlarged meeting of the bureau of the LCP Central Committee with the participation of secretaries of city and district committees of the party and elected party activists of the republic.

"Our meeting should help regulate the efforts of party organizations so that they could actually be in the vanguard dealing with political problems and constantly maintaining contact with working people and influencing them" Mikolas Burokevicius, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the pro-CPSU LCP, said at the opening of the meeting.

The agenda included items concerning work to restore and strengthen primary party organizations within the LCP.

A resolution on this question says that all city and district party committees have been restored in the republic and that there are now 1,070 primary party organizations with 39,967 communists.

At the same time, a serious damage was done to the party by the depolitization idea, to which almost all party

organizations of law enforcement agencies and a number of other state institutions yielded.

The bureau adopted a resolution on the celebration of the 73rd anniversary of the October revolution. The resolution expresses agreement with the proposal by the ideological department of the Central Committee and the Vilnius LCP City Committee to hold a military parade and a civilian demonstration in Vilnius on November 7. Flowers are to be laid at monuments to Lenin and to figures of the revolutionary movement, to Soviet Army servicemen and at the tomb of fighters for Soviet power in Lithuania.

The bureau also adopted a statement in connection with the law on political parties, which the Lithuanian Parliament voted for on September 25.

The parliament, the statement says, "irresponsibly is continuing to heighten political tension in the republic, seeking a deeper split of the society on the strength of world outlook, ethnic and other differences."

Lithuania's Gold Market Problems Examined

LD2709180690 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpts] At present gold is one of the best and most reliable sources of investing money. [passage omitted] The price of gold is no longer important to the buyers. It has substantially increased lately. First of all, about the official prices. We have been informed by officials at the Lithuanian price department that in the last 10 years the price of gold was increased three times. One gram of gold of an average quality cost 34 rubles [R] in 1979, R45 in 1981, and at the beginning of this year the price of one gram of gold increased by 57 percent and now costs R71. [passage omitted] On the black market the price of one gram of gold has reached R140.

As is known, Lithuania purchases all gold from the Soviet Union. Vilnius Radio was informed by Deputy Minister of Trade Vaclovas Zilinskas that Lithuania only obtains gold jewelry. We do not receive unprocessed gold. This year Lithuania purchased R96 million worth of gold. In the past the Soviet Union used to sell to Lithuania only silver for the manufacture of jewelry. But now, because of the political situation, the Druskininkai firm of jewelry and art articles will not be supplied with two tonnes of silver as originally scheduled.

Usually the states have their own stocks of gold. But an official of the Bank of Lithuania explained that the republic does not hold gold in its banks. This bank function belongs so far to Moscow and nobody knows when Lithuania is going to have its own supplies of gold.

Thus we talk only about jewelry. Vilnius Radio was informed by the Lithuanian haberdashery base, Zigmantas Muraukas, that at present gold jewelry is supplied to Lithuania by the Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, and Latvia.

They used to supply it until the blockade. During the blockade all supplies stopped, even from neighboring Latvia. [passage omitted] The supply of gold resumed after the blockade. But whereas previously it was possible to obtain goods according to quarterly orders, at present Lithuania is supplied each month according to a strictly established norm, and not a single gram more. According to the director of the base, the supply may be stopped at any time. But he hopes that the supply of gold will continue up to new year. It is true that during the blockade Lithuania failed to obtain gold worth R16 million, but nobody will now supply this gold to Lithuania.

And now about trade itself. Nobody can freely purchase gold jewelry in the shops. All gold products obtained are allocated to enterprises and organizations. One hundred and fifty jewelry articles are allocated for 1,000 workers. The workers' collectives decide themselves how to distribute them. [passage omitted]

RSFSR

RSFSR Legislator Discusses Presidential Powers

LD2809021590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1540 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Interview with Sergey Shakhrai, chairman of the legislative committee of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Lyudmila Semina; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Shakhrai] [passage omitted] The USSR law on granting the president additional powers has not, of course, passed unnoticed. While generally understanding the need for resolute measures in the crisis situation, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] parliament cannot fail to be concerned by the fact that a number of provisions of the adopted law simultaneously run counter to three fundamental documents of the Russian Federation: the declaration on sovereignty, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies decision on the demarcation of functions between the Union and the republic, and the law on ownership in the Russian Federation. So once again we are not against granting the president additional powers in the present situation, but we believe that these powers ought to be agreed with the republic and should not violate its sovereignty, and should be used for the purposes of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin economic program.

[Semina] We are in very great need of accord at the moment.

[Shakhrai] Yes, we are not losing hope of this. So we are not rejecting the whole law, but we are saying that a number of its provisions are not in accord with the fundamental documents which I listed.

Very important matters were discussed in the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. I think that listeners will

also find this interesting. And in the Council of Ministers the economic situation of the republic is regularly analyzed. What we have come into cannot even be called an inheritance. Nothing but debts! And at the same time, the Union ministries and departments are actively sabotaging all our measures to strengthen the republics' economic foundations. The method used is to turn Union ministries into concerns and state enterprises into joint-stock companies, and so on. The old diktat from the center is being camouflaged by a new label, and at the same time Russia is being deprived of its economic base. We are seeking urgent and effective measures against this. [passage omitted]

Deputy Discusses New RSFSR Constitution

90UN2848B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 36,
Sep 90 p 6

[Transcript] of interview with Oleg Rummyantsev, secretary of the RSFSR Constitutional Commission, RSFSR people's deputy, and cochairman of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, by SOYUZ special correspondent Aleksandra Lugovskaya; place and date not given: "Russia, Sharp Turn"—first four paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] It is right on the threshold, and having restored statehood, which had been erased from the memory of generations, Russia has demanded of its parliament and government vigorous reforms—political, economic, and social.

While B. Yeltsin, the head of the Russian Parliament, was completing his strenuous marathon tour of the republic, the first stage of work on a document which is to turn inside out the principles of its peoples' existence—the constitution of the Russian Federation—was being completed in the Supreme Soviet building on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment. And on 31 August there was a keen debate at an enlarged plenary meeting of the Constitutional Commission on the basic principles and structure of the future basic law of the republic. The working group proposed that discussion of the basic principles be put to a public referendum and that a special Constitutional Assembly be elected for the adoption of the constitution. However, the deputies were unable to arrive at a common opinion, and a decision on these matters was postponed until the end of September.

At a press conference B. Yeltsin, chairman of the Constitutional Commission, called the constitution currently in force decrepit and an impediment to parliament's law-making activity. Russia is on the threshold of radical economic reforms, but a transition to market relations is impossible without cardinal changes in the life of society itself. And the new authorities are prepared to offer it to them. The draft constitution is being prepared under difficult conditions—the foundations of the Russian federal and Union treaties are being laid. They will largely determine Russia's relations with the USSR and

coordinate the time of introduction of the new constitution. But the deputies are optimistic—the people's credit of trust in the Russian Supreme Soviet and Government is high.

Our meeting with Oleg Rummyantsev, secretary of the Constitutional Commission, took place when the still "hot" pages of the new document had only just been placed in his document case. As secretary of the commission, O. Rummyantsev organizes its activity, coordinates the work of all subdivisions—six subcommissions, a working group, and a group of experts—and is responsible for the preparation of models and the final wording of the summary documents. He is a scholar, political scientist, and the author of works on the civil society, the opposition, and the democratic movement. And since 1987 he has been involved in political reforms in practice, having been a leader of an informal democratic movement. He has been elected a people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. O. Rummyantsev is 29 years old and is today cochairman of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation which is gaining strength. We offer a transcript of our interview with him.

[Lugovskaya] The preparatory period is over, the principles have been formulated, and the structure of the new constitution determined—what next?

[Rummyantsev] Next we will announce a public competition of draft constitutions and, having selected the best, we will use specific wording and amendments from them in our subsequent work. That there will be serious competition is attested by the fact of participation in the contest of the draft Constitution of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia once drawn up by A.S. Sakharov. It is not a question of alternatives inasmuch as the Constitutional Commission has been endowed with the authority to prepare a new constitution. Nonetheless, the competition will help us. Prizes, the first of 5,000 rubles, are envisaged for the winners. The jury will complete its work before 1 January 1991.

[Lugovskaya] What will the Constitutional Commission itself be doing in this time?

[Rummyantsev] We will be working on a precise schedule: Preparation of the constitution will be complete by mid-October. In September-October we will put the finishing touches to its principles and structure, preparing in parallel Russia's first referendum, to which we will put these issues. And if the people give us the "OK," using this support we will begin to prepare for adoption of the new constitution.

[Lugovskaya] What kind of support do you expect from the people, and will it be able to express it specifically in a referendum?

[Rummyantsev] Outwardly, in very prosaic manner. The referendum will last no less than 10 days, and it is important that everyone come, vote, and express his civil will. The voting papers will in fact contain the sole

question: "Do you support the principles of the new constitution?" and then its 12 principles. Each will require a "yes" or "no." That is it. But we know something else also: The Russian Constitution will be born in an incredibly tough struggle. The localities are still really bossed by the party apparatus, superiors of the party schedule of appointments, and representatives of repressive authorities who, we anticipate, both just before and during the referendum, will start real political persecution of this draft. The main thing, therefore, is that people understand where the truth lies, believe it, sweep the lies aside, and sense that at this time the fate of society is being decided, essentially.

[Lugovskaya] We have approached the essence of our interview—what the new system of Russia will be like.

[Rumyantsev] Not capitalist and not socialist, but constitutional. I am not sure that the nature of the state arrangement—socialism or capitalism—should be defined in the constitution.

[Lugovskaya] Since we have no "ism's" now?

[Rumyantsev] We will have an "ism" in the form of pluralism. The main thing that our constitution will not have is an officially enshrined state ideology, because political and any other pluralism is incompatible with its existence. And we will struggle for this to the utmost.

[Lugovskaya] But you intend using some things from the former constitutions? From the 1918 Russian Constitution, for example.

[Rumyantsev] It is as yet too early to speak about detailed wording. Of course, we have taken advantage of some points, but very few. The texts of the 1936 and 1977 Constitutions are quite similar and highly ideologized. How, for example, could we avail ourselves of a section which writes about the historic significance of the October revolution? We wish to create a constitution of direct political and legal effect. The courts will be able to use this document when deciding on specific cases. As far as the 1918 Constitution is concerned, it is imbued with revolutionary romanticism, and our democratic revolution which we are accomplishing in Russia today is based on rationalism. The time has come to exchange the abnormal and irrational for the viable and rational.

[Lugovskaya] All that you have said is close and comprehensible to me, but I entertain a doubt, nonetheless: Can a new constitution in today's situation exist without being based on political power and ideology? Soviet power is so weak as yet.

[Rumyantsev] It will remain weak unless a sharp turn is made. The Russian Congress of People's Deputies, the parliament and its leadership, B. Yeltsin specifically, have demonstrated their will to power. It is already being buttressed by specific decisions and an endeavor to realize them. This is of fundamental importance. In preparing the constitution we have relied on our own experience and knowledge and our understanding of the

dreadful reality in which the Russian Federation currently finds itself. We have to primordial restore statehood, of which it was deprived. We do not wish nor will we allow its new structures to resemble the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB, and the party schedule of appointments. Russia's state authorities must be elected by the people and subordinate to them: the president elected directly by the people, the parliament elected on a multiparty basis, and so forth. And we will try to do everything to ensure that our constitution is in practice a treaty between state and society.

[Lugovskaya] What is the nature of the preamble to the constitution?

[Rumyantsev] It will be very brief and solemn and will guarantee the principles of the constitutional arrangement. And the first substantive section will proclaim that the Russian Federal Republic is a sovereign, democratic, law-based, and social state created by peoples uniting voluntarily in it....

[Lugovskaya] A soviet socialist republic?

[Rumyantsev] No. Russian Federal Republic or Russian Federation.

[Lugovskaya] And what will be the object of the constitution: the individual or the state?

[Rumyantsev] We wish to create a constitution of three collaterally subordinated levels: the individual, society, and the state. At the apex of this pyramid is the individual. For this reason, immediately following the principles of the constitutional arrangement is Chapter II, "Rights of the Citizen and Individual." Then Chapter III, "The Civil Society." And only then "Federal Arrangement of the State." Chapter V is devoted to the system of all of state authority and the separation of powers. We move from the individual to the state, and one of the basic principles provides for the responsibility of the state to society and the citizen. This was lacking in all the previous constitutions.

[Lugovskaya] As there was never anywhere the chapter "The Civil Society"?

[Rumyantsev] All that we have at the present time—from the reforms through the "political spring"—is the result of the awakening of the civil society. We see private property and freedom of initiative as the basis of it. Free structures can develop only in a society of proprietors, and for this reason we wish to return to it. The very environment of the civil society and personal liberties will put the state authorities in a subordinate position and prevent a repressive policy in respect of society as a whole.

[Lugovskaya] Yes, but how will you be able to remove, for instance, the monopoly of the CPSU which exists today de facto? After all, it is strong, and the inertia of thinking in society has not disappeared either.

[Rumyantsev] I will speak about another kind of monopoly—a monopoly of the plunder of society when before our eyes representatives of the party, Communist Youth League, and trade union schedule of appointments are being “transplanted” to various mixed enterprises and some fictitious associations and societies, taking away with them plundered millions and transferring them to domestic and foreign bank accounts. In a state based on the rule of law such actions, which are not without trace, would be prosecuted in legal manner. A session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will adopt a whole package of important legislative enactments, and we hope that this phenomenon will not go unattended. And that after the adoption of the constitution and the implementation of judicial reform the judicial authorities will tackle this issue in earnest.

[Lugovskaya] How will Russia's federal arrangement be realized? Surely this is the most complex question?

[Rumyantsev] The adoption of the constitution will be preceded by the adoption of a federal treaty of Russia and the conclusion of internal treaties between the subjects of the federation. The question of the federal arrangement is the one that is the most debated in the draft constitution even today. Following lengthy argument in the working group, we reached the following conclusion, and may we not be censured for it: Granted the maximum sovereignty and autonomy of the subjects of the federation, we should still preserve Russia's statehood in a new, democratic, law-based form. This means that the decisions of the federal parliament and court in the sphere of their jurisdiction, when conflicts arise, will have greater force and they will have the final say. But there are not many such questions, and for this reason another chapter—“Local Self-Government”—is provided for in the constitution. Questions of land tenure, the tax system, the militia, the courts, and so forth will be transferred fully to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. The following point is envisaged also: Following the adoption of the constitution, its ratification by the subjects of the federation will begin. And if an autonomous republic is unwilling to join the state of the Russian Federation, it can decline to ratify it.

[Lugovskaya] How strong are such tendencies?

[Rumyantsev] The aspiration to sovereignty frequently emanates not from the peoples of the autonomous entities but from their leadership placed in office according to the schedule of appointments. And I see a very dangerous tendency of the center, the Union schedule of appointments, and its repressive authorities speculating on this and igniting a conflict to spite the Russian leadership. This is being done deliberately.

[Lugovskaya] Does the constitution provide for election of the president?

[Rumyantsev] Undoubtedly. We contemplate the form of constitutional rule for the Russian Federation being a presidential republic. The “strong president—strong

parliament” system will not only balance but also determine the “framework” of presidential power. Given the present state of our political culture, it is very important that the president be able to adopt competent decisions.

[Lugovskaya] I would like to know: Will the working group make use of foreign constitutional experience?

[Rumyantsev] Undoubtedly. I, for example, was recently in America where I conferred a great deal on questions of the constitution. I met with senators, congressmen, governors, mayors, leaders of various communities, and scholars, and received as a gift 20 volumes of an anthology of the world's constitutions. A special report for our commission was written by A. Blaustein who has taken part in the preparation of a score of constitutions of various countries. The constitution should take effect next spring.

[Lugovskaya] As secretary of the Constitutional Commission, you evidently come into contact with its chairman, B. Yeltsin. How are your relations developing?

[Rumyantsev] I confess that in the past I was for a time critical of Boris Nikolayevich. Upon closer acquaintance, I realized that he has outstanding political flair and is pursuing personnel policy very adroitly, particularly where key positions are concerned. He is paying paramount attention to the Constitutional Commission. I would like such businesslike relations to continue. He supports the work we are performing in the commission.

[Lugovskaya] Thank you for the interview. Accept my wishes for success in your work.

Yeltsin Addressed on Kuybyshev Name Change

90UN2848A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 36, 7 Sep 90 p 6

["Open letter to B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet": "Samara or Kuybyshev?"]

[Text] Dear Boris Nikolayevich,

The revival of Russia's sovereignty is unthinkable without the restoration of its true history and a return to the national memory lost under the conditions of the long domination of administrative diktat. The desecration of shrines, the demolition of churches and hundreds of thousands of villages, and the extirpation of the primordial names of ancient Russian cities has done irreparable damage to the multinational culture of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The process of acquisition of a historical memory, which began in the years of perestroika, has powerfully boosted the national-cultural and social movement in our city also, now named Kuybyshev. A “Samara” committee was formed and national-cultural centers emerged. In conjunction with the artistic unions, they advocated the restoration to the city of its historical name. More than 70,000 signatures on an appeal to the USSR Supreme

Soviet were collected and a regional toponymic conference and also a sociological study among the townspeople were conducted. Finally this June, reflecting the opinion of the community, the city soviet of people's deputies adopted a decision on the return to the oblast center of its primordial name—Samara. Material, statements, and petitions were presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet office.

All to whom the fate of the fatherland is dear—not only people from our parts—welcomed the news of the restoration to the city of the name with which glorious pages of Russian and Bulgarian history and culture are associated.

And suddenly, out of the blue, the Kuybyshev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, high-handedly intruding upon others' jurisdiction and infringing the principles of the priority nature of the lower components, adopts a decision which in practice cancels out the city soviet decree.

Dear Boris Nikolayevich, we appeal to you as a man not indifferent to the fate of Russia to finally decide the question of the restoration of historical justice and the return to our city of its primordial name—Samara.

We believe that the question of the return of their names to ancient Russian cities should be decided at the next RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

[Signed] A.Ye. Pavlov, writer; P.S. Kabytov, professor at Kuybyshev University; A.N. Zavalnyy, bibliographer-folklorist; Yu.F. Shishelov, deputy of the city soviet; V.A. Dobrusin, deputy of the city soviet; V.M. Anokhin, people's deputy of the RSFSR; A.M. Kolyadina, deputy of the oblast soviet; V.A. Yershova, people's artiste of the USSR; G.N. Rassokhina, chairman of the "SamarSKIY sobor" Russian Cultural Center; A.A. Petrov, secretary of the "SamarSKIY sobor" Russian Cultural Center; Ye.V. Lazarev, executive secretary of the Kuybyshev Writers Organization.

Independent Union Foreshadows Demise of AUCCTU
LD2809090290 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT
28 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow September 28 TASS—The writing is on the wall for the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). The founding congress of the Federation of the Independent Trade Unions of Russia, the largest Soviet constituent republic, which ended in Moscow on Thursday, dispelled any lingering doubts on that score.

Its decisions say that over decades of unqualified subordination to the Soviet Communist Party, the AUCCTU turned into an inert and amorphous organisation that cannot effectively protect working people's interests.

A sweeping overhaul of the trade union movement is needed, which should be carried out on the basis of its total independence from any party and economic administrative structures. The federation's view is seen as particularly authoritative as its membership has already swelled to more than 50 million—over one third of all members of Soviet trade unions.

The drive for setting up independent trade union centres, which discarded the principle of democratic centralism in their activity, is now typical of the entire trade union movement in the country. In addition to the federation, this year saw the founding of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Lithuania, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Latvia, the Central Union of Estonian Trade Unions and the Federation of the Independent Trade Unions of Uzbekistan.

However, only unitary and coordination actions by trade unions can uphold the working people's rights in conditions of an all-Union economic market with a diversity of the forms of ownership and types of employers.

Elaborating a uniform strategy of the country's trade unions in the world trade union and working class movement and their participation in the activity of the International Labour Organisation and other U.N. institutions remains an important task. The founding congress of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions proposed that an authoritative single trade union centre of the country be established on fundamentally new principles. The model of an all-Union centre recently proposed by the AUCCTU plenum is no longer thought relevant.

The Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions thinks that the functions of a uniform elected body operating between the all-Union congresses of trade unions could be fulfilled by a coordinating council involving an equal number of representatives from each republican and autonomous organisation.

It would convene and adopt important decisions on the basis of consensus. The Council of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions began consultations on this issue with republican trade union centres and sectoral trade union federations. A final decision on the AUCCTU's fate and the nature of the new trade union centre will be made at the 19th congress of the USSR's trade unions planned to be convened late in October.

New 'Russian Parliamentary Herald' Program Aired
LD2709175990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1455 GMT on 27 September carries a new 15-minute program entitled "Russian Parliamentary Herald" which is introduced by Rasul Kazbekovich Mikhailov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet member and a Dagestan TV correspondent. Mikhailov says:

"Greetings, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Mass Media has given me the task of conducting the first broadcast of the new program 'Russian Parliamentary Herald'.

"The 'Russian Parliamentary Herald' will report on things that often remain outside the framework of TV relays of the Russian Supreme Soviet sessions. It will report on the legislative activity of committees and commissions, on the main things that the RSFSR deputies are doing."

Mikhailov then introduces S.M. Shakhrai, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Legislative Committee chairman and Presidium member. He says that the subject of their discussion will be the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's opposition to the new powers given to the USSR president.

Refuting the accusation that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium acted solely on the basis of rumors about the USSR Supreme Soviet decision, Shakhrai says: "We had the draft document, we had information from USSR and RSFSR people's deputies, and we had no reason to doubt them. Thus I believe that in the first place the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's reaction was well-founded and was expressed in the correct and optimal form. The situation is developing in such a way that perhaps it was expressed too mildly."

Commenting on the media treatment of the dispute, Mikhailov says: "Unfortunately the RSFSR Supreme Soviet does not have such regular broadcasts and access to such mass information media as, say, the Union Supreme Soviet, the president, and the CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, unfortunately, these newspapers contain somewhat distorted interpretations of our position and of the way we adopted the decision. For example, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA even published these words: 'Certain forces in the Russian Supreme Soviet unleashed such protest actions that you would be amazed. What are they based on? On nothing at all. Just rumors.' This way of interpreting our activities does not allow us to respond or comment."

Commenting on the RSFSR's proposed response, Shakhrai says: "I think that to ensure that in the future there is no illusion or desire to ignore the RSFSR parliament we should first of all adopt a law in parliament which would not be very complex, a law saying that all presidential decrees and USSR laws are subject to ratification by the Russian parliament. The president could address us, and his advisers too, and we will adopt all the healthy measures which are essential in this emergency situation. We ask only one thing—that account be taken of our opinion and of the republic's interests and these should not be ignored. This would be a law on the ratification of all-Union acts in Russia. Without this ratification they will be invalid."

Shakhrai says that measures should be undertaken to protect the RSFSR's economic interests which are being infringed upon. He summarizes saying: "I would like the viewers to know the following: The stupor and paralysis

of power, the artificial creation of the absence of quorums, and so on can not continue any longer. I think that we must now think and prepare an extraordinary congress or preterm congress of RSFSR peoples deputies. This congress should decide one main question and put this issue to the voters: To whom do they entrust power on Russian territory—to the Russian Supreme Soviet or to those deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet who were elected within our republic?"

"I think that in order to avoid conflicts and stirring up passions with the aid of the mass media, we need to use a civilized form, a referendum—to put this question to a referendum. Therefore I think that on Monday next week we should over the course of the week in its second reading adopt—we have already approved it in its first reading—a law on referendums. And in order to avoid these impasse situations we should hold an extraordinary congress."

Pro-Moscow City Council Paper Debuts

LD2809024190

[Editorial Report] Moscow in English to North America at 2200 GMT on 27 September carries a three-minute report on the publication of the first issue of the Moscow newspaper KURANTY on an unspecified date.

The announcer says the newspaper reflects the views of the Moscow City Council and the people representing Moscow in the Union and Russian supreme soviets.

The newspaper's editor, Moscow City Council member Anatoliy Pankov, outlines the goals of KURANTY. He says the newspaper will stand out because it believes that people's councils have yet to enjoy real power. He adds that the paper intends to help implement this power.

Although it is independent from any party, he says, it came into being thanks to the Communist Party. The Moscow committee of the party refused to share two papers with the Moscow City Council, and suggested helping launch another paper instead.

Expanded Powers for Sobchak Questioned

90UN2879A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 38, 22 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent Vit. Potemkin: "The Second Circle"]

[Text] Leningrad—No, I do not care for the story about how Anatoliy Aleksandrovich fell out with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Nor the story of this dramatic conflict between the mayor of Leningrad, Aleksandr Shchelkanov, who submitted his resignation, and the chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, Anatoliy Sobchak, who in the city soviet presidium refused to accept this resignation. I wish now to speak about something else.

About the deep-lying and perfectly natural social and political causes of this conflict which reflects, as in a

drop of water, the entire absurdity of our new authorities—rather, multiple authorities, and to be entirely accurate anarchy. After all, Anatoliy Sobchak has entered into a conflict not with A. Shchelkanov personally but with the imperfect system of power itself born of our fragile, I would like to say prematurely born, democracy.

Now that the hot heads of the deputies of the Leningrad City Soviet have cooled down considerably and they are not so intoxicated with their long-awaited power, it has become apparent that governing the city is not a question of criticizing, making declarations, and calling for mass meetings and strikes. People are now going on hunger strikes and holding mass meetings not at the walls of the Smolnyy and beneath the windows of V. Gidasov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the oblast party committee, but beneath the windows of the chairmen of the Leningrad City Soviet and the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee].

For a long two months the new Leningrad City Soviet was simply unable to nominate a leader from its ranks, and then Sobchak was asked to run for city soviet deputy and subsequently, when he had won, to be their chairman. Generally the political leader with the highest approval rating—after B. Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev—was summoned to a certain period of reign. He found a refractory democratic child. From day to day the situation changed for the worse: strikes of transport workers demanding the elimination in the Leningrad City Soviet of the contending factions; mass meetings of medical personnel presenting ultimatums; complaints from cultural figures; tobacco riots; empty store shelves; a harvest not gathered in....

Even just a few months ago it all seemed so simple: the "democratic" Leningrad City Soviet, the "conservative" party apparatus and the "conservative" Leningrad Gorispolkom. Long live Soviet power—and all would be plain sailing! It turned out that Soviet power was by no means power. The soviets are not counseling the ispolkom [executive committee] and directing its work along a strategic channel, sending down a "democratically" shaped decision and demanding of the "conservatives" its unswerving fulfillment. It is a naive person who believes that if we replace the "conservative" Leningrad Gorispolkom and its bureaucratic apparatus, the diarchy will be eliminated. Alas, alas, this is not the case. The point is that wholly heterogeneous people reflecting the interests not of particular social groups and political organizations but expressing their personal platforms, their personal viewpoints, have been elected to the Leningrad City Soviet. Approximately 80 percent of the deputies are Communists, but they are united not in a single faction but in seven different factions which are frequently in conflict among themselves, which naturally prevents the adoption of timely and constructive decisions. An example: Not one of the candidates for deputy proposed by A. Sobchak and A. Shchelkanov has been approved. They are quite unable to put together their

teams and bring in people whom they trust and on whom they can rely. In addition, virtual anarchy reigns in the rayon soviets and rayon ispolkoms. Here, there, and everywhere they are declaring their decisions to be above the decisions of the Leningrad City Soviet and the Leningrad Gorispolkom, and they are being impolite to the superior authorities. As a result, all structures of the legislative, executive, and economic authorities have found themselves out of balance. The conflict between the city and the districts has intensified particularly in the period of redistribution and privatization of state property. And each wishes to be a real authority.

The market is coming. It is inevitable. But how is it to be embodied, given the actual multiple authority and most complex multiple-conflict situation which exists at this time not only in Leningrad and not only in Moscow but in many regions of the country also?

Sociological surveys show that Leningraders are extremely dissatisfied with the political situation. Since the June elections they have come to expect changes for the worse.

The specialists who drew up a briefing paper for a working conference of the Leningrad City Soviet Presidium believe that power is still supported by the political mood of the masses, not by economic policy. A deterioration in the economic situation altogether threatens a loss of the credit of trust in the "democrats" also.

What is to be done?

The regional policy center proposes strengthening the executive authority, endowing it with maximum powers. Considering Sobchak's enormous authority, it is proposed to accord him special rights in the exercise of executive authority and to temporarily abandon the classical idea of the separation of powers since the legal foundations for such a separation are still lacking currently. And it is proposed to create a special collective organ of administration for Leningrad for a particular period—a Regional Administration Committee—which would be made up of both deputies and specialists. Consequently strengthening "democrat-nonprofessionals" with "specialist fellow travelers"? Consequently, in one way or another limiting the rights of the legislative authority—the Leningrad City Soviet? What would this mean? A merger of the legislature and the executive? Our country has already had this, if you will.

So the story of how Anatoliy Aleksandrovich quarreled with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich is the story not of their personal relations, which are not that brilliant either. It is a dramatic story of our "prematurely born democracy" and, to judge by everything, it could be typical of the majority of cities and villages.

What is to be done?

in my view, there is one solution. At the Leningrad City Soviet session—it begins on 3 October—all the disconnected political forces need to recognize the supremacy of national values as being common to all mankind over political values, restrain their arrogance, and moderate group and interpersonal ambitions in the name of the common cause. And it should still be remembered that in times which are difficult for all, moral significance is attached to the proposition that "the social is higher than the personal." Otherwise, the second circle is toward confrontation, anarchy, chaos; and God forbid, as a consequence, dictatorship—this tragic pattern.

Yakutsk Adopts Sovereignty Declaration, New Name

LD2709134390 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
1300 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] A new state formation, the Yakut-Sakha Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] appeared today on the territory of the Russian Federation and as a member of it. This is what is said in the declaration on sovereignty which was adopted by the session of the Supreme Soviet. This document is the basis for drawing up the new constitution of the Yakut-Sakha SSR, the concluding of a treaty with the Russian Federation, participation in the concluding of the Union treaty, and improving republican legislation.

Explosion at Novolipetsk Steel Plant Kills One

LD2809080190 *Moscow TASS in English* 0752 GMT
28 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 28 TASS—A powerful explosion crippled a steel plant in Novolipetsk, central Russia, killing one worker and injuring another, the RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper reports today.

It says the accident occurred at the plant's sheet rolling section on Wednesday night, when the furnaces were being warmed up after scheduled maintenance.

Khabarovsk KGB Chief Meets With Public

LD2709120890 *Moscow Television Service in Russian*
0830 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Report by correspondent L. Stroykov, including recorded interview with V.V. Pirozhnyak, chief of the KGB directorate for Khabarovsk Kray, at the "Leninist Komsomol" factory in Komsomolsk-na-Amure; date not given: from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The campaign against the state security bodies is growing wider and more and more uncontrolled, and in many cases, provocative in many regions of the country. This can be confronted with glasnost, by truthful information about the work of the state security bodies.

[Stroykov] Similar meetings with people will become regular in Khabarovsk Kray from now on. The first one

is being conducted by the KGB directorate chief at the works from which he was once sent to serve. It is the Leninist Komsomol works.

Do you consider yourselves the successors to the Chekists? Of what is ex-general Kalugin guilty? Could the repressions of the thirties and forties be repeated? Does the KGB intend to bring order to trade? Is there progress in the fight against crime in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, and is the KGB helping with it? Why is there still no USSR law on the KGB?

The former NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] and MGB [Ministry of State Security] played a special part in the history of Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Its residents were already well aware before that the city of youth was not built just by enthusiasts with Komsomol passes. The system of numerous camps had a significant influence on life in those years. There can be no return to the tragic past. Alienation must give way to understanding. We all need that.

[Pirozhnyak] No security bodies—they may have various names, both in our country and abroad—can function and carry out their tasks without relying on the masses as we used to say, without relying on the public, on the assistance of Soviet people. This is very important for our activity. Without that assistance we will not be able to carry out the function entrusted to us. Our detachment is small, and it is not in a position to solve the tasks which we could solve together.

Altay Kray Declared Free Enterprise Zone

PM2809100590 *Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
27 Sep 90 *Second Edition p 1*

[PRAVDA-TASS-INTERFAX report under general heading: "Telephone, Teletype, Telefax"]

[Text] Barnaul—An extraordinary session of the Altay Kray Soviet of People's Deputies has approved the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] resolution and declared Altay Kray a free enterprise zone. In the opinion of specialists, the introduction of new business rules in the kray will bring tangible results: People have been given the opportunity to earn more and the consumer market will be saturated.

Omsk Obkom First Secretary Resigns

90UN2864AC *Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian 20 Sep 90 *Second Edition p 2*

[Article by S. Shkayev: "Plenum of the Omsk CPSU Obkom"]

[Text] Omsk—The 10th plenum of the Omsk CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] has taken place and examined an organizational question. The plenum satisfied the request of A.P. Leontyev, first secretary of the party obkom, to be released from the post he occupies.

"Having deeply and thoroughly considered the ruling of the 28th CPSU Congress which defined the need for limiting the functions of party and state organs," said A.P. Leontyev, speaking at the plenum, "and taking into consideration today's political situation in the country and the oblast, I have arrived at a firm conviction of the impossibility of holding the offices of both first secretary of the CPSU obkom and chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies. I believe that this is henceforth impractical and politically unjustified."

N.V. Zhuravlev, second secretary of the Omsk CPSU Obkom, has been entrusted with the duties of first secretary until the oblast party conference.

The plenum heard information concerning the structure of the oblast party organization and a procedure for forming its governing organs; it also passed an appeal to Communists and all workers of the oblast.

Ryazan Gorispolkom Abolished, Problems Outlined

90UN2853A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Kakovkin for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Without a Rudder and Without Sails...."]

[Text] Ryazan—There is no longer a gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] in Ryazan. At a hastily convened special session of the city soviet of people's deputies, it was reorganized, to put it bluntly, it was abolished.

What happened is what should happen sooner or later, if sober logic is followed. Because the two-stepped authority—"city soviet of people's deputies-gorispolkom"—that has been in existence since the elections last spring simply looked awkward, and it had little effect. Nonetheless, the obvious haste and poor reasoning that accompanied the reorganization of the gorispolkom downright alarmed the citizens.

But, as can be seen, those who are "running the show" today in the city soviet of people's deputies do not have people's needs first and foremost, but entirely different concerns. Instead of collectively working out wise decisions, the discussion at the session followed the familiar scenario of berating "party apparatchiks" and accusing them of all conceivable and inconceivable sins. The following were brought to the forefront: "A worsening in the population's food supply, the strike by bus drivers, delays in turning on hot water, and an extreme ecological situation...." To be fair, it must be noted that all of the enumerated "arguments," except, perhaps, the first one, arose under the eyes of the new city soviet of people's deputies, which is simply obliged to share responsibility for this. Take, for example, the actual resolution adopted by its own presidium, which in fact counterbalanced the appeals of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin on the

mobilization of forces to save the harvest, where assistance to the village was actually interpreted as "destabilizing the situation in the city." At the same time at the session, V. Ryumin, chairman of the soviet, not blinking an eye, accused local party and soviet organs of attempting... "to suppress the democratic reorganization with the hands of hungry people."

What followed was most interesting: After the abolition of the gorispolkom, almost its entire staff... was invited to work in the new apparatus. It turns out that with all of its defects the former ispolkom was not really that bad, consisting of really experienced specialists and capable organizers.

In general, the old ispolkom no longer exists, and it is not known when a replacement for it will be organized. True, negotiations are continuing.

What is the solution? In my opinion, there is only one—consolidation and a shift from senseless claims to close cooperation. The interests of the city demand that the parties forego principles. Left without a rudder or sails, it is continuing like a sinking ship rolling from side to side, taking on newer and newer problems that are not being resolved: Even without this, the weak preparation of the city for winter has slowed down, the vegetable storehouses are empty, and the interruptions in commercial products have become more frequent. All citizens are suffering from this. It is like the saying: "When the master sneezes, everyone catches cold." But life shows that to test the patience of the people is a risky business.

Western Republics

Coverage of Hungary's Goncz Visit to Ukraine

Gorbachev Sends Greeting

LD2709193490 Budapest MTI in English
1722 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Kiev, September 27 (MTI)—Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, arrived in Kiev on Thursday [27 September]. He is to pay a three-day official visit at the invitation of Leonid Kravchuk, president of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Prior to leaving for Kiev, Goncz received a message from the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, which was handed over by the Soviet ambassador to Hungary. Gorbachev welcomed the Hungarian president on the occasion of his visit to the Ukraine. The Soviet president expressed his hope that Goncz's talks in Kiev would be successful and that they will have a chance to meet personally in the near future. (The date of the meeting will be determined later. According to MTI's information, the meeting between the two presidents will be held this year.)

Arpad Goncz was officially received at Kiev's Borispol International airport with military honours. Great

interest was shown to the visit of the president, who was met by his host Leonid Kravchuk. Goncz and Kravchuk made brief statements at the airport.

Goncz noted:

"I am happy to be here on Ukrainian soil. Hungary has centuries-old relations with Ukraine, and our cooperation has a long history. I sincerely hope we shall be able to renew these long-standing relations, and that our cooperation will develop into close friendship. This cooperation covers political, economic and cultural areas alike. I sincerely hope cooperation will deepen into human relations as relations based on love and human friendship are the ones that prove to be the most lasting.

"We were particularly pleased to receive President Gorbachev's message prior to our departure. President Gorbachev welcomes the effort we are making to establish relations with the Ukraine, on a par with neighbouring countries."

Leonid Kravchuk voiced his hope that the Kiev talks serving to establish Ukrainian-Hungarian relations will be successful.

Kravchuk expanded on this idea when talks opened later with Goncz in the building of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. In his brief introductory statement, Kravchuk termed the visit of the Hungarian president to be of historical importance. In this context, he noted that Arpad Goncz is the first high-ranking foreign guest here since the declaration of Ukrainian state independence. He voiced his hope that talks will open the way to long-term and fruitful bilateral relations.

Consular Links Established

*LD2709193390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Excerpts] President Gorbachev has wished success to Arpad Goncz, Hungarian head of state, for his negotiations in the Ukraine. [passage omitted] Arpad Goncz's visit is considered historic in Kiev because this is the first time a president of another country has visited since the Ukrainian declaration of independence Gabopr Izbeki reports:

[Izbeki] The Hungarian Republic wants to form friendly links based on real interests with the would-be new Soviet Union and with its member republics which are becoming independent. This how Arpad Goncz replied to the question of Hungarian radio at his news conference today. The president, together with Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, described the visit which started today as of historic importance.

In the political sphere the two countries have agreed to assume consular links which, as a result of Soviet changes, may develop in time into full-scale diplomatic relations. Now it is the opening of the consulate in Uzhgorod which is first on the agenda.

The Hungarian delegation was pleased that it was the Ukrainians themselves who proposed that the two sides sign a nationality charter and that they shape an exemplary nationality policy.

Arpad Goncz has also received a promise for the erection of a Hungarian military memorial in the Ukraine. In return, Kiev asked that Hungary properly care for the graves of Ukraine soldiers who had fallen in Hungary.

Economic issues were raised only in a general sense, but it is clear that the Ukrainians are interested in Hungary's help to catch up with Europe. They also asked for their economic experts to be trained in Hungary. We, on the other hand, would like to have a share on a long-term basis in the plentiful Ukrainian energy production. [passage omitted]

After the negotiations the two presidents signed a joint declaration about the intent and direction of relations. [passage omitted]

Ukraine Central Committee Plenum Opens 28 Sep
*LD2809041890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0200 GMT 28 Sep 90*

[Text] A plenum of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee opens today in Kiev. Urgent tasks of the republic's party organizations in the current socio-political situation are being submitted for discussion by those taking part.

All-Ukrainian Strike Delayed Until 1 Oct

*LD2709175490 Moscow TASS in English 1840 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyanskiy]

[Text] Kiev September 27 TASS—An all-Ukrainian strike planned for today has not been held. The usual pace in the Ukrainian capital has not been disrupted either in the street or enterprises. Reports from other Ukrainian cities say that the situation there is tranquil, too. Only Lvov students boycotted studies.

TASS got in touch with Kiev strike committee which coordinates activities of strike committees of the Ukraine. Anatoliy Lupinis, chairman of the executive of the interparty assembly, which includes representatives of all the parties that sprang up of late, told TASS that early in September the committee decided to hold a strike on October 1, not September 27. This was [passage indistinct]

Lenin Monuments Defense Rally Held in Ukraine

*PM2709135190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1*

[UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Dismantling Impermissible"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk, 26 Sep—A mass meeting in defense of the monuments to V.I. Lenin was held here today at the call of the Ukrainian Communist Party city committee. Several thousand inhabitants of the city gathered here with banners and slogans stating "Hands Off Lenin!"

Those taking part in the meeting agreed that the dismantling of monuments to Lenin is an intolerable phenomenon. They sharply criticized a number of movements which by their actions, including affront to memory of Lenin, destabilize the situation in the republic and the country.

In a resolution those taking part in the meeting stated their firm socialist choice and support for the ideas of V.I. Lenin and urged the population to prevent his memory from being affronted.

Ukrainian Newspaper Coverage Criticized

90UN2827A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
7 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by A. Sinko: "An Inaccurate Reflection in the Pages of the Newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU"]

[Text] ZA VILNU UKRAYINU, the newspaper of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, began to be published on 1 July in Lvov. In its first issue the editor informed the readers that like-minded people who "vow to serve the People and the Truth" are working at a "people's newspaper." That was a noble vow. How are its journalists living up to it?

In the 9 August issue, the newspaper VILNA UKRAYINA, organ of the Lvov Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], published a collective letter from veterans of war and labor from the town of Drohobych. The letter was called "This Is Our Position" and it angrily told of a rally that took place in the city on the occasion of raising a monument in Pervomayskiy Park "to the hero of the Ukrainian people, Stepan Bandera." Having reminded the youth of the bloody crimes of the followers of Bandera—on whose consciences lie "tens of thousands of tortured peaceful residents, including 1,900 teachers and doctors and more than 50 priests..."—the veterans further complained that discussions have been going on for several months in the labor collectives and in the press over where and with what funds to raise a monument to that immortal kobza [old Ukrainian instrument resembling a guitar] player Taras Shevchenko, but the question has been left hanging; in the case of Bandera, a rally was conducted and the whole thing was over in a matter of hours—the monument has already been installed.

The newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU of course did not report the veterans' letter, but it did mention the letter in a commentary. We emphasize that the commentary was distinctive. And the 9 August issue, as though to spite the party newspaper, printed the eulogy of S. Bandera, "The Court's Verdict," on one whole page....

The journalists of the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU promised not only to serve the truth, but—and we quote—"to deliver the Ukraine from the information famine of many years." A goal that is truly noble! But what are they in fact doing? One reads information, but it is completely one-sided. You want examples? There are more than enough of them. In one of the issues (12 August) we find a couple of articles. The first tells how a collective of the Vesna Garment Association is successfully fulfilling a special order from the Shevchenkovskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee—to sew 10,000 yellow-and-blue banners. And the second reports on privileges—a monetary allowance, a comfortable apartment, a visiting nurse, etc.—granted to Yuriy Shukhevich and his family, the son of Roman Shukhevich, the famous figure of the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists].

The material that fills the regular column "From Everywhere" is also geared to a specific taste. The very headlines speak of its character: "Mass Exodus From the CPSU" (Novokuznetsk), "The Dissolution of the Party Organization" (Rostov-na-Donu), and "They Will Live Without Party Committees" (Leningrad). A very specific taste, as we see.

And the information may simply not accord with what has happened. Or the sense is correct, but it is relayed so as to discourage those who hold a different point of view. For example, here is how they have dressed up a report on an exhibition in Lvov of young Kiev artists: "Each work is a slap in the face to the socialist empire." Or the distinctive beginning written by the author of the notes "It Is Not Beer That Destroys People": "As we know, Marx liked beer very much. Hitler also began his political career with the famous beer hall putsch." We expect that the reporter had his own reasons for using the word "also."

It is hardly by such notes as these—and so far we have not seen any others—that the newspaper of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is going "to deliver the Ukraine from the information famine of many years."

The newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU also has its own way of understanding the aspiration to "report on the activities of organs of state power and defend the rights of democratic soviets in their struggle with reactionary forces"—these were the words of Vasilii Baziv, the newspaper's chief editor, reported in the first issue. On 11 August the newspaper printed the words of Z. Krivoruchko, chief of the oblast health department. And what did the leader of health services for the Lvov area speak about in a long article entitled "How To Find One's Rescuer?" Do you think it was about medicine? Only indirectly. "Of course we will improve our medical care," notes the author, "however all that is only a palliative, a temporary change which resolves nothing so long as we are not a free nation." It is about the latter that the chief doctor of the oblast cares most of all. Even

though, we believe the readers were mostly hoping for a practical program for a specific way out of a complicated situation.

The speech of M. Bilyak, deputy of the oblast soviet, was printed under the rubric "A Deputy Speaks Out." It seemed to us that the editorial board was very much opposed to this step, because M. Bilyak's observations are clearly at odds with the newspaper's line. But it was forced to do this: You do not refuse a deputy whoever he may be. True, they could not refrain from a disclaimer after the deputy's words: "We have our own views with regard to the deputy-apparatchik's arguments concerning our newspaper."

We have already spoken about these views. And what did the deputy find it necessary to speak about? "It should not be forgotten," he said, "that a publication should have a Soviet, not anticommunist tendency; it is desirable that there be a more business-like tone to the articles and that there be more information of a political and economic content and less hidden malice and instigation. The newspaper is a reflection of the oblast's soviet. It should be an accurate reflection."

Yes, it should be an accurate reflection. We add our own voice to this practical desire, this objective evaluation of the publication. The people's representatives should prove that they are mature people and know the road to social and economic prosperity for the region. Steering them toward this goal is the duty of a publication, not confrontation. All the shouting is beginning to pall; people have become bored with this business. Time will demonstrate which position is dearer to the journalists of the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU. For the time being they have clearly forgotten their promises.

Tense Ethnic Situation Reported in 'Moldova'

90UN288A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Sep p 2

[Article by TRUD correspondent V. Golubev: "Moldova: Is It Necessary to Burn Bridges?"]

[Text] Kishinev—Let us acknowledge the obvious: The process of democratization which began in the sovereign Republic of Moldova two years ago has today turned into an extremely tense confrontation on ethnic grounds. Not one of the social forces existing in the political arena included such a goal in its program of course, but the result is in front of us.

It is naive to suppose that the demarcation line will follow the borders of the recently proclaimed Dnestr and Gagauz Republics. Borders do not exist for ethnic enmity. Tomorrow the Bulgarian villages situated on the territory of the Gagauz state will declare their own sovereignty, and people will ask how to draw a line of demarcation in Dubossary, where the "tricolor" flies over the rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] and the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] stands under the red flag. The village of Nezavertaylovka will be split into two independent states. We can even

reach the point of "sovereignty" for a street, a house, a driveway—in Kishinev people are already voting at elections, as a rule, according to ethnicity and without paying any attention to the platforms of the candidates for deputy....

Absurd? But if we follow the chain to its logical conclusion, the last link in it will turn out to be personal sovereignty—the first step on the return trip. Even a single sovereign individual must seek a common language with another sovereign individual.

The deputies of the republic parliament have not been able to find a common language. The session of the parliament turned into a continual rally in which, with the aid of television, all Moldova took part. It ended when the left bank party and representatives of the Gagauz rayons slammed the door, having broken off work in the Supreme Soviet. After that, of course, there was more harmony in the parliament, but crisis processes began to increase in the republic. The declaration of two state formations on the territory of the republic brought the concentration of explosive substances to critical mass....

M. Snegur, president of Moldova, appealed to the people with a speech which ended with the words "Down with separatist leaders! Down with those who show no loyalty to the state! Not a single inch of the land of our ancestors to satisfy the autonomy ambitions of the newcomers! Let us preserve the integrity of the state of Moldova and defend our ethnic dignity..." Tens of thousands of volunteers declared their readiness to defend the integrity of the republic.

On the other side, committees to defend the state formations that had been proclaimed were immediately formed in Tiraspol and Komrat. In Komrat everything was hanging by a thread—things were only a step away from tragedy, but fortunately that step was not taken. The situation is being aggravated by all kinds of rumors. For example, they say in Tiraspol that in Kishinev some sort of women's assault battalion is being created, and in Kishinev they say that there are supposedly 200 Komrat volunteers prepared to commit terrorist acts against parliamentarians—a terrorist has been assigned to each parliamentarian. And it continues in the same vein....

In this electrified atmosphere a special session of the Moldova Supreme Soviet adopted a sensible ruling: To interrupt its work, form deputy groups, and send them to the local level to analyze the causes for the existing situation. It only took the deputies three days to come to the conclusion that it must be a question of certain errors tolerated by the parliament. If tens of thousands of residents of the republic live in terror and distrust and consider themselves aggrieved, then this is a reality which must be taken into consideration.

A number of laws which have been adopted recently by the Supreme Soviet are simply not being accepted by a significant portion of the population, including the Moldavian population. Many do not approve of the new

state flag of the republic—the "tricolor"—and they are far from ready to move to a Latin alphabet. There is almost a complete lack of a material base for studying the Moldavian language—there are not enough teachers, textbooks, or literature. The law adopted by the parliament on the state language is often violated, and it has evoked extremes of passion even without that. In other words, there are numerous real, not invented problems which may not be resolved using the Criminal Code.

At the session the deputies talked about the need to focus efforts on the main thing—preserving the civil peace—and about the need for reasonable compromises, negotiations, and the use of popular diplomacy. But the atmosphere in the hall changed abruptly when debates began at the microphones toward the evening: "This is a plot against Moldova!" "The colonizers came to our country, and we got down on our knees and asked for mercy." "We must not implement consolidation on the basis of capitulation before separatists...." "They are stealing our land and our language...." And finally "It is necessary to institute state of emergency...."

On this occasion M. Snegur explained in a very calm speech that the language and the national symbols are not really the causes of the crisis. The true cause is opposition to perestroika on the part of destructive forces. This view is being repeated endlessly in the mass media as well. And even the deputies who visited at the local level argued that the problem will not be resolved "by the intrigues of dark forces." And no one expressed any distrust in their views. Officially it seems as though no commissions had ever gone out visiting anywhere....

But if we speak unofficially, then I believe that the leadership of the republic is aware of the true situation even without any commissions. I wish to quote a small segment of a conversation with V. Pushkash, deputy chairman of the Moldova Supreme Soviet, that was recorded on a dictaphone:

"I agree that we are in a hurry. At times our rulings outpace the level of thinking of many people. But we need to overcome the conservative forces somehow. If we try to persuade them, perestroika will go on for years. Unfortunately, when I speak about conservatism I have in mind not only the organizers of the opposition but also the basic mass of the people which is conservative by itself...."

We should not cavil at words; the sense is important. And the sense consists of the fact that Viktor Stepanovich understands very well the nature of parliament's current difficulties and the nature of the crisis which has been created. The question is only whether "conservatism of the people" may be overcome by force and by political, administrative, and other pressures.

Yes, it is always possible to throw open the office window, indicate the street, and say "Look, the people are waiting, the people are making demands and we cannot let them down." But the leaders of "the so-called Dnestr Republic," as they say in Kishinev, also throw

open their windows and say the same thing. Moreover, referendums are hastily being conducted everywhere which supposedly demonstrate the readiness of an overwhelming number of people to live separately from Moldova. But I dare suppose, many of them do not show that inflexible determination to secede that the leaders of the "separatists" demonstrate. And far from all are convinced that other possibilities in defense of the interests of the left bank have been given a fair try.

Nonetheless, at a meeting of the presidium of the provisional Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol, one of the participants who called himself a representative of the "grass roots" said energetically that the people do not sense an emergency situation and do not understand that the bridges have been burned, and he appealed for the adoption of exhaustive measures to make it clear to everyone that the bridges have in fact been burned and there is no return. And he ended in the following manner: "They look to us with hope. And on the right bank the people expect victory from us." What kind of victory? Over whom? And what in general does victory mean under existing conditions? What is the meaning of the appeals to adhere to principles and declare oneself? When everyone declares himself to the end and "adheres to principles," apparently there will be nothing left to do but to go at each other, us against them....

There is far more common sense in the doubts of R. Kiblik, deputy chairman of the settlement soviet of the village of Glinoye in Slobodzeyskiy Rayon—and Moldavian by nationality by the way—than in such "adherence to principles." During the referendum she voted for secession of the Dnestr area, but in her soul she does not believe in that undertaking. In general she is "for a unified Moldova, but so that there is peace." Raisa Dmitriyevna said that after the latest meeting on "self-determination," the female kolkhoz [collective farm] members begged "Your politics bore us and we do not care what kind of republic it is. Just let us work normally and buy whatever we can with our wages...."

And in the Gagauz village of Tomay, not one of the deputies who assembled to discuss the situation called for burning bridges and going "to the end." People do not trust the future, they are under constant tension, and they are far from happy with these dangerous games—with the self-defense detachments, rations, call signs, and all the rest which it seems someone is enjoying very much. I had the opportunity to converse with many leaders in Komrat and Chadyr-Lung. And the majority of them expressed sensible, sober thoughts: About the need for compromises and about conclusions that are drawn with unnecessary haste.

But then I read the ruling of a congress of Gagauz deputies of all levels which took place after this congress—what kind of compromises does it include...?

Economic relations are having a very destabilizing influence on the sphere of ethnic relations. In Komrat I was shown calculations demonstrating that Kishinev is

"shamelessly exploiting" the southern rayons. I also saw similar calculations in Tiraspol. On the other hand, in Kishinev they say that the center is stealing everything. These conversations may be heard on the streets, in the long lines, and in each home. They have become commonplace and are increasingly taking on a noneconomic, or more accurately a nationalist tone. The opposing parties ascribe to each other the wish to distract the masses from the resolution of urgent economic problems in the name of their own mercenary interests. But how can economic problems be resolved when there is no peace in the republic? When they are breaking all the dishes in the house there is no use thinking about income.

Alas, it is not uncommon to try to extinguish an interethnic conflagration by pouring gasoline on it. If there is a rally in Tiraspol, then there is an antirally in Kishinev. If there is a congress in Tiraspol, there is an anticongress in Dubossarskiy Rayon. If there is a great national meeting in Dubossarskiy Rayon, there is a congress of voters and deputies of all levels in Komrat.... The atmosphere at these gatherings is highly electrified, extreme points of view predominate at them, and anyone who thinks differently is excluded. And not one heated word is left out. As one of the deputies told me, even those who think differently lower their heads and raise their hands.

However no one is about to resolve economic, social, and interethnic problems at rallies. They give their organizers political capital and moral justification for any actions because "the people demand it"! At that special session of the Moldavian parliament, one of the deputies said in desperation "Whoever can help us get out of this situation should be awarded the Nobel Prize." As though a miracle were needed. But it is clear that it must be a question only of a wish to find a reasonable way out of the crisis and of a certain amount of courage to stand up to extreme tendencies.

There are no unresolved ethnic problems in Moldova, but there are realities which must be taken into account. The first reality is that 35 percent of the population residing in the republic is not of Moldavian nationality. And even if all these people suddenly declared a wish to leave Moldova, it would be impossible on a practical level to carry out a great resettlement. Incidentally, the majority of them are not guests on this land—they have soaked it with their sweat, and their ancestors lie there.

The second reality proceeds from the first: Interethnic contradictions always exist in a multiethnic state. I remember a sentence I overheard in Tiraspol: "There are two truths—one for the right bank and one for the left." And it really is true. Except that each truth, taken apart from the other, is a great untruth.

Yes, the people who gave the republic its name have suffered tremendous injury. The existence of their culture has been threatened, and their language has been ejected from the sphere of state usage and driven into the

kitchen. In Slobodzeyskiy Rayon, for example, where half of the population is comprised of Moldavians, only 392 copies of a general edition of the rayon newspaper with a circulation of 14,000 were printed in Moldavian. Those who arrive in Kishinev sense that they are in the capital of the republic rather than in, say, Omsk more because of the climate than because of any ethnic characteristics.

It is clear that we need an energetic, perhaps emergency, but certainly deeply considered program of ethnic renewal. The only paradox is that it is impossible to implement such a program in principle without scrupulous, delicate observation of the rights and interests of the minority. And this is in the very interests of the majority.

Today there are tense discussions underway concerning the conclusion of a new Union treaty. The events in the Transcaucasus region, Central Asia, and in Moldova show that the treaty will become a fiction so long as each sovereign republic does not take upon itself obligations guaranteeing that **personal sovereignty** will be assured independent of ethnic affiliation and so long as strict forms of control over observation of these obligations are not devised.

There was a time when, faced with the campaign to defend human rights, we called it bourgeois propaganda and interference in the internal affairs of our state. Today, when there are more trouble spots on the map of our country than on both hands, we begin to understand that the alarm of the world community about human rights was dictated primarily by concern about their own safety. Because in the modern world everything is interconnected, and any local crisis threatens to turn into a global catastrophe.

Moldavian Political Situation Worsening

90UN2871A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 22 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent V. Okunev: "An Appeal to Common Sense"]

[Text] The political situation in Moldova continues to worsen. On 17 September several dozen people broke past the guard into the building of the Moldovenergo production association. The attackers claimed to be representatives of the Moldovan People's Front. Those who forced their way in demanded that the Moldovenergo workers who were leaders of the electric movement [as published] be turned over.

The next day a group of agitated people who had gathered in the building of the House of the Press demanded that the newspaper MOLODEZH MOLD-AVII be closed down. The immediate cause of the disturbance was an allegedly insulting photograph of

SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova Prime Minister M. Druk on the front page of the newspaper.

On that same day in the square of the Great National Assembly in Kishinev, there was a rally against the separatist actions of the residents of the Dnestr area. The Organization of Democratic Youth of Moldova took responsibility for organizing this rally, which violated the moratorium declared by the parliament on demonstrations. Those attending the rally blocked the city's main street and shouted slogans for several hours: "Down with separatism," "Occupation troops go home," "Moldovans unite," and "Down with the Russian empire."

Against the background of these events the voice of the Communist Party of Moldova sounded strong and constructive. The Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee Bureau called for the creation of civil accord committees at enterprises, in the cities, and in the rayons, and called for all sociopolitical organizations to publicly support the rejection of the propaganda of ideas involving betrayal of the territorial integrity of the SSR of Moldova.

Snegur Restricts Gagauz Republic's Rights

90UN2852B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by S. Gamova: "Moldova: The Conflict Continues"]

[Text] Kishinev—A week was granted by the parliament of the republic to leaders of the proclaimed Gagauz and Dnestr republics to convoke a congress of deputies and repeal rulings adopted earlier. The week is over.

In the process, what is being offered those residents of the south and the Dnestr region who have decided on the need for economic and political independence of the regions?

According to M. Snegur, the Gagauz may be granted only cultural autonomy and the Left Bank region may be granted the right to economic independence within the bounds of the local soviets in accordance with the law on self-government and self-financing.

The "center" called for the convocation of a Great National Assembly. They chose to conduct it in the small Moldavian village of Lunga, situated on that bank that has proclaimed itself the Dnestr Republic.

"We are at home here," said those who gathered for the assembly. The age-old Moldavian land should not be handed over to various types of separatists and their leaders—this demand was present in all the speeches, including those of the president of the republic and his prime minister.

Deputies of all levels from the Gagauz region gathered on Sunday for a regular session. Not having earlier achieved autonomy within Moldova, they are now trying to achieve full secession.

In the meantime the law enforcement organs of the republic have begun to carry out the parliament's commission—to punish leaders of the movements advocating separatism. Dobrov, leader of the Gagauz organization "Arkalyk" and member of a provisional committee of the Gagauz Republic, has been arrested. He is accused of exceeding his authority and of calling the people to arms.

In the event of further disobedience of the laws of Moldova, the next step of the parliament, according to M. Snegur, may be to stop financing individual soviets and to carry out the president's rights to dissolve them.

Gagauz Republic People's Deputy Interviewed

90UN2852A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 37, Sep 90 p 5

[Report on interview with I. Karakash, candidate assistant professor of legal sciences at Odessa University and expert consultant on legal issues, and G. Kalchu, Republic of Moldova people's deputy and member of a Gagauz Republic provisional committee, by I. Krasnopolskaya; date and place not given: "The Gagauz Seek a Compromise"]

[Text] [Krasnopolskaya] The two of you spent almost two weeks in Moscow. What brought you here?

[Kalchu] Primarily the conspiracy of silence in the mass media concerning events in the republic. And when some information does get through, it is one-sided. But the main reason is the circumstances surrounding Gagauz Republic. On 23 June the parliament of Moldova declared that in August 1940 the Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] of Moldova was formed illegally as the result of an occupation by Soviet troops. The formation of the Moldova SSR did not take into account the opinion of the Gagauz people concerning their inclusion in the republic. On 27 July 1990 the Moldova Supreme Soviet examined the question "On a Study of the Requests of USSR People's Deputies and Other Appeals for the Creation of an Autonomy of the Gagauz People Within Moldova." The Moldova Supreme Soviet refused to grant an autonomy to the Gagauz people.

[Krasnopolskaya] What happened after that?

[Kalchu] A congress of deputies of village, settlement, rayon, and city soviets; people's deputies of the Moldova SSR; and people's deputies of the USSR took place on 19 August in the city of Komrat. About 800 people assembled. The congress announced the freedom and independence of the Gagauz people and proclaimed the Gagauz Republic an independent subject participating in the Union treaty. However, the government and the Moldova Supreme Soviet Presidium declared this ruling

anticonstitutional and banned the people's movement "Gagauz Khalky," even though this movement had nothing to do with organizing and conducting the Congress. In addition the procuracy, the KGB, and the Moldova Ministry of Internal Affairs were charged with instituting criminal proceedings against people's deputies, activists, and organizers of the congress.

[Krasnopol'skaya] Ilya Ivanovich, I have a question for you. So far as I know, no other such cases exist in legal practice.

[Karakash] That is correct. There have never been any criminal cases brought for the declaration of a republic or against people's deputies. In the mass media the leadership of the Moldova Republic constantly insists on the need to resolve disputes through dialogue and political methods. But these criminal cases are in direct contradiction with such statements.

[Krasnopol'skaya] Georgiy? How are you preparing to act?

[Kalchu] The congress has created a provisional committee that is carrying out the functions of republic government. It has been charged with organizing and conducting elections to the organs of state power of the Gagauz Republic.

[Krasnopol'skaya] You stubbornly insist on the existence of such a republic?

[Kalchu] Yes, it exists. The Gagauz Republic has received and continues to receive many congratulations from various social and political organizations, not only within the Soviet Union but abroad.

[Krasnopol'skaya] In your opinion, what is the cause of the existing situation?

[Kalchu] The Gagauz people, small in number, do not have their own state formation either in the Soviet Union or abroad. During the entire period of the existence of Soviet power, not even the most elementary conditions have been created for the Gagauz people to live as an ethnic group. Our culture, art, economy, have not developed.... Our traditions have begun to die out, and we are threatened with the loss of our native language.

[Krasnopol'skaya] Did Russification of the Gagauz take place?

[Kalchu] Of course. And now they want to replace Russification with Romanification. The program documents of the People's Front of Moldova mention achieving a further change of names and becoming the Romanian Republic of Moldova. However, the Gagauz wish to remain part of a renewed USSR.

[Krasnopol'skaya] Ilya Ivanovich? I have a question for you as an expert in legal questions. Representatives of the People's Front have come to power in the Republic of Moldova. Leaders of the people's movement also have

been elected to the soviets in the territories densely populated by Gagauz. It would seem that democracy exists in both places. Why can they not come to an agreement between themselves?

[Karakash] In the first place, I think that the people who have come to power do not have sufficient experience and political wisdom in the resolution of such complicated questions. I hope that with time such experience and wisdom will come. In the second place, representatives of the ethnic movements of the people's fronts do not know how to find compromises. Like life, we need compromise. Especially because the Moldavian, Gagauz, and other peoples who reside in that region have lived in peace and harmony for centuries. ***

SOYUZ information: According to the 1989 census, 197,768 Gagauz live in our country. There are 153,458 Gagauz living in the territory of Moldova and 31,967 in the territory of the Ukraine.

Caucasus

Armenian Communist Party Leader Addresses Congress
NC2709151590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
1630 GMT 25 Sep 90

[Report by unidentified correspondent from the Armenian Communist Party's 29th Congress at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee conference hall in Yerevan—recorded]

[Excerpts] Vladimir Movsisyan, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, opened the congress. [passage omitted] After a recess, the tricolor flag—the symbol of the independent statehood of Armenia—was brought into the hall upon delegates' demands. Vladimir Movsisyan delivered a report on the first point on the congress agenda. He said that the Armenian Communist Party has come to the congress saddled with grave problems. The critical situation in the party demands difficult choices. The emergence of divergent platforms within the party and the diverse political struggles for power are undermining the party's foundations and making its ideological and political position slacken. Such phenomena cause serious concern and anxiety for the fate of the party and the people. The developments in the republic are evolving at unusual speed. Only by working together with all the democratic forces in the republic could one hope that the party could renew itself and find its own niche in the present society. The crisis within the Armenian Communist Party developed not only because of the complex and tense situation, but above all because of the increasingly serious and acute crisis in the entire political structure throughout the country in general. Lately, there has been no shortage of praise for perestroika, for public reassessment of distant and past errors, and for promises about

the future. However, it is now time to make an assessment of the errors allowed during the perestroika period. Referring to this point Movsisyan said:

[Begin recording] Though it initiated perestroika, the CPSU failed to formulate a strategy for it in a profound and principled manner. [passage omitted] The absence of a correct political strategy by the Armenian Communist Party, the inconsistency in decisions and actions, and the Armenian Communist Party's inability to foresee the consequences of the decisions made and to mobilize the Communist forces created serious difficulties and problems for realizing the objectives and ideas of perestroika. The meaningless postponement of the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the absence of a political and legal assessment of the genocide of the Armenian population in Azerbaijan, and the refusal to recognize the refugee status of thousands of deported Armenians engendered a negative attitude toward the central government organs and the CPSU and generated anti-Russian feelings among certain groups. [passage omitted] The central issue to which the congress must provide an answer is how to renew the ideological and organizational principles of the Armenian Communist Party. The congress must also decide how to give the party a new democratic shape and spirit to enable it to genuinely serve the interests of the workers and of all the people. [passage omitted] There are sharp arguments over the status and name of the party. The solution to this fundamental problem is important for the party and the people. Therefore, the congress should solve these problems on the basis of the results of the all-party referendum. [passage omitted] In deciding upon the fate of the Armenian Communist Party, we must be wise and moderate, take into account the lessons of history, and proceed from not only the current complex situation but also from the existing status of the republic and the Union treaty to be signed by our republic. We must also be able to foresee the future. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the Communists, the Armenian Communist Party should be restructured as an independent party with its own program and regulations. The party restructuring should not be a mere face lift. The Armenian Communist Party must become a genuinely democratic and popular party imbued with the highest national interests. [words indistinct] In creating a really independent party we must restructure our relations with the CPSU. Instead of the sweeping and harsh centralism and absolute submission, we have to find a way to free cooperation, independence, equality, and mutual consent. All decisions of the CPSU that are incompatible with the national interest of the Armenian people are unacceptable to the Armenian Communist Party.

One of the most important issues before the renewed Armenian Communist Party will be the establishment of a dialogue and cooperation with the diaspora Armenian parties and movements for the sake of the national interest, in pursuance of the Armenian cause, and for the enhancement of relations between Armenia and the

diaspora. We must fully evaluate our economic legacy and must free ourselves from all sorts of ideological fables, in particular from the principles of Marxism-Leninism of the Stalin and Suslov variety. The declaration of Marxism-Leninism as the sole scientific view and political ideology not only serves to justify the conspicuous party failures but also alienates the Soviet people from international civilization and progress. [passage omitted] Hence, it is necessary to revise one's picture of socialism, which is based on the forcible command-administrative nationalization of private property. [passage omitted]

Comrades, at present the party acutely needs a new clear policy on the national problem. There has been an unprecedented exacerbation of interethnic relations in recent years. The distorted words of friendship and internationalism used for decades have crumbled, uncovering the bankruptcy of the declared successes and achievements of the CPSU's, quote, Leninist wise nationalities policy, unquote. In practice, that policy was often neither Leninist, nor, in particular, wise. Today the sad consequences of this policy are obvious to all. The present leadership and the Politburo of the CPSU failed to realize the significance of the nationalities question. The move by the population of Nagorno-Karabakh to defend its national self-determination and national dignity completely exposed the bankruptcy of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Government and of the CPSU. [passage omitted]

The disdainful disregard by the country's leaders of the various appeals and decisions made by the Armenian authorities, the conclusions of the authoritative commissions, and of the proposals and appeals made by the international organizations and public for a just political solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem convince us that the above-mentioned crimes committed against the Armenian people for over more than the last two and one-half years are being implemented with the tacit approval of the center and in complicity with the relevant Union ministries and departments. [passage omitted] Today, the situation in the republic is moving toward stability, but there are intentional efforts to create tension. The sides involved are trying to apply force to suppress the freedom-loving and daring people of Nagorno-Karabakh. [passage omitted] The republic's Communists firmly condemn the stance of the central authorities toward the matured national questions, in particular the self-determination question in Nagorno-Karabakh and the apartheid policy pursued by the leadership of Azerbaijan against the Armenian people. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Dzhanik Dzhanoyan, chairman of the auditing commission of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered an accounting report. Vaan Yeghizaryan, acting chief of the administrative affairs department of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report on the budget and property of the Armenian Communist Party.

An extensive exchange of views took place on the reports.

The congress also sent a cable to Viktor Ambardzumyan, Zori Balayan, Sos Sargisyan, Vachakan Grigoryan, and Semyon Babayan, who are on a political hunger strike in Moscow. While expressing their respect and support for their patriotic, daring, and self-sacrificing move, the delegates called on them to end the political hunger strike and to wage the struggle for our just cause by other means.

The 29th congress of the Armenian Communist Party will continue its deliberations tomorrow.

Military Commandant Restricts Entry to Baku

*LD2709165790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 27 Sep 90*

[Text] AZINFORM—TASS has reported that until 2 October entry into the capital of Azerbaijan by strangers has been restricted in connection with the worsening operational situation in the city.

A decision to that effect was taken by the city's military commandant, Colonel (Buniyaov), at the demand of the residents of Baku to cut short the shady dealings of strangers not engaged in socially useful work and in order to avoid—on the eve of the elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets—possible disruptions of law and order and of the normal labor rhythm in the republic's capital, and other undesirable excesses.

In today's republican newspapers the commandant provides information about instigatory and provocative escapades by extremists and about attempts by informal organizations to stage events which run counter to state of emergency rules. The restrictions do not apply to those sent on a mission to the capital of Azerbaijan nor to those who arrived here for family celebrations and funeral services. The commandant gave the residents of Baku the assurance that their rights and security will be ensured in accordance with the law. Everything possible will be done in order for the elections to take place in a democratic basis in the conditions of glasnost and expression of free will.

Demonstrations Held in Stepanakert 25 Sep

*NC2809095190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1730 GMT 25 Sep 90*

[Text] The all-Union radio reports that nearly 7,000 people participated in a demonstration in Stepanakert on 25 September. Large groups of people gathered in Lenin Square and along the roads leading to it. The demonstrators carried placards with slogans against the central government organs, the Nagorno-Karabakh Organization Committee, and the commandant's headquarters of the state of emergency regime in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and its adjacent rayons.

Earlier, a clandestine radio station called on the people to take part in the rally. Leaflets prepared by a (?secret) organization [not further identified] were distributed in the city. They encouraged the people to resist civil war, the Nagorno-Karabakh Organization Committee, and the commandant's headquarters of the state of emergency regime.

Establishments and organizations did not open for work on that day. Schools and training establishments suspended lessons. However, the explanatory work carried out by the commandant's headquarters and the Nagorno-Karabakh Organization Committee among the people was effective and the protests gradually subsided.

The demonstration did not last for as long as was planned.

Azerbaijan Introduces Food, Goods Restrictions

*PM2609124190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 First Edition p 1*

[INTERFAX report under general heading: "Telephone-Teletype-Telefax"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Trade Ministry collegium has deemed it necessary to sell goods in stores only to people living on the republic's territory. Trade Minister Agaslim Bagirov reported in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent that quotas are also being introduced in the republic for the sale of food and some nonfood goods to each person. A. Bagirov also reported that the Ministry of Communications, the Azerbaijan railroad administration, and the Caspian Maritime Steamship Company are taking steps to prevent the export of consumer goods from the republic.

TASS Views Azerbaijan Pre-Election Scene

*LD2709193590 Moscow TASS in English 1906 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[By AZERINFORM-TASS correspondents Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Natan Barskiy]

[Text] Baku 27 September TASS—The socio-political situation in Azerbaijan on the eve of the September 30 elections to the republican Supreme Soviet and local councils of people's deputies has been strained not only by the state of emergency but also by the continuing inter-ethnic conflict with neighbouring Armenia.

Along with communists and non-party people, two hundred and fifteen representatives of the Democratic Bloc contend for 350 parliament seats.

Democratic Bloc representatives include leaders and members of the Popular Front, among them many leaders of the front, representatives of the Social Democratic group, the Ecological Union, the Greens Movement and other informal organizations.

Ninety per cent of 1,185 registered candidates to run for the republican parliament have a higher education and almost every fourth of them has a scientific degree.

The number of workers and farmers among candidates is almost a third less than previously, just as the number of women and young people. There are 278 leaders of party, local-government, trade union and Young Communist League agencies on the candidates' lists.

Almost all first secretaries of district party committees, and leaders of local councils and law enforcement agencies will contest seats in parliament.

Colonel Valeriy Buniyatov, military commandant of Baku, stated in the press today that everything possible will be done for the elections to be held on a democratic basis under conditions of openness and free expression of voters' will.

Azerbaijan Hosts FRG Socialist Youth Delegation

NC2609161690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1730 GMT 21 Sep 90

[Text] A delegation composed of the young socialists of the Western [Garbi] Westphalia region visited Azerbaijan for nine days. The delegation arrived in our republic in accordance with the agreement reached between the republic's youth organizations—that is, the Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]—and the young socialists organization of the Social Democratic Party in the FRG for the establishment of uninterrupted ('bilateral') relations.

The members of the visiting delegation met with Sahip Alekperov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, and visited the spiritual administration center of the Muslims in the Transcaucasus, the [word indistinct] center, the [word indistinct] historical and cultural center, and the Azerbaijan history museum. They also traveled to Sheki and Zagataly.

Observers Invited to October Georgian Elections

LD2609101790 Moscow World Service in Russian
0930 GMT 26 Sep 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day By Day" program]

[Text] International observers have been invited to the parliamentary elections in Georgia which are to be held at the end of October. For the first time these will be on a multi-party basis: 35 parties and movements are taking part in the election campaign. Republican Foreign Affairs Minister Georgiy Dzhavakhashvili told the INTERFAX agency that Georgia is expecting foreign lawyers and also parliamentarians from West European countries as observers.

Forthcoming Elections in Georgia Previewed

LD2709225490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1145 GMT 27 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Eduard Ediberidze]

[Text] Tbilisi, 27 Sep (TASS)—National Congress elections are to take place on 30 September on the initiative of the opposition parties in Georgia, one of the three Transcaucasian republics. Almost all the sociopolitical organizations and parties in the republic, including the democratic grouping [demokraticheskaya fraktsiya] of the Communist Party, will take part in the elections. According to the organizers of this undertaking, the future congress should become a consolidator of the national liberation movement and a means of monitoring the actions of the official state bodies. This is the main difference of the republic supreme soviet congress which will have its elections on 28 October.

The elections to the congress that are to be conducted without the support of the official authorities have aroused special interest in the republic. The most influential parties with realistic chances of winning seats in the congress have set up election blocs. These are the National Democratic and Democratic Parties of Georgia and the National Independence Party and its allies.

One of the blocs is made up of the parties of the liberal stand which will also take part in the supreme soviet elections. The democratic grouping of the Georgian Communist Party, as well as the candidates from the Georgian League of Citizens, uniting those who have effectively rejected their Soviet citizenship, will run for the elections separately.

As far as the attitude of the future congressmen to the supreme soviet elections is concerned, according to observers the tactics of boycotting them are continuing, although the boycott is not of an ultimatum-like character. Moreover, the opposition parties have dropped their previous ban on the participation of their supporters in the elections to the future parliament.

'Stalin' Party Causes Political Turmoil in Georgia

PM2809085590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Sep 90 p 1

[Report by own correspondent N. Mikeladze under "Week's Events" rubric: "Is 'Stalin' in With a Chance?"]

[Text] Tbilisi—This is about Stalinists. Very real Stalinists, from the Georgian political organization "Stalin."

From the moment it made its first appearance by the monument in Gori and talked about plans to create a world Communist Party, about a global Stalinist appeal to join the Communist Party and the Komsomol, and so forth, this organization has been assured of operatic fame. General Dzhordzhadze did not previously figure among the political leaders whose popularity can be judged from time to time by public opinion polls.

But now there has been an unexpected turn of events. Barely had the election campaign begun than "Stalin" reminded people of its presence by applying for registration to the Central Electoral Commission. The commission, which is mainly composed of members of the opposition, refused to register the "Stalin" organization on the grounds that it conducts its activity in line with the program and statutes of another party—the CPSU—and does not recognize all the requirements of the USSR Constitution and the Georgian Constitution. In short, it is at variance with the republic's law on multiparty elections.

The "Stalin" organization appealed to the Georgian Supreme Court. The court reached its verdict within the prescribed time: "Stalin" will take part in the elections.

You might think this is a strange question, but it has to be asked: Does this organization have a chance? Let us see. There are the old men—those who so sweetly calm hotheaded youth by saying: Young men, it is too late for us to live our lives differently. So they are the first possibility. Then there are people on the "downwave" caused by unfulfilled promises of a better life. They are the second possibility. And finally, there are dissidents from the new morality who can instill respect in some people. After all, unlike everyone else they have not rushed to trample underfoot what was yesterday fervently idolized....

This could just be an amusing incident. But representatives of the most diverse political strata have their misgivings. A party only has to secure four percent of the vote to be represented in parliament.

Some of the opposition have set up camp outside the doors of the Georgian Supreme Court carrying banners demanding that the court's decision be reversed and its chairman resign.

None of the present authorities or their opponents have ever been in such a difficult situation as multiparty elections before and have no experience of this. They are learning methods of political struggle—methods known to all kinds of people but not to us—as they go along.

The same electoral commission refused to register another 11 organizations, and the same Supreme Court restored the rights of six of them.

The Union of National Accord and Rebirth, which was formed quite recently as a sociopolitical organization of the creative, scientific, and technical intelligentsia, has also failed to get through the electoral commission's net at the first attempt. But as I am sure you realize, it has very great potential. Once again, the official reason given by the electoral commission is that the union's activity and program do not comply with the electoral law. Unofficially, however, the opposition seems to be more concerned with the nomenklatura nature of the organization and "Communist Party maneuvers."

Rejecting these allegations V. Advadze, chairman of the union board and USSR people's deputy, recently said in particular that more than 20 members of the board have left the CPSU....

In this situation, it is difficult at present to say anything for sure. You could agree with the opposition—the Georgian Union of National Accord and Rebirth certainly does have its fair share of functionaries past and present. On the other hand, the intelligentsia's "self-determination" undoubtedly puts the Communist Party—which had been counting on big names—in a more difficult position. I recently read these lines in a Central Committee address to the republic's Communists and people: "The Georgian Communist Party is coming under particularly frenzied attack from those people who just yesterday were members of this party themselves and formed its now nonexistent nomenklatura. It would be interesting to know how they have managed to clear themselves so quickly...."

In short, a battle is being waged for power, people's minds, and seats in parliament. A battle is also being waged against parliament: The political parties that are boycotting the elections are driving radio-equipped buses around Tbilisi, agitating in the rayons, and appearing in the press.... The machinery of pluralism has caused new emotions to spill out into the streets.

It is a pity that this has not been reflected in the stores as well....

Central Asia

Ethnic Tensions Persist in Alma-Ata

PM2809084190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by V. Ardayev under "IZVESTIYA Correspondents on Events in Country" rubric: "Rally in Alma-Ata"]

[Text] The capital of Kazakhstan remains tense following the explosion that occurred 19 September at the entrance to a Kazakh school.

All this time School No. 145 has been at a virtual standstill—most parents are not letting their children go to lessons. School No. 45, which teaches in Russian and is located in the same building, has not interrupted its studies.

Last Saturday a citywide rally took place in the square in front of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences Presidium building. The several hundred assembled people were joined by a crowd of Kazakh youths which came here in a column along the city's central streets. They sang songs and carried banners written in Kazakh and Russian: "We Will Not Give Up an Inch of Kazakhstan's Land!" "We Will Not Let Kazakhstan Be Torn Apart!" "My People, Prepare To Defend Your Land!" "Turkestan for the Turks!"

"Expel Chauvinists Golovko, Vasilyeva, Petrushenko (USSR people's deputies from East Kazakhstan Oblast—V.A.) From Kazakhstan!"....

Little was said about the school explosion itself at the rally. A series of speakers protested the publication in the central press of A. Solzhenitsyn's article "How We Should Modernize Russia" which contains, in their opinion, "provocative fabrications regarding claims on Kazakhstan's territory."

A call to evict IZVESTIYA's own correspondent in Alma-Ata from Kazakhstan was also voiced at the rally. These voices appeared after IZVESTIYA's publication of the piece "Explosion in School" (No. 264), which somebody in informal national movement circles for some reason considered an attack on the Kazakh people's right to have their own schools, although this in no way follows from the text. V. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, advised rallygoers' representatives to demand the correspondent's recall during a meeting with them the day before.

But other voices were heard at the rally. Thus the informal M. Yeleusizov and S. Duvanov, leader of the Kazakh Social Democratic Party, spoke out sharply against such methods of bringing pressure to bear on journalists.

Kazakhstan Abolishes Daylight Savings Time

LD2809031290 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh
1400 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Having considered the request and wishes of the working people, trade unions and organizations, and the necessary resolution of the State Commission for Unified Time and Standard Hours of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] has abolished summer time in the territory of Kazakhstan as of 30 September of this year. At 0300 on that day, the clock hands will be moved back one hour. Beginning in 1991 in the Kazakh SSR, within the framework of the time regulations, the clock hands should not be moved ahead one hour in the summertime each year. In other words, no introduction of summer time! The oblast executive committee, the Alma-Ata and Leninskiy city committees, together with the ministries and departments, institutions, organizations and enterprises, have been instructed to alter the timetable of their work where appropriate.

Soviet of Nationalities Examines Events in Osh

LD2609225590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 Sep (TASS)—Today there was a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities in the Kremlin.

The sitting examined the question of events in Osh oblast, Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], which

occurred in summer this year. A report was made on this by People's Deputy G.K. Kryuchkov, leader of a group of USSR People's Deputies who studied the situation in situ in Osh oblast at the instruction of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

An appropriate decision, which will be published, has been adopted on this question.

Radio Tajikistan To Carry "Voice of Aryan" Program

LD2609194390 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik
1600 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Dear radio listeners: As we reported previously Radio Tajikistan aims to improve and increase the [word indistinct] and information for Tajiks living outside the territory of Tajikistan. For this purpose it has prepared a series of interesting programs. We decided to call the program Saday-i Aryan [The Voice of Aryan]. This radio program will be transmitted from the Soviet Union republic centers. On 27 September the Voice of Aryan program will be transmitted live at 1500 [0800 GMT] from the cities of Bukhara and Dushanbe via the first program.

Dear listeners, you can participate in the preparation of the [word indistinct] and the topics of the program. The telephone numbers of the "Voice of Aryan" studios are 277457 and 277307 and they are at your service.

Turkmenistan's First Secretary Niyazov Interviewed

PM2709104190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Interview with S.A. Niyazov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, and chairman of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, by M. Volkov: "Seeking the Path to Accord"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—[Volkov] The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] is characterized today by stable interethnic relations and public opinion is not agitated by rallies, strikes, and informal movements. The republic's inhabitants associate this primarily with the activities of the Turkmen Communist Party. How do you assess the situation, Saparmurad Atayevich? Please tell us about the party organizations' work experience.

[Niyazov] Unfortunately it is not all plain sailing with us either, so I want to adjust the picture significantly so that PRAVDA readers do not get the impression that all the problems have been solved in Turkmenia and it is resting on its laurels. We have the usual number of difficulties typical of a republic that is rich in raw materials and shows rapid demographic growth. Take Tashauz Oblast which is in the Aral Sea region. The entire territory is a social disaster area.

Another question, and one that often crops up but that is not always complimentary as far as our people are

concerned: How can they tolerate the situation, they must indeed be slothful.... I then respond with the following question: How could such a people have raised the world's fastest thoroughbred—the akhaltekinets? So let us not be hasty with our conclusions and think a while. Every people has its own distinctive features. But peoples are similar in one respect: No people lack skill and talent, no people lack an ethnic culture based on traditional morality and self-respect. And another thing: No people is indifferent to its children's future. I believe it was for the children's sake that the talents of our ancestors, forced to obtain not only food but beauty as well in harsh nomadic conditions, were honed. Indeed, the people's morality was forged in conditions of a fight for life in which valor and courage, decency and nobility, and keeping one's word were more valuable than gold.

Our poet Makhtumkuli had a great talent, great primarily because he was in tune with the people's soul. Today's reverence of his genius is a distinctive manifestation of the people's vibrant moral memory, inseparable from the ideals of reason, good, and justice. And this flush of ethnic self-awareness is the direct result of perestroika which our people sincerely believe in.

Now that history itself has brought us to an awareness of the issue of ownership as an issue of a specific human need, it is easy to appreciate the nature of our former inactivity. The system was evil and ruthless in separating people from their interests, it wrapped itself around the deepest strings of their hearts and deadened them. But we still ask the question: Why do our horses lose their speed and stop, where is the old aroma of our world-famous melons, why are the colors of the carpets dull, and why is the sound of the dutar [string instrument] not so resonant?

The talent is not drying up, it is the people's patience that is drying up. You ask why our people's patience has not dried up then? I do not want to be too hasty here. Indeed, the Turkmen people are typically patient, forgiving, and respectful of their neighbors. These qualities are rooted in the distant past. Having realized through their moral sense what ethnic arrogance can do, the Turkmen did not allow this conflagration to break out in their republic. But now that these conflagrations are raging in a number of regions, they see that they were right in the first place, and are increasingly sure that this must not be allowed to happen.

You ask what policy does my argument represent? What role does the republic's Communist Party play, and is it so great if the people themselves understand everything? I believe it is all interrelated. We would not have what we have today if we had not quickly arranged a dialogue with the people; if we had not touched the strings of their hearts that respond to kind words and effective participation; if we had not prepared their minds to take on board the complex, contradictory processes of perestroika. This is how we saw our role and our mission. We

turned to the elders—our wise men—for help and support, and henceforth the republican Council of Elders will be the compass by which we will gauge our actions.

[Volkov] PRAVDA wrote about your meetings with the leaders of Uzbekistan—R. Nishanov and then I. Karimov—in border areas, in the Turkmen border area where Uzbeks live and in Uzbek border areas where Turkmen live, and about the subsequent measures adopted by the neighboring republics' governments—ethnic schools and newspapers were opened, radio and television channels began to broadcast in ethnic languages, and so on. Can these meetings now be called fruitful?

[[Niyazov] Indeed! But the party organizations are responsible for the bulk of the work; they have concluded friendship treaties between neighboring oblasts, cities, and rayons; they are strictly adhering to them and are cooperating closely. The Iolotanskiy Rayon party organization has accumulated some instructive experience. There are tens of thousands of Baluchi—immigrants from Afghanistan—in the rayon, they have equal representation in leading bodies, and their children were recently given the opportunity to study their mother tongue.

[Volkov] Even so, recently it was you, was it not, who effectively removed the rayon leadership....

[Niyazov] Right. The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee took a tough line on the leading Communists in the rayon who had been turning a blind eye to the falsification of cotton figures. As you can see, the one does not prevent the other unfortunately.... But we have not tolerated and will not tolerate any deviation from the norms of party life. Maybe that is why the Turkmen Communist Party's stock is so high in the republic. Many people here remember the 1986 Central Committee sixth plenum when I and my colleagues, who had only just joined the leadership, had to take an unusual decision: to expel from the party four comrades who were secretaries of the Tashauz Party Oblast Committee [obkom], including the first secretary and the oblast soviet executive committee chairman. But there was no other way: The oblast inhabitants' problems were snowballing while the leadership was thinking only about its own well-being, and was engaged in deception, not unselfishly at that.

We declared war on negative phenomena in the party and waged an offensive against passivity and inertia. By the time of our 24th congress 13 Central Committee Bureau members or candidate members had been replaced and 188 oblast, city, and rayon committee secretaries—63 of them first secretaries—had been voted out. At the same time, we are actively rehabilitating communists who were subjected to unwarranted repressions. And we are doing all this in an atmosphere of glasnost.

Anyway, glasnost is helping a great deal, above all to stabilize the situation. We cannot imagine a time when

we did not use such splendid means of communication with the population as the press, radio, and television. Direct broadcasts of speeches by republic, oblast, and ministry and department leaders—with feedback from the public—have become a tradition. They help prevent emotions from overheating and they have developed into an effective means of communicating with the population, although of course they are no substitute for actual meetings in collectives and in cities and villages which we particularly value. Without engendering any undesirable processes and sentiments, we have declared Turkmen the state language, we have adopted a wide-ranging declaration on sovereignty, and we have made the rights of citizens of other nationalities law.

[Volkov] Both Communists and nonparty people expected a great deal of the 28th CPSU Congress. However, the assessment of its work was not unanimous. In particular, there were many critical opinions: It failed to justify hopes and it failed to bring about a breakthrough in the renewal of the party and its democratization. What do you personally see as the main results of the congress? How are these results reflected in the Turkmen Communist Party's work?

[Niyazov] Society's reactions to the congress results varied—it would be odd, to say the least, if it had been any different. Remember the first Congress of People's Deputies; one of its merits was the fact that it provided an objective template of society. I would cite the same analogy in the case of the 28th congress—it mirrored the party and its problems and sensitive areas. It was as if we were standing back and looking at ourselves, seeing all our shortcomings. This in itself is a good thing.

By and large, you know, I am rather wary about our general tendency always to give mutually exclusive assessments of everything and to seek some kind of absolute. After all, any of life's norms will contain bad and good; that is natural. The rejection of the congress results by opponents both on the right and on the left I see as a maximalist, dogmatic tendency to seek a result at the outset without comparing the causes and the consequences. Given the crisis in society and in the party, how could one expect the congress to come up with decisions that would immediately put our life on the right, democratic road? That is both demagogic and utopian.

Not to see, not to recognize the evolutionary leap forward in all that is taking place around us and to regard perestroika as a failed experiment is to destroy the first shoots of democracy and freedom, without which we can transform neither politics nor economy nor morals. I am convinced, too, that the congress gave powerful momentum to the regrouping of the party on a healthy, constructive basis. This took place in a very complex ideological and psychological struggle and I am sincerely amazed that people should have tried to deny the congress life's breath, albeit labored.

I think the main result is that the congress established the tactics for party actions in conditions of real democracy,

of a federation undergoing renewal, of autonomous Union republic Communist Parties. How did this affect our work? In the first place we obtained theoretical and psychological support for the independent quest and steps we had undertaken before. We saw that blindly borrowing someone else's experience could be disastrous for a people that has its own specific path of development and its own national characteristics. The belief has grown that the party is a powerful regulator of the mood of the masses and it does not need direct authority to be able to control this mood. But as I said before, we are seeking and will continue to seek methods and forms of work. Recently the Central Committee Bureau decided to elaborate Turkmen Communist Party programmatic and normative documents which will incorporate a conceptual analysis of the republic's ethnic and historical conditions and provide clear political guidelines for the practical activity of party committees and primary party organizations in the new conditions. At the same time, we take it as read that each republic Communist Party's autonomy is not only its right but also its duty, a very important factor that enables it to be a real ideological and political force in its republic. The genuine autonomy of the Union republic Communist Parties does not contradict internationalism but is inseparable from it. I believe that it is an essential condition of their voluntary, lasting, and effective cooperation. With the election of the first secretaries of Union republic Communist Party Central Committees as members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo—and this is not an office, but a form of representation of republic Communist Parties in the CPSU—a collaboration mechanism at party level has appeared, which I hope will make it possible to regulate federative processes on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

[Volkov] People sounded off at the congress about the conservatism of a large number of delegates and there was even talk of a conservative majority. And it is no secret that some speakers made clear hints that such trends are particularly strong among the Communists of the Central Asian republics. How do you regard such opinions? How would you describe the struggle between the so-called conservative and radical forces in the CPSU?

[Niyazov] It seems wrong to me even to attempt to portray the Central Asian region as some ethnic monolith wherein all the strands of life are woven into one. Were it so, hotbeds of interethnic dissension would probably not have arisen in the region and we, the republics' leaders, would not have had to sit down at the negotiating table to tackle problems to do with mutual ties and seek potential mutually advantageous agreements. Each republic has its own approach to the sovereignty issue, but I am convinced that these approaches are much more realistic and constructive than conservative. One thing certainly brings us together—a desire to continue our development in a united, renewed Union.

I would not want to introduce a disparaging note into the concept of "conservative forces," as is often done. I saw

at the congress that it is not the fault but the misfortune of many Communists that they are backward in their thinking and their political culture is inadequate. I said this in my speech, incidentally. And if people slowly but sincerely see the light, and I believe this happened to many at the congress, it means there is a healthy movement in the party.

I do not think the conservatives from our region are very different from their fellows in other republics. After all, conservatism is a way of thinking. And should people be pilloried for that? What you should do is change their minds, reeducate them, and bring them over to your side; that is the task of the party's progressive forces. I count among them all the Communists who are endowed with the courage of realism, who in terms of being constructive go much further than the most left-wing radicals, not to mention the conservatives.

As for their struggle it is rooted, as far as I can see, not in principled approaches to the fundamental values of socialism—and this too was mentioned at the congress—but in that same dogmatic methodology and inability to distinguish the possible from the real. I believe that representatives of both currents are in the grip of an illusion, in the grip of myths and dogmas, and the quicker they acquire a real perception of life, the better it will be both for the party and for the people whose interests they purport to defend.

By and large I do not see anything unnatural or dangerous to our multimillion strong party. We have gotten out of the habit, or rather have not gotten into the habit of living and working in conditions of competition, healthy practical, and intellectual rivalry. I think time will sort things out and in real multiparty conditions we will acquire both culture and civilized political democracy.

[Volkov] The party has relinquished the functions of power and you have already stressed that. To all appearances, the process of growing into the new "clothes" is not all that painful in party organizations and the "division" of power with the soviets is not leading to serious confrontation. But the market and the realities of sovereignty lie in store, so how does the republic's Communist Party intend to uphold its vanguard role in these conditions?

[Niyazov] The work of our Supreme Soviet, which has done a truly massive amount of work in such a short time—from the adoption of vitally important decisions on maternity and child care and supply of gas and drinking water to the populace to the approval of republican state sovereignty—gives an idea of the totality of legislative and executive power that has been transferred to it. The task is to activate these levers at local level, in the sticks where, as is known, the new ways are struggling to establish themselves, encountering problems of a psychological nature. In some places you find stereotypes of the old approaches, so we are not that surprised when we hear what kind of method a party

committee or executive committee is using to protect its powers from the soviet. They take things to absurd lengths, to having separate tables and chairs—alas, these are features of yesterday's authorities. I do not think the party-command syndrome has been completely eliminated at the top levels of the party.

At the last Supreme Soviet session we came to the conclusion that it was advisable to combine the posts of soviet chairman and party committee secretary. We are introducing this practice at the level of rural and rayon soviets, and in time when we have gotten to grips with the party's programmatic documents, we will introduce it higher up.

Our main task at the moment, though, is to help cadres appreciate that the delimitation of functions is not an end in itself, but a vital necessity that arises out of the realities of the rule-of-law state.

The market, the sovereignty of the republics, and the renewed Federation—they are all components of a single concept. It is called progress. Identifying, detecting, anticipating any new trend in order to explain it to the people in good time and stir their creative energies—what is this if not a vanguard mission?

[Volkov] How do you understand the "renewed Federation" concept? To what extent, in your view, should it and can it contribute to the real progress you have just talked about? Are the steps the republic is taking to acquire autonomy an example of this—of creative movement?

[Niyazov] Historically our country has found progress hard-going. Therefore, for all my optimism I would not presume to believe that the renewed Federation we will have as soon as we have prepared the relevant documents is going to solve the whole mound of problems in an instant. The creation of the Federation must be regarded as a process, and only then will we avoid extremes.

It should not be forgotten how different the republic's starting points are. The rule-of-law foundation of the Federation under renewal is extremely important in these diverse conditions. The Union Treaty will be both a means of strengthening the republics' mutual interest in preserving and developing the country and a mechanism for solving the Federation's acute problems. Otherwise there can be no question of any progress. We will sink into a morass of endless dovetailing and coordination, and engender unprecedented egoism and confrontation. The country's president has an infinitely greater role to perform here.

By and large I believe that despite the crisis in the country the objective prerequisites now exist for the transition to the new qualitative state. Albeit by trial and error, we have gotten round to building a state in which internationalism will be transformed from an abstract political and ideological principle into an expression of real economic, political, and cultural ties and interests.

That is my answer to the first part of your question. As for the republic's role in this process, we want to join the Union as a strong and reliable partner, and this above all we see as the means and condition of our autonomy. The republic possesses very rich natural resources, its territory is enormous, and there are thousands of threads linking it to the rest of the country. All this is our potential, not to mention the people. We are arranging links with Union republics and foreign partners and are preparing for market relations. We believe, moreover, that at the initial stage they must be socially guaranteed because developing the market and, at the same time, curbing its vagaries is a humanitarian consideration. And this is part and parcel of progress.

A common morality and mutual trust and respect must also be introduced into the new relations—what people would not welcome this?

UN Environmental Experts Visit Aral Sea

PM2709090990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1

[PRAVDA-TASS-INTERFAX report under general heading: "Telephone, Teletype, Telefax"]

[Text] A group of experts from the UN Environment Program (UNEP) has arrived in the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Soviet scientists and their colleagues from the United States, Britain, France, Japan, Poland, and Kenya spent several days at the epicenter of an ecological disaster—the Aral Sea and rayons of the autonomous republic adjacent to it. The UNEP experts were invited to help in elaborating a plan of actions to preserve the Aral Sea. Is it not too late?